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ABSTRACT
In the two decades between 1954 and 1974» the State of
Louisiana progressed from a closed, white-dominated society
to an open, multi-racial society with legal safeguards in
place to assure equal protection and equal opportunity for
all residents regardless of race or color.

Prior to I960,

the vast majority of blacks were unable to vote, serve on
juries, buy homes in decent neighborhoods, use publiclyowned facilities or frequent hotels, restaurants and other
public accommodations.

In addition to these humiliations,

they were required to utilize inadequate "separate but
equal" public parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, schools,
waiting areas and correctional facilities until the mid-

1960's.
Most of the state's segregated institutions were deseg
regated between 1964 and 1969.

The major desegregation

battle was fought in public elementary and secondary
schools.

As the 1960's came to a close, the foundations had

been laid for the creation of unitary school systems, deseg
regation of correctional facilities and prohibition of
racial discrimination in housing and employment.
With the dawn of the 1970's, a more conservative mood
swept the nation, but a more progressive decade began in
Louisiana.

Although the enigma of a dual system of higher
ix
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education continued to escape resolution and discrimination
continued in employment and housing, the political arena was
brighter for blacks.

They were voting in large numbers and

thus were able to secure the election of local and state
candidates who were less hostile to black aspirations.

In

1971, a coalition of black and Cajun votes was able to elect
a liberal, populist governor.

Once the new administration

assumed office in 1972, existing segregation statutes were
repealed, and in the following year, a new constitution was
written with guarantees of equality and equal protection for
all citizens of the state.
By 1974, de jure segregation was dead and blacks had
the means to assure that its demise was permanent.

Although

the thornier issue of de facto segregation remained
unresolved, there was hope and promise that it, too, would
be eradicated one day.

x
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Like other Southern states, Louisiana was reluctant to
relinquish its antiquated system of racial segregation prior
to 1954.

The legal or de jure means by which the state

enforced its more than a century-old custom of separating
white and black Louisianians resulted in blacks being
accorded less than second-class citizenship.

Virtually all

elements of political, economic and social life were segre
gated, first by custom and then by law.

After 1954, the

intense resistance of state and local government officials
to federal assaults on legal segregation left Washington
with no other recourse than to impose comprehensive demands
upon the state, in order to compel Louisiana's white citi
zens to comply with the mandates of the United States
Const itution.
The purpose of this study is to review and analyze the
dismantling of de jure segregation within the State of
Louisiana between 1954 and 1974.

In order to clarify the

situation that existed in Louisiana at the time of the first
Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, the history of
racial discrimination by statutory means is first summarized
from the post-Reconstruction era to the mid-twentieth
1
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century.

The major portion of the study next addresses the

numerous legal artifices devised by state segregationists to
resist increasing federal pressure to eliminate all vestiges
of de jure racial segregation in Louisiana.

Note is taken

of the de facto basis upon which segregation and discrimi
nation also existed by custom, but which was more difficult
to erase.

By 1974, most active resistance to desegregation

in Louisiana had disappeared, although lingering vestiges of
the old system remained in evidence.

Therefore, it was

necessary occasionally to extend the study past 1974, for
the sake of continuity and completeness.
Immediately following the Civil War, the defeated South
briefly and unrealistically resumed many of its antebellum
practices, attempting to negate the results of Union vic
tory.

However, the imposition of Radical Reconstruction in

1868, brought forth an attempt to create a fair and equi
table political system in which freed black slaves would
become citizens and receive equal treatment before the law.
Most white Democrats intensely resisted Radical rule, and it
was apparent that the reality of civil equality for blacks
might be ephemeral, and might not survive the Radical state
regime.

With the end of Radical Reconstruction in Louisiana

in 1877, black gains were placed in jeopardy when the
"Redeemers" or "Bourbons" replaced the former Republican
regime.

Most visible signs of black social equality with

whites were quickly erased, although the state's Democratic
leaders refrained from overt acts of legal discrimination
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that might provoke reactions from the federal government.
However, as national public opinion and federal courts pro
gressively showed less concern about black equality, and as
the courts dismantled both constitutional and statutory
guarantees of black equality, the state's leaders took their
cue and codified what had already existed in custom and
practice in a de facto system of racial segregation.

By

1954, the state's racially segregated system was firmly
entrenched by law and had entered all facets of life.
The first Brown case had a major impact on the segre
gated systems of the Southern states.

Although it was orig

inally applied only to public school systems, Brown later
became a symbol and standard for the federal government in
its determination to abolish de jure segregation "root and
branch."

The decision at the time did not stir the people

of Louisiana to immediate action and concern, because there
was no visible sign of its immediate application to local
conditions.

However, the implications of its decision were

not lost on strict adherents to the status quo, and their
strength and numbers rose gradually to lead the fight
against desegregation with every means at their disposal,
legal or otherwise.
During the 1950's, the South witnessed a major intru
sion into its local affairs by federal courts to enforce the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The courts,

for example, came to oppose racially discriminatory voter
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registration procedures, and the systematic exclusion of
blacks from state juries in Louisiana.

In addition, the

courts provided blacks a modest victory in higher education
and interstate transit during the early 1950's.

By the mid

dle of the decade, however, Louisiana's leaders began to dig
in their heels and adopted a defensive strategy of "legis
late and litigate," to keep the federal judiciary at bay and
to postpone indefinitely the possibility of massive integra
tion.

By the end of the decade, obsession with the race

issue had permeated Louisiana white society, and came to
dominate the next two gubernatorial elections of 1959-60 and
1963-64.

As the 1950's came to a close, many of the state's

white leaders and ordinary citizens braced for an all-out
battle to defend racial segregation, regardless of the
consequences.
Efforts by state segregation leaders to halt action by
the federal courts reached their zenith during the battle to
desegregate New Orleans public schools in I960.

The defeat

of Louisiana segregationists in that encounter resulted in a
permanent rent in the fabric of school segregation, and they
were never again able to command such support or attention
from the majority of the people of the state.

Thereafter,

the fight to retain segregation was conducted at the local
level as desegregation spread gradually from one locality to
another.
During the early 1960's, peaceful demonstrations spread
across the South as black college students, stirred by a
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sense of racial pride and outrage at injustice, helped to
awaken anger and concern among people elsewhere in the
nation.

When the Southern states, including Louisiana,

responded to these nonviolent protests with arbitrary force
and enactment of measures to stifle peaceful expression of
protest, pressure was brought to bear on the executive and
legislative branches to take remedial action.

At the same

time, federal courts launched additional assaults on the de
jure system of racial segregation and assisted the demon
strators by striking down numerous state and federal court
decisions which had supported arrests conducted under arbi
trary and discriminatory state laws.

The courts also

expanded their views on the selection of an impartial jury,
but.were hesitant to interfere in trial procedures unless a
clear case of discrimination could be proven by the defend
ant .
The eradication of de jure segregation was given a tre
mendous boost in the mid-1960's by comprehensive federal
legislation and aggressive executive and judicial actions.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed private acts of dis
crimination in public accommodations, as well as in all pro
grams receiving federal funds, while the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 restored the right of Southern blacks to register
and vote.

At the same time, federal courts began to force

each public school system in Louisiana to begin at least
limited desegregation of its educational institutions under
a freedom of choice plan, and completed the process of
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desegregating the state's colleges and universities.

By

1965, however, blacks demonstrated impatience with the slow
progress toward total desegregation and became increasingly
militant in their protests against racial injustice.

Scat

tered areas within the state became the scenes of ugly dem
onstrations between whites and blacks, and state officials
began to perceive a noticeable change in the federal courts
thereafter, when life and property were placed in jeopardy.
Federal efforts in behalf of blacks peaked in the late
1960's as Congress and the courts culminated their respec
tive efforts in protecting civil rights and assisting blacks
as equals within American society.

Congress registered its

opposition to housing discrimination in 1968, while the
Johnson Administration energetically enforced federal laws
protecting black rights.

However, the victory of Richard

Nixon that year, in a campaign denouncing federal "excesses"
in behalf of civil rights, was an ill omen for continued
federal vigor in this field.
During the Nixon Administration, 1969-74, the executive
branch adopted a "go slow" policy toward further desegrega
tion.

In effect, it attempted to freeze black gains in the

South, unless there was substantial evidence of blatant
racial discrimination through de jure means.

However, the

federal courts remained vigilant, ordering the immediate end
of all dual education systems in 1969.

As the Supreme Court

became afterward less aggressive in its views on civil
rights, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became more so,
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taking an active role in the desegregation process.

By the

end of 1970, the remainder of the dual public school systems
were brought to an end in Louisiana, and except for a few
scattered pockets of resistance, de jure segregation had
been terminated in elections, education, public facilities,
transit, public accommodations, family relations, employment
and housing.
With most of the legal obstacles to blacks removed by
1970, the concern of the federal government shifted to elim
inating lingering effects of de jure segregation, as well as
examining de facto situations to determine if they did not
indeed result from the previous systematic legal program of
racial discrimination.

The federal government also shifted

attention from segregation in the South to segregation in
the northern and western parts of the nation, and on the use
of busing as a means of achieving a more equitable racial
balance in segregated school systems.

As a result, the

Southern states were once again permitted to conduct their
own affairs, unless substantial evidence was offered to sub
stantiate an allegation of lingering racial discrimination.
By 1972, the mood in Louisiana had undergone a profound
change.

Blacks were able to register and vote in large num

bers, and were able to influence the outcomes of several
elections.

Their support helped elect black candidates, or

at least forced white candidates to court their vote pub
licly.

After an election, black aspirations could no longer

be ignored, resulting in the provision of real benefits for
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blacks as citizens in their own right, and not as incidental
recipients of assistance provided to needy whites.

A new

day dawned in Louisiana as black votes helped elect Edwin
«

Edwards, an open-minded, neo-populist gubernatorial candi
date from Cajun South Louisiana.
black votes and received them.

Edwards publicly courted
After taking office in 1972,

he actively supported measures proposed by the black dele
gation to the state legislature, including the repeal of a
host of segregationist legislation that remained on the
statute books.

Although de facto segregation and isolated

acts of private discrimination continued to exist, the state
witnessed a new attitude of openness and its first real
promise of racial harmony and equality by 1974.
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Chapter II
DESEGREGATION AND STATE LAW
Introduction
Between 1954 and 1974, black demonstrations against
segregated public transportation and "white only" jury
selection focused the attention of both federal courts and
black organizations on discrimination and state law in
Louisiana.

Demonstrations began in the state with protests

that arose over segregated transit in the latter half of the
1950's, expanded in the early 1960's with voter registration
drives and lunch counter sit-ins, and then spread in the
mid-1960's to include picketing of downtown businesses and
protests against general racial discrimination in various
parts of the state.

Throughout this time, the white

hierarchy was adamant about maintaining the status quo and
used an array of laws that were designed to prevent any
challenges to the system of segregation.

Here, the federal

courts played another major role in voiding state and local
efforts to stifle black aspirations for equal treatment
under the law.
The jury selection system was another target area of
blacks to assure due process in the courts of the state.

9
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Although federal laws had existed since the late 1800's to
safeguard black rights to equal treatment before the courts,
the state found ways to extend the segregated system to jury
service.

Despite the fact that the state supreme court

expressly forbade systematic exclusion of blacks from jury
service before the turn of the century, rarely did a black
citizen serve on any jury panel, civil or criminal, prior to
I960.

The United States Supreme Court was reluctant to

interfere with state and local court procedures, and often
accepted assurances of jury commissioners that they had per
formed their duties without racial prejudice.

Had it more

closely monitored the jury selection process across the
state, the court would have uncovered gross disparities
between what Louisiana professed and what the state actually
did.
Demonstrations
The first black demonstrations in Louisiana were the
result of events that occurred in other parts of the South.
In the 1950's, there were attempts, often sanctioned by the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), to bring about an end to segregated public trans
portation in Louisiana cities that had local public transit
systems.

By the early 1960's, the Congress of Racial

Equality (CORE) became active in the nonviolent sit-in
demonstrations conducted at private businesses that prac
tices racial discrimination, as well as in demonstrations
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in support of the right of blacks to register to vote and
use public facilities.

In the mid-1960's, the focus of

black protest became more militant, resulting in blacks
shoving less patience in waiting for desegregation and dis
crimination to end gradually.

Unfortunately, the militancy

resulted in a harder line being taken by the federal govern
ment just as barriers to equal rights for blacks were crum
bling.

By the early 1970's, in an attempt to insure that

law and order was adhered to and respected, Congress and the
federal courts retreated substantially from their tolerant
views regarding protests in the sixties.
Among the first demonstrations to erupt in the state
were those involving state and local transit systems.
During the 1950's, demonstrators in Baton Rouge, New Orleans
and Shreveport expressed their opposition to segregated
seating on public conveyances.

When the federal courts

voided the state's segregated transit law in 1958, blacks
challenged white waiting rooms and restaurants within termi
nals.

By I960, sit-ins had become a reality across the

South.
In the spring of I960, the first major sit-in in the
state occurred in Baton Rouge.

Several black college stu

dents from nearby Southern University staged a sit-in at
lunch counters in the Greyhound Bus Terminal, a drug store
and a local department store.

Although they sat quietly

without placards of any kind and simply requested service,
twelve of them were arrested for disturbing the peace.

In
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state district court, they were told that their mere
presence at the lunch counters had breached the peace, and
were summarily found guilty and fined $100 each, or sen
tenced to ninety days in jail.*

In addition, the students

were expelled from Southern University.

Following denial of

their appeals by the state supreme court, they turned to the
federal courts.

In late 1961, the Supreme Court reversed

their convictions in State v. Garner, deciding that there
was insufficient evidence to support the charge of
disturbing the peace.

The court also found that the statute

upon which the convictions were based was "overbroad" in its
language.^
Less than a month after the Baton Rouge sit-ins, one present
and three former college students were arrested when they
attempted to use a white-only library in Shreveport.

They

were arrested by waiting city police, who had been alerted
in advance by an informer, and charged with vagrancy and
disturbing the peace, despite their peaceful behavior.3
These events stirred major concern among solons meeting
in the Regular Session of the Louisiana State Legislature in
the spring and early summer of I960.

Overreacting, they

adopted a host of legislation to bolster existing state laws

*State of Louisiana v. Briscoe, State of Louisiana v.
Hoston, State of Louisiana v. Garner, 6 Race Relations Law
Reporter (hereafter cited as RRLR), 168 (I960).
^Garner v. State, 82 S. Ct. 248 (1961).
Willie Burton, On the Black Side of Shreveport
(1983) 103.
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that dealt with law and order.

Among the issues addressed

were perjury, aggravated battery, disturbing the peace,
resisting an officer, criminal mischief, trespass, solici
tation, and obstructing public passages.

Upon adjourning,

legislators felt assured that they had adequately prepared
law enforcement officials with the tools necessary to combat
any assault upon the status quo by any future demonstra
tions .4
Hardly had the legislature recessed before a new wave
of sit-ins struck Shreveport and New Orleans.

In August,

four black college students were arrested in Shreveport
after asking officials of a local department store why they
had fired all black cafeteria workers, requesting that qual
ified blacks be hired for meaningful positions, asking that
discriminatory signs on water fountains be removed, and for
asking that discrimination no longer be practiced at the
store's lunch counter.

When they refused requests by

department store officials to leave, they were arrested.5
In September and October of I960, New Orleans stores
became the targets of demonstrators.

During the course of

the sit-ins, the mayor and police chief made public state
ments condemning the demonstrations and declaring that they
would use the full force of the law to bring them to an

^State of Louisiana, Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular
Session (Baton Rouge, I960), no. 68, no. 69, no. 76, no. 76,
no. 77, no. 78, no. 80.
c

Burton, On the Black Side, 103.
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immediate end.

Subsequently, one white and three black

protesters were arrested while staging a sit-in at a whiteonly lunch counter in a downtown store.

They were prose

cuted on a charge of criminal mischief and were convicted.
The protesters appealed on the grounds that the store man
ager and the city police were enforcing an unconstitutional
"custom of the state" in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

However, the state supreme court upheld the

convictions since the criminal mischief statute made no
reference to race, and because of the nature under which the
law had been applied in this case.^

In 1963, the United

States Supreme Court reversed the convictions, taking full
note of statements made by the mayor and police chief, whose
clear intent had been to maintain segregated service in
dining facilities, and whose methods had not been entirely
motivated by the need to preserve the peace in a possibly
volatile situation.7
Another breach of the peace case arose out of the
arrest of several blacks who attempted to use the facilities
of a segregated parish library in Clinton, Louisiana.
the defendants refused to leave, they were arrested.

When
In

1966, the case reached the Supreme Court, which ruled that
the defendants had not intended to provoke a breach of the
peace, and that the evidence demonstrated that they had

^State v. Goldfinch, La., 132 So.2d 860 (1961).
^Lombard v. State, 83 S.Ct. 1122 (1963).
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acted In a quiet, orderly and polite manner while in the
library.

The tribunal held that they had a right to be in

the library and had simply expressed their constitutional
rights of free speech, assembly and petition for redress of
grievances.

Since the basis for the state's prosecution of

the protesters was their race, their convictions denied them
the equal protection of the laws.®
In still another case, the Supreme Court reversed the
breach of the peace convictions of blacks who had entered a
white waiting room in a Shreveport bus terminal, and then
had refused to leave when requested to do so by local
authorities.

Four black citizens intending to stage a

"Freedom Ride" to Jackson, Mississippi, were arrested at the
Continental Trailways Bus Terminal, where approximately
forty city and parish lawmen were waiting for them.

In

addition to their arrests, the two persons who had brought
them to the

terminal were also arrested.9

Citing Garner

v.

State, the Supreme Court reversed their convictions on the
grounds that the presence of blacks in a white waiting room
was insufficient evidence to establish guilt for the charge
of breach of the peace.
The major demonstration case in the early 1960's which
focused the

8Brown

attention of federal courts on state devices to

v. State, 86 S.Ct. 719 (1966).

^Burton, On the Black Side. 106-107.
*^Taylor v. Louisiana, 82 S.Ct. 1188 (1962).
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limit blacks protesting against racial discrimination was
Cox v. State of Louisiana.

The case included all of the

elements used by the state to prevent mass demonstrations of
any kind, particularly those involving race.

Pitted against

one another were anxious law enforcement and municipal
officials with a determined yet orderly crowd of black
demonstrators in front of them and an increasingly hostile
and growing number of whites behind them, arrayed before the
parish courthouse in downtown Baton Rouge in 1961.
The demonstration began with a CORE-directed action
against downtown businesses that were maintaining "white
only" lunch counters.

On December 14, 1961, a group, pri

marily composed of students from Southern University, car
ried signs protesting segregation and urging a boycott of
certain stores during the lucrative buying spree leading up
to

Christmas.

City police responded by arresting twenty-

three of the protesters.

That night, Ronnie Moore, student

president of the local CORE chapter, called for a mass dem
onstration to protest the arrests and the "evil of discrim
ination. " H
On the following day, approximately 2000 blacks, mainly
college students, assembled on the Southern University cam
pus five miles north of Baton Rouge.

Learning that the bus

drivers who were supposed to bring them to the city had been
arrested, most of the protesters decided to march in an

**Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Dec. 15, 1961.
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orderly fashion to the downtown area.

When Moore was

arrested for violation of an antinoise ordinance while using
a bullhorn to urge on the marchers, Reverend B. Elton Cox, a
field secretary of CORE and advisor on the general protest
movement, assumed the leadership of the march .^
Arriving in Baton Rouge before noon, the demonstrators
assembled at the old State Capitol Building approximately
two and one-half blocks from the parish courthouse where the
twenty-three picketers arrested the previous day were being
held.

From there, the group marched to the courthouse.

Upon the arrival of Cox at the head of the group, the chief
of police consulted with him in the presence of the sheriff
and the mayor.

Cox informed the authorities of the purpose,

content and duration of the demonstration, and was told by
the police chief that his group could assemble across the
street from the courthouse, approximately 101 feet away, and
no further.

The demonstrators then proceeded to fill the

sidewalk for an entire block, while the police cordoned off
the street directly in front of them.

There was no public

access along the pathway, and entrances to buildings across
from the courthouse were effectively blocked.*3
During the demonstration, the crowd sang a few songs
and cheered when they heard loud responses from inmates on
the third floor of the courthouse, which made law

12Ibid., Dec. 16, 1961.
*^Ibid.; Cox v. State of Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th
Cir. 1965).
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enforcement officials even more uneasy.

Adding to the ten

sion was the gathering of around two hundred fifty whites on
the sidewalk along the front of the courthouse, directly
across from the black demonstrators.

Subsequent testimony

and a film taken by a local television crew showed that the
black protesters were loud but in control, while the whites
present were becoming increasingly agitated as the blacks
sang, cheered and waved signs protesting racial discrimina
tion.
The climax of the demonstration came when Reverend Cox
addressed the group, condemning segregation and the illegal
arrest of the picketers.

He then instructed the group to

break for lunch and to stage a sit-in at four downtown busi
nesses with dining facilities that still refused to serve
blacks.

In the event that they were again denied service,

they were to sit quietly for one hour and then leave.

At

this point, Sheriff Bryan Clemmons assumed that Cox's speech
had been "inflammatory" and had disturbed the peace, then
took it upon himself to order the crowd to disperse immedi
ately.

Most of the personal accounts of what happened next

agree that Cox instructed the group not to move.

Thus far,

the mood of the students had not been hostile, aggressive,
unfriendly or riotous.

The sheriff later testified that he

had felt that the situation was getting out of hand.

As

about eighty city police and parish deputies began to push
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the black demonstrators back and fired tear gas at them,
pandemonium broke out and the protesters fled in disarray.
Fifty persons were arrested during the melee and Reverend
Cox was arrested later in the day on charges of obstruction
of public passageways, obstruction of justice, breach of the
peace and criminal conspiracy.*5
Cox was subsequently tried in state district court and
found guilty of all but the criminal conspiracy charge.
When he and two other CORE members criticized the district
attorney and the judge for the way in which the case had
been handled, they were indicted by the East Baton Rouge
Parish grand jury for defamation.^

On appeal to the state

supreme court,

the sentence on obstruction of justice was

set aside, but

the convictions on obstruction of

public

passageways and breach of the peace were affirmed in June of
1963.

During the state court proceedings, a ruling was

handed down that the right of free speech was not absolute,
and that a state could regulate its exercise by general and
nondiscriminatory legislation.*7
obstruction of

statute regulating the

public passageways provided

that:

No person shall wilfully obstruct the
free, con
venient and normal use of any public sidewalk,
street, highway, bridge, alley, road, or other
passageway of any public building, structure,
water craft or ferry, by impeding, hindering,

l6Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965).
^ C o x v. Louisiana, La., 148 So.2d 600 (1963).
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stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage
theron or therein.
However, legitimate labor organizations and certain approved
labor methods to secure higher pay and better working condi
tions were exempted from the

l a w .

18

Another statute defined

disturbing the peace as occurring when someone intended to
provoke a breach of the peace by crowds or congregating with
others:
. . . in or upon a shore protection structure . . .
or on a public street or public highway, or upon a
public sidewalk, or any other public place or buildor in any hotel, motel, store, restaurant, lunch
counter, cafeteria, sandwich shop, motion picture
theater, drive in, beauty parlor, swimming pool
area, or any sports or recreational area or place,
or any place of business engaged in selling or serv
ing members of the public, or in or around any free
entrance to any such place of business or public
building, or any building owned by another . . .
Those persons who failed or refused to disperse or move on
when ordered to do so by a law enforcer of the state, parish
or municipality would be subject to

a r r e s t .

19

Cox filed two separate appeals with the United States
Supreme Court, one involving his conviction on charges of
disturbing the peace and obstruction of public passageways,
and another involving the validity of a state statute pro
hibiting picketing near a courthouse.

Arguments were held

before the court on separate days, and the justices decided

18
Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 80.
19Ibid., no. 69.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
to issue two separate opinions in each case in January of
1965.
In the first case, the Supreme Court held that Cox's
rights of free speech and free assembly had been infringed
upon because the breach of the peace statute allowed persons
to be punished merely for peacefully expressing contrary
views on segregation, and it granted local officials "unfet
tered discretion" in regulating the use of streets for
peaceful parades and meetings.

The court held that the por

tion of Cox’s speech advocating sit-ins was constitutionally
protected, and that cheering, clapping and singing to pro
test segregation, discrimination and the arrest of fellow
students was not a breach of the peace.2®
The court recognized that a state or municipality had
the right to regulate the use of city streets and other
facilities in order to assure public safety and convenience,
and that everyone could not address a group at any time or
public place.

Government authorities had a duty and respon

sibility "to keep streets open and available for movement,"
but a statute that was so "vague and indefinite" as to allow
for the punishment of peaceful expression of the rights of
free speech and assembly was unconstitutional.2*

20Cox v. Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965).
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According to the justices, one of the functions of free
speech "is to invite dispute," even to the point of inciting
people to anger.

In this incidence, fear by local author

ities that violence might erupt due to the opinions being
expressed by Cox did not justify curtailment of his basic
rights of free expression.

In addition, a government

authority could not require persons desiring to disseminate
ideas to present them to law enforcement officials for their
consideration and arbitrary discretion to approve or reject
them.

Therefore, Cox's convictions were

r e v e r s e d . ^2

In the second Cox v. State of Louisiana case, the
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of picketing near a
courthouse.

The state statute in question was almost iden

tical to a federal law passed by Congress in 1950, and
provided that:
Whoever, with the intent of interfering with,
obstructing, or impeding the administration of
justice, or with the intent of influencing any
judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the
discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or
near a building housing a court of the State of
Louisiana . . . shall be fined not more than five
thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
The

Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to pass

a law

in order to protect "its judicial system from pressures
which picketing near a court house may create."

However,

Cox could not be convicted for any offense relating to this
statute since he had received tacit permission from the

22lbid.
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chief of police, in the presence of the sheriff and mayor of
Baton Rouge, to conduct a demonstration across the street
from the parish courthouse and had complied with that agree
ment.

Although local officials later regretted their deci

sion to allow the demonstration to proceed, they could not
rescind this prior grant of permission and arrest the demon
strators for their actions in picketing near a courthouse.
The Supreme Court then declared that laws and regulations
governing freedom of speech and assembly should be drawn so
as to give the public fair warning of what was illegal, but
should not be so broad as to stifle protected

f r e e d o m s .

^3

This case did not end here, though, because the state
district attorney for East Baton Rouge Parish promptly
charged Cox with "attempting to obstruct justice."

After

failing to have the case removed to the federal district
court, the defendant applied for and received a stay order
from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the grounds that
the state was seeking to prosecute him for "attempting" to
do what the Supreme Court had ruled was not a violation of
the law. 24
In another case arising out of the CORE-directed demon
stration in Baton Rouge in 1961, the issue of unlawful
assembly was raised.

In Clemmons v. CORE, local officials

asked the federal courts for an injunction against the black

2^Cox v. Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 475 (1965).
24Cox v. Louisiana, 1348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965).
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civil rights organization for sponsoring anti-segregation
demonstrations on the grounds that such gatherings had
obstructed public streets and resulted in numerous viola
tions of state criminal statutes in the past.

The court

permanently enjoined the defendants on discovering that
CORE had not secured a permit to conduct the march of
December 15, 1961, and that the group of approximately two
thousand persons had ignored the plaintiffs' order to dis
perse.

The federal judge declared that the defendants'

rights of free speech and assembly were subordinated to the
state's interest in public safety when there was a "clear
and present danger" to that safety.

Later, the Court of

Appeals reversed the lower court decision because the plain
tiffs had failed to show a federal cause of action.

Local

officials had not shown that CORE and the demonstrators had
intentionally conspired to deprive them and other members of
the community of their federally protected rights under the
law.

Therefore, the district court was ordered to dissolve

the injunction and to dismiss the complaint.^5
Because the federal courts had neutralized the effec
tiveness of several of Louisiana's law and order statutes,
the state legislature in 1963 passed additional laws to
strengthen its resolve and position as civil rights organi
zations announced plans to traverse the South on behalf of

2S

Clemmons v. CORE, 201 F.Supp. 737 (E.D. La. 1962),
323 F .2d 54 (5th Cir. 1963).
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blacks who were too intimidated to stand up for their civil
rights.

Among the laws enacted were new trespass, dis

turbing the peace, criminal mischief, resisting an officer
and solicitation measures.^
In the mid-1960's, CORE sponsored various demonstra
tions in several Louisiana cities in order to focus atten
tion on the plight of blacks.

A case in the town of Clinton

involved the arrest of a white CORE task worker who accom
panied two black residents in their attempt to register to
vote in East Feliciana Parish in August of 1963.

Although

sitting quietly, he was arrested for disturbing the peace,
and the district judge set a cash bond of $2000, despite the
fact that the maximum penalty for conviction was $1000 and
one year in jail.

On August 20, the town of Clinton and

East Feliciana Parish sought an injunction in state court
against CORE because its civil -rights activities encouraged
others to violate state laws and threatened plaintiffs with
violence and irreparable injury.

After the state court

issued a temporary restraining order against it, CORE sought
unsuccessfully to have the case transferred to federal dis
trict court.

On further appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court

in 1963, CORE received a stay order, but the state district
judge, John R. Rarick, ignored it and extended his restrain
ing order to muffle CORE.

Attempts by black leaders in the

26

Acts of Louisiana, 1963, Regular Session, no. 91, no.
93, no. 9?, no. 96, no. 99.
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parish to settle racial problems peacefully with the mayor
of Clinton failed in September, so CORE organized a boycott
of town merchants the following month.

Thirty persons,

mostly blacks, were subsequently arrested for disturbing the
peace and defamation.

In December, the East Feliciana

Parish grand jury indicted twelve blacks who had signed a
letter to the mayor the previous September asking him to
form a race relations committee to help solve problems.

The

case was never brought to trial, and after the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fifth Circuit Court dis
missed CORE'S earlier appeal because the issue had become
moot.27
Another CORE case involved demonstrations in the town
of Plaquemine in Iberville Parish.

On August 13, 1963, the

town became the scene of a CORE-directed protest meeting at
a Baptist Church, where national CORE director James Farmer
was scheduled to speak.

The meeting was broken up by law

enforcement officers using horses, electric cattle prods,
and tear gas, resulting in the arrests of hundreds of blacks
who had come to hear the speech.

As in Clinton, local

officials sought and received a restraining order.

However,

this time, the order was issued by a federal district court,
on the grounds that such action would prevent possible
injury to large numbers of persons.

Because the judge was

27

Leon Friedman (ed.), Southern Justice (New York;
Pantheon Books, 1965) 119-20; 9 RRLR 1131-32; Clinton v.
CORE, 341 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 196577“
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out of state and could not be reached to grant a hearing on
a motion by CORE to dissolve the order, CORE appealed to the
Fifth Circuit Court, which lifted the restraining order.
Shortly thereafter, the district judge returned, issued a
new temporary restraining order and denied CORE'S request to
dissolve the new decree.

In mid-September, he issued a new

restraining order, then lifted it on the following day to
allow the case to be tried in state courts before federal
action was taken on it.

In October, a state district court

issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from
further actions in promoting or engaging in demonstrations
in the town or parish.
In September of 1963, members of the black community in
Shreveport sought a permit for a memorial march through the
downtown area as a show of sympathy for the deaths of four
black children resulting from the recent bombing of a church
in Birmingham, Alabama.

When the request was denied, the

group decided to hold the march anyway and to proceed to a
memorial service at a nearby church.

Nearly two hundred law

enforcement officers prevented the march from taking place,
and proceeded to surround and intimidate the several hundred
blacks who had congregated at the church.

Incidents there

resulted in numerous injuries to some of the demonstrators
at the hands of the police as the crowd was dispersed.

On

28

Friedman, Southern Justice, 118; Town of Plaquemines
and Parish of Iberville v. CORE, 8 RRLR 862-73 (1963).
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the following day, students at a black high school organized
an impromptu march of their own, and were met by helmeted
policemen "with clubs, shotguns, and pistols . . . slinging,
beating, bruising, kicking, and pushing every black in sight
and reach."29
A more peaceful situation occurred in Vest Monroe in
the following summer, when two white voter registration
workers affiliated with CORE were arrested for disturbing
the peace because of their assistance in registering local
black residents.

Since the voter registration book was open

for only three days, the chief of police decided to enforce
a city ordinance which prohibited whites and blacks from
walking together on the town's sidewalks for five days.

His

clear intent was to prevent the formation of integrated
teams of registration workers and to serve as a show of
arbitrary police power to local blacks who might have inten
tions on becoming involved in civil rights activities.30
One of the most serious civil rights demonstrations to
take place in the state occurred in Bogalusa in 1965.
Racial trouble began in January when local blacks tested
their rights to use public accommodations in the city, and
Ku Klux Klan threats forced the cancellation of a speech by
Brooks Hays, an Arkansas Congressman known for his straight
forward views on the impracticality of segregation.

In

^Quoted in Burton, On the Black Side. 101-02.
Friedman, Southern Justice, 60-61.
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February, state police were called in when racial tensions
escalated after two CORE workers claimed to have been
attacked by a mob of white men.

In the following month,

CORE announced that it would use Bogalusa as a "summer
project," and blacks began picketing local stores that
continued to practice racial discrimination.

Tensions

between blacks and whites in the city resulted in fighting
between rival pickets on the town's main street during the
last two days of May, and led to the brutal murder of one
black deputy sheriff and the wounding of

a n o t h e r .

31

During the summer of 1965, both blacks and whites armed
themselves as scattered incidents continued to inflame
residents of the surrounding area in both Louisiana and
Mississippi, luring white supremacist groups to the racial
battlefield that Bogalusa had become.

At this point,

Governor John J. McKeithen sent in the state police armed
with rifles and submachine guns to set up roadblocks to
deter additional outsiders from descending upon Bogalusa.
Also, the federal courts became concerned about the hostile
actions taken by various white supremacist groups operating
in the city and by the lack of leadership provided by
Bogalusa officials.

The federal district court issued a

preliminary injunction against the chief of police and cer
tain other local officials, specifically enjoining them from

^*Diane Smith, "School Integration in Washington
Parish, Louisiana: 1954-1972" (Master's thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1972) 37-49; Baton Rouge State Times,
Apr. 22, June 1, 1965.
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failing to protect demonstrators from assaults and harassments while peacefully demonstrating in protest of racial
discrimination.

When the court discovered that the chief of

police and the commissioner of public safety had not com
plied with its order, it cited them for contempt and ordered
them to adopt and publicize a plan which included the educa
tion of police officers on their duties and responsibilities
during demonstrations.32

jn two related cases, twelve civil

rights workers filed a $425,000 damage suit against
Bogalusa, Washington Parish, and the State of Louisiana; and
two organizations and thirty-three individuals were
restrained by the federal courts from interfering with the
civil rights of black residents of Washington Parish.33
By the late 1960's, local authorities in some areas of
the state were still attempting to prevent vocal protests by
blacks against racial discrimination.

Several blacks were

arrested in 1968, while picketing the West Baton Rouge
Parish School Board Office in Port Allen because of the
racist policies of the board.

Their arrests were based on a

local ordinance that made picketing unlawful except under
certain conditions.

The federal district court in Baton

Rouge upheld the ordinance, but the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the decision on the grounds that the

32lbid.; Hicks v. Knight, 10 RRLR 1430 (1965).
33United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux, 250
F.Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1965).
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regulation violated the First Amendment because of its over
breadth.

The ordinance restricted all types of public and

private picketing, prohibited picketing on sidewalks and
streets, embraced all facilities in Port Allen, and limited
the number of picketers to two.34
As racial tensions intensified in the mid-1960's, state
and local officials became alarmed at the arrival within the
state of large numbers of "outside agitators" whose purpose
was to assist blacks in the attainment of their constitu
tional rights.

As a result of their concern, state autho-

ities attempted to prosecute certain persons under the
"Subversion Statutes" for their activities in promoting
civil rights for blacks, as well as linking the civil rights
movement with the time-honored charge that it was part of an
international communist conspiracy.

These attempts led to

the case of Dombrowski v. Pfister (1964), in which a federal
district judge approved of the state's attempts to prosecute
civil rights workers for sedition, treason, subversion and
communist activities aimed at the unlawful overthrow of the
state government.

However, the Supreme Court reversed the

decision in 1965, invalidating Louisiana's anti-subversion
statute because of its "chilling effect" on freedom of
expression.

The court found the statutory definition of

"subversive organization" so vague, broad, and uncertain as
to inhibit freedom of expression because of its threat of

^Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (E.D. La. 1968).
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criminal prosecution.

The majority also voided the portion

of the statute that required members of Communist-front
organizations to register, because it failed to provide a
method for procedural due process.35
The state riot statute was called into question at the
end of the decade in the case of Douglas v. Pitcher.

Under

this law, the state prohibited the "endeavor by any person
to incite or procure any other person to create or partici
pate in a riot," which was defined as "a public disturbance
involving an assemblage of three or more persons acting
together or in concert which by tumultuous and violent con
duct, results in injury or damage to persons or property."
The law had been patterned on the federal Anti-Riot Act,
which had been upheld by the federal courts.

The Douglas

case arose from the arrest of two black speakers at a mass
protest rally in Baton Rouge following the killing of a
black youth by a white city policeman.

The rally was

followed by disorders in which several persons were injured
and property damage had occurred.

Perhaps reflecting the

national reaction to a more militant atmosphere that pre
vailed by the end of the 1960's, the federal district court
decided in the case to uphold the state's riot

s t a t u t e .

36

^Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F.Supp. 556 (E.D. La.
1964), 85 S.Ct. 1116 (1965).
^Douglas v. Pitcher, 319 F.Supp. 706 (E.D. La. 1970).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33
The Lav and Racial Intimidation
Sometimes, Louisiana law was used to intimidate blacks
in

order to render them ineffectual in attempting to gain

equal treatment and due
by

process.

This objective was sought

various devices, but the intent was clear.
One of the earliest attempts to silence the voices of

change was to strike at any organization which might possi
bly challenge the segregated system.

Because of its active

involvement in the campaign to secure civil rights for
blacks, the NAACP became the primary focus of the state
government in stifling black aspirations in the latter half
of the 1950's.

Although the first state branch of the orga

nization had been chartered in 1914, it was never seriously
challenged until 1956.

At that time, the NAACP was prose

cuted under a 1924 anti-Ku Klux Klan law, which regulated
"all fraternal, patriotic, charitable, benevolent, literary,
scientific, athletic, military, or social organizations,"
requiring them to file a list of their members and officers
residing in Louisiana.

This requirement had to be met

between December 15 and December 31 each year.

However, the

group was reluctant to file its membership list because of
fears of reprisals by segregationists, which led to a court
challenge.

On March 29, 1956, a state district court judge

issued a preliminary injunction banning the NAACP from oper
ating within the state as long as it failed to comply with
state law.

The organization appealed unsuccessfully to
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federal and state courts and lay dormant until being resur
rected in December in New Orleans, Lafayette, Lake Charles,
Shreveport, Alexandria, and Baton Rouge.

When State

Attorney General Jack P. F. Gremillion announced his inten
tion to prosecute them for failure to comply with the orders
of the state courts, they decided to submit and file the
required membership lists by the end of the

y e a r .

37

Besides the NAACP, two educational organizations were
also compelled to file membership lists because of the stand
of their parent organizations on segregation in 1956.

The

state attorney general issued an opinion bringing them under
the scope of the 1924 law, and declared that teachers who
belonged to them could be dismissed under current teacher
tenure laws.

Therefore, the National Parent-Teacher

Association filed a list of its 6500 Louisiana members,
while the Louisiana division of the National Education
Association filed a partial list of the names of 4000 of its
approximately 9000 members.3®
In 1958, the state legislature enacted a new law aimed
at integrationist organizations in the guise of forestalling
Communist infiltration into the state.

The statute required

certain types of "non-trading organizations" that were
affiliated with organizations created or operating under the

37

Acts of Louisiana, 1924, Regular Sessions, no. 2; New
Orleans Times-Picayune, Apr. 25, Dec. 20, 1956.
Og
New Orleans Times-Picayune, Nov. 28, 1956.
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laws of other states to file affidavits declaring that none
of its officers was a member of any group cited by the House
Un-American Activities Committee or the United States
Attorney General as Communist, Communist-front or subver
sive. 39

Under the 1924 and 1958 laws, members of the NAACP

were being fired from their jobs, employees were being
prohibited by their school boards from joining, and local
NAACP leaders were being intimidated by law enforcement
officers and white supremacist

g r o u p s .

^0

The Shreveport

affiliate of the NAACP challenged the two statutes in the
federal courts, which voided them in the early 1960's on the
grounds that the first violated due process while the second
subjected members of the NAACP to possible economic
reprisals.41In another blatant episode of racial harassment, two
cases arose out of an incident that occurred in Plaquemines
Parish in the mid-1960's, but which was not settled until
the early 1970's.

One case involved machinations by parish

authorities who grossly violated a black resident's civil
rights.

Then, when he selected an out-of-state civil rights

attorney currently residing in Louisiana to defend him,
parish officials began harassing his legal counsel in an

39

Acts of Louisiana, 1958, Regular Session, no. 260.

^Burton, On the Black Side, 104.
^Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 181 F.Supp. 37
(E.D. La. I960), 81 S.Ct. 1333 (1961).
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effort to deter any possibility of civil rights progress for
black residents of the parish.
In the first case, Duncan v. Perez, a black man was
arrested for simple battery in connection with his part in
breaking up a confrontation between his two cousins and four
whites in 1965.

Although the charge was dropped, he was

rearrested and his bond set at twice that of the parish bond
schedule.
tenced.

In a non-jury trial, he was convicted and sen
When his out-of-state civil rights attorney lost an

appeal to the state supreme court, Duncan was again arrested
and a new bond was set.

Then, the attorney was arrested on

a charge of practicing law in the state without a license
after he attended a conference with the parish district
judge to post an appeal bond for his client.

Relatives who

attempted to post a property bond for Duncan were informed
by the sheriff that the assessed value of the property had
to be at least double the amount of the bond, although this
was contrary to state law and practice.

The case eventually

reached the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the
conviction because the defendant had been denied trial by
jury.

Duncan then sued the parish district attorney in fed

eral court to enjoin him from further prosecution on the
charge of battery.

In 1970, the court concluded that the

defendant would not have been prosecuted and reprosecuted
had it not been for the civil rights nature of the case,
Duncan's selection of an out-of-state civil rights attorney
to represent him, and his vigorous defense of his legal
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rights.

Therefore, the court voided any future attempts by

the state to reprosecute him, on the grounds that irrep
arable injury and bad faith prosecution had been clearly
established by the parish district attorney over the past
five years of litigation.^
In the related case of Sobol v. Perez, parish officials
conspired to make an example of Duncan's attorney.

Sobol

was licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and
New York State, before the United States Supreme Court, and
in federal courts operating in the Eastern District in
Louisiana.

He had resided in the state since 1965, perform

ing volunteer work for the Lawyers Constitutional Defense
Committee, which provided attorneys for civil rights litiga
tion in the South.

After being arrested in 1967, for prac

ticing law in the state without a license, Sobol was finger
printed, jailed for four hours and had his bail set at $1500
without any appearance before a judge.

Being joined by the

United States as "intervenor," the attorney filed suit
against Plaquemines Parish political boss Leander Perez,
Sr., his son who served as the parish district attorney, and
the parish district judge.

In 1968, the federal courts

decided that Sobol's arrest was harassment and was meant to
deter him as well as other attorneys from providing legal
representation in civil rights cases.

It was determined

^Duncan v. Perez, 321 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970), 455
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
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that the plaintiff's actions in representing Duncan did not
constitute unauthorized practice of law under Louisiana
statutes, which allowed out-of-state lawyers temporarily
present in the state to practice in state courts.

The law

had never been used against any other visiting attorney, so
that its use in the Sobol case "could only be interpreted as
harassment."43
Trial Procedure
The major issue arising in connection with trial proce
dure was in the racial composition of grand and petit
juries.

On several occasions prior to 1954, the state

supreme court had expressed its intentions that juries be
selected without discrimination against members of the race
of the accused.

However, local and state officials were

able to exploit loopholes in the law or within the de jure
system of segregation itself to insure that virtually allwhite juries were selected until the mid-1960's.

In

Louisiana, the roster of registered voters was the primary
list used in compiling the general venire from which the
grand and petit juries were selected.

Since few blacks were

registered to vote before the 1960's, it was practically
assured that juries would be all-white.

Then, local offi

cials resorted to various other devices in order to purge
the lists of any remaining black names.

43Sobol v. Perez, 321 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970), 455
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
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The systematic exclusion of blacks from juries was the
first major obstacle that had to be removed in order for
black citizens to receive fair and equitable treatment in
state courts.

During the latter half of the nineteenth cen

tury, attempts were made by the federal government to assure
blacks of the selection of fair and impartial juries.

The

Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided harsh penalties for state
officials who excluded blacks from jury duty.

Then, in

1880, the Supreme Court declared that every citizen was
entitled to the right of trial by a jury that was free of
prejudice.

Although proscribing outright exclusion of any

class or race, it did approve of the states establishing
qualifications for juror eligibility.

Unfortunately, this

loophole subverted federal intentions of protecting the
rights of 1&acks in the selection of a jury free of racial
discrimination.44
In 1895, the Louisiana State Supreme Court ruled that a
black defendant had the burden of proving that his jury was
chosen under a policy of systematic exclusion of blacks.
Otherwise, the court would accept the testimony of jury
commissioners that some black names were included in the
jury wheel at the time of the selection of the defendant's
venire, and that they had made no distinctions on the basis

^Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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of race, color or previous condition of servitude in jury
selection.45
Not until 1935 did the United States Supreme Court
adopt a view contrary to this decision, when it declared
that it would not accept a simple denial by the state that
it did not discriminate.

Instead, state officials would

have to offer proof in the face of a strong prima facie
challenge, and they would be required to demonstrate that
there were reasons other than race for the lack of qualified
blacks on juries.46
Whether or not naivete played a role in its decision in
1937, the state supreme court held that there was no dis
crimination on the grounds of alleged systematic exclusion
of blacks from juries if the evidence showed that blacks
were included in every jury list, that some blacks had
served on grand or petit juries in the past, and if accused
blacks were tried as fairly as whites in state courts.
Citing the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 2 of
the Louisiana State Constitution of 1921, it declared that
state action through the legislature, courts, or executive
or administrative officers "in excluding all persons of the
African race solely because of race or color from serving as
grand or petit jurors in (the) criminal prosecution of a
person of the African race, is a denial of equal protection

4^State v. Murray, La., 17 So. 832 (1895).
46Norris v. Alabama, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935).
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of the laws."

No one had a right to a jury composed of only

whites, only blacks, or mixed persons.

A loophole in the

ruling was provided when the court instructed jury commis
sioners to select only "persons who they know to be compe
tent, regardless of whether they are black or white."

In

addition, it stated that there would be no presumption of
discrimination if all names but a few placed in the general
venire were white, unless evidence to the contrary was pre
sented.

Otherwise, it would be presumed that the list was

selected "in a fair effort to select best qualified persons,
and not with any view of discrimination on account of race
or color."47
During the 1940's, the state supreme court issued
additional rulings on the waiving of rights, proportional
representation on juries, and prima facie evidence of jury
discrimination.

In a 1940 case, the state supreme court

held that a defendant had to first raise the issue of racial
discrimination in the selection of his grand or petit jury
at his initial trial.

If not, he waived such right and

could not later cite this reason in motioning for a new
trial.48

As late as 1955, the United States Supreme Court

upheld this decision, when it affirmed the conviction of
three black Louisiana residents for rape, despite their
allegations that blacks had been systematically excluded

47State v. Gill, La., 172 So. 412 (1937).
^®State v. White, La., 192 So. 345 (1940).
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from their grand jury.

The high court decided that they had

been provided with counsel and a reasonable opportunity to
object to the composition of their grand jury "in a timely
fashion," and in failing to do so, had waived their consti
tutional rights at that

t i m e .

49

In 1941, the state supreme court ruled on a case
involving a parish jury commission that had drawn up its own
prospective juror list, composed of black and white names of
persons that it considered to be competent and qualified to
serve.

The justices held that "in absence of proof of fraud

or designed discrimination, it is to be presumed that
commissioners performed their duties within the spirit of
the law, wisely and well."

In addition, the court decided

that the law did not set a fixed proportion or percentage of
whites or blacks on juries, and that "negroes are not
entitled to representation on grand and petit juries in
proportion to the population."5®

In the following year, the

state supreme court declared that no violation of a black
defendant's rights occurred if blacks were included on a
petit jury panel, but none were selected.51
Louisiana's high court held in 1944, that the evidence
showed that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was

^Michel v. Poret, Poret v. State, La., 76 S.Ct. 158
(1955).
50State v. Pierre, La., 3 So. 2d 895 (1941).
"^State v. Augusta, La., 7 So.2d 177 (1942).
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made in Allen Parish, where 10 to 20 percent of the popula
tion was black but where no black citizen had ever served on
a jury in the history of the parish.

Therefore, in a rare

judgment, it was decided that the accused had been denied
equal protection of the laws in the selection of his
jurors.52
In 1947, the state supreme court ruled that a person
charged with a crime was not entitled to have the exact per
centage of his race placed on the general venire lists of
grand and petit juries in order to avoid a charge of dis
crimination.

However, "substantial representation" by the

race of the accused would be sufficient as opposed to "token
representation."53
• Congress re-enacted Section 4 of the 1875 Civil Rights
Act concerning jury service in 1948.

The statute declared

that:54
No citizen possessing all qualifications which are
or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified
for service as grand or petit juror in any court
of the United States, or of any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servi
tude; and whoever, being an officer or other per
son charged with any duty in the selection or
summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon
any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not
more that $5000.

■^State v. Anderson, La., 18 So.2d 33 (1944).
^^State v. Perkins, La., 31 So.2d 188 (1947).
^ United States Code Annotated, Title 18 (hereinafter)
cited as 18 OsCA), (St. Paul: West Publishing), Section
243.
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Despite the passage of this law, discrimination in the
selection of juries in Louisiana remained the rule instead
of the exception.
During the 1950's, the state supreme court and at least
one trial court took a harder line toward systematic exclu
sion or token inclusion of blacks on juries.

In two cases

decided in 1952 and 1957, the state supreme court held that
such tactics were unconstitutional, but that the percentage
of blacks and whites in the population or on the voter reg
istration list was not to be used as a gauge in determining
whether the selection of a grand jury was based on racial
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .

55

in 1952, a district court in Orleans

Parish became the first trial court to annul an indictment
on the grounds that blacks had been systematically and
intentionally excluded from parish grand juries because of
their race and color in violation of the Fourteenth
A m e n d m e n t .

56

j n

a 1955 case, the state supreme court upheld

the conviction of a white man who had motioned for a new
trial on the grounds of systematic exclusion of blacks from
his grand jury.

The court felt that he had no right to such

a challenge of his indictment since neither he nor his vic
tim was

b l a c k .

57

xwo years later, the court overruled a

■^State v. Green, La., 60 So.2d 208 (1952); State v.
Eubanks, La., 94 So.2d 262 (1957).
56
Louisiana v. Dowels, 1952 (unreported case, cited in
Eubanks v. State, 1958).
57State v. Lea, La., 84 So.2d 169 (1955).
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motion by a black defendant that "persons of color" who
served on his

had

grand jurywere not of the same class as

"Negroes."58
The United States Supreme Court issued a major ruling
concerning jury selection in Louisiana in the case of
Eubanks v. State in 1958, reversing the decision of the
state supreme court, which had declared that there was
insufficient evidence for a charge of systematic exclusion
of blacks from a grand jury in an Orleans Parish murder
case.

During

Court, it was

the course of an investigation by the Supreme
determined that the population of Orleans

Parish was one-third black, and that the parish jury commis
sion had initially begun to include blacks as potential
jurors in 1936.

By 1954, when Eubanks was indicted, thirty-

six grand juries had been selected, with at least six blacks
being included in each list.

However, only one black citi

zen was selected among the four hundred thirty-two jurors
named during the previous eighteen year period, and it was
alleged that the single black juror chosen was thought to
have been white.

Despite the fact that there were a sub

stantial number of blacks available and qualified for jury
service, virtually none had served.

In overturning the

case, the Supreme Court held that the "mere general asser
tions by officials of their performance of duty in select
ing (a) grand jury is not an adequate justification for

■^State v. Palmer, La., 94 So.2d 439 (1957).
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exclusion of Negroes from grand jury service," declared that
"chance and accident alone do not constitute adequate expla
nation for continued omission of Negroes from grand juries
over long periods of time," and overruled the defense "of
local tradition" for failure of the state to comply with
equal protection.59
At this same time, the state supreme court overruled a
motion that the state was required to present evidence that
blacks were being called for jury service.

The justices

declared that the court had ruled for nearly eighty years
that discrimination in the selection of juries was unconsti
tutional.

Once again, the court held that the burden of

proof for a charge of racial discrimination in the selection
of a jury was on the defendant.50
In 1959, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its
opinion in United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, a
Mississippi case in which a conviction was struck down on
the grounds that there was strong prima facie evidence of
systematic exclusion of blacks from juries.

This decision

became the foundation for subsequent decisions by the appel
late court involving discrimination in jury s e l e c t i o n . i n
a companion case in 1964, the court ruled that there was
systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury system in a

59Eubanks v. State, 78 S.Ct. 970 (1958).
60State v. Fletcher, La., 106 So.2d 709 (1958).
^ United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71
(5th Cir. 1959).
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Georgia case, and that the state had in effect required
blacks "to choose between an unfairly constituted jury and a
prejudiced jury."62
In the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama, the Supreme Court
appeared to do an about face.

Prior to this decision, the

federal courts were predisposed to overturn convictions
when there was complete exclusion of blacks or obvious
tokenism of blacks on juries, and they had generally
approved of prima facie evidence of jury discrimination for
reversals.

However, after Swain, the Supreme Court cast

doubt on what constituted a prima facie case of discrimina
tion, when it declared that "an imperfect system is not
equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race."

It

also indicated that a jury system did not have to perfectly
mirror the population and proportions of different groups
present within the community.63

However, the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals chose to strictly construe the meaning of
this decision, and continued to apply the Constitution's
guarantee of a fairly selected jury system.

During the late

1960's, the Fifth Circuit Court maintained a higher set of
standards than those imposed by the Supreme Court.64

52Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964).
63Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965).
^ F r a n k T. Read and Lucy S. McGough, Let Them Be
Judged; The Judical Integration of the Peep_5outh
(Metuchen, N.J.:
Scarecrow Press, 1978) 339.
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During the 1960's, the courts undertook the issues of
criteria for jury selection, exemptions from jury service,
use of prejudicial remarks during trials and the use of
peremptory challenges.

It was during this time that both

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court became actively involved in the supervision of
jury procedures in the Southern states.
The Louisiana State Supreme Court handed down a major
state decision in civil rights in 1962, in State v. Goree,
which dealt with the use of "best man" criteria for jury
selection.

The case stemmed from a charge against several

blacks for "battery with a dangerous weapon on a white man"
in Lincoln Parish, the site of all-black Grambling College.
The court discovered that the parish had a non-white popula
tion of 11,925 persons out of a total population of 28,535
in I960.

On the official parish voter registration list,

there were 860 qualified black voters among the nearly 8000
persons registered.

Of the registered black voters, 112

were teachers, 38 were over sixty-five years of age, 440
were women, 9 were school bus drivers, 61 were students and
1 was a doctor.

The evidence showed that the parish jury

commission had used the registration list to draw up a genral venire list from which the grand and petit jury lists
were taken.

In the five years prior to the Goree trial in

1961, only one black name had been drawn for the petit jury.
Jury commissioners testified in court that they had failed
to include blacks in the general venire list because of
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their decision to place only the names of persons who they
considered to be the "best men" for jury service.

They

claimed that their actions had not been motivated by racial
considerations, and had only eliminated persons who were
entitled to exemptions because of occupations or age. ^5
The trial court judge in Goree in 1961, held that the
jury commission had carried out the state mandate of select
ing "none but good and competent jurors" who were "of well
known good character and standing in the community."

He

also ruled that the jury lists were virtually all-white
"because of the well-known fact that the moral standards of
Lincoln Parish Negroes are rather low," basing his opinion
on personal observations that 85 percent of the criminal
cases brought before his court had been committed by blacks.
He also held that the number of blacks available for jury
selection was low because the better qualified ones were
entitled to exemptions from jury service if they were pro
fessors, school teachers, school bus drivers or sixty-five
years of age or older. ^6
In overturning Goree's conviction, the state supreme
court held that the jury commission in Lincoln Parish had
overstepped its authority by assuming the power of exempting
qualified blacks, automatically exempting them without their
prior consent.

Under state law, persons desiring to invoke

^“*State v. Goree, La., 139 So.2d 531 (1962).
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the exemption law were required to produce certain documents
declaring that they wished to be exempted.

Since qualified

blacks were available for jury service but no effort had
been made to select them, the state supreme court decided
that systematic exclusion of blacks from the general venire
and petit jury lists had been established.
Shortly thereafter, the decision by an Orleans Parish
jury commission to exempt common laborers from jury panels
was challenged in federal courts, because of its effect in
removing many qualified blacks from juries.

In 1964, a

federal district court approved the process because Orleans
Parish did not pay its jurors, which would have worked a
hardship on common or daily wage earners, many of whom were
black.

Therefore, the court validated the procedure even

though it resulted in a disproportionate number of blacks
being excused from jury service.^5
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
decision was reversed.

Evidence was presented that no

blacks had served on an Orleans Parish grand jury since
1936, and that no blacks had ever been selected for petit
juries in criminal cases.

In addition, it held that the

equal protection clause of the Constitution prohibited a
state from creating arbitrary and unreasonable classifica
tions for jurors in criminal cases, and that the state had

67Ibid.
68
United States ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 234 F.Supp.
171 (E.D. La. 1964).
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failed to adequately explain its long-standing practice of
placing small numbers of blacks on its juries.

In deciding

to exempt certain persons from jury duty, the "overriding
consideration . . .

is not the burden of jury service on

prospective jurors but fairness of the system."

The court

could find no state statute permitting Orleans Parish to
exempt laborers as a class.

If such a law had existed, it

would have been invalid on the grounds that it violated the
constitutional requirement that an impartial jury represent
a cross section of the community.

However, the exclusion of

certain occupational groups such as doctors and firemen was
approved because of the need for their uninterrupted ser
vices within the

c o m m u n i t y .

In 1966, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
litigant who was not a member of an excluded class could
also challenge the composition of a jury that was affected
by discrimination.

It ruled that a person was entitled to a

jury that reflected "a fair cross-section of the commu
nity .70
It was this rationale that was the basis of the Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968, which prohibited any dis
crimination in the jury selection process and designated the
list of registered voters as the primary source of jurors.
The law also required the use of other sources, when

69Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.1966).
^Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.
1966).
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necessary, to insure that federal grand and petit juries
were "selected at random from a fair cross-section of the
community," and to insure that all citizens would have the
opportunity to serve as jurors.

Another provision of the

act stipulated that no citizen could be excluded from fed
eral jury service on account of "race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status."71

Therefore, it was a

logical progression in the line of judicial reasoning when
the Supreme Court ruled in 1972, that whites could not be
tried fairly by grand and petit juries from which blacks had
been excluded.72
A federal district court in Louisiana ruled in a
Tangipahoa Parish case in 1967, that voter registration
rolls which represented a fair cross-section of the commu
nity could be used by a jury commission as the only source
for the names of prospective jurors.

Then, if the general

venire reflected a cross-section of the community and the
grand and petit juries were drawn fairly by lot from such a
venire, it was immaterial that the racial composition of the
ultimate jury was disproportionate.

However, in a rehearing

of the case before the court in 1969. it was shown that
blacks made up 29 percent of Tangipahoa Parish's adult popu
lation and 15 percent of its registered voters, but only 2.6
percent of jury venires at the time of the defendant's

71Read, Let Them Be Judged, 344; 28 USCA, Sections
1986-71.
—
---72Peters v. Kiff, 92 S.Ct. 2163 (1972).
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trial.

Therefore, the court decided that a prima facie case

of systematic exclusion of blacks from juries had been
established.73
In a Vermilion Parish case of 1976, the state supreme
court upheld the practice of adding names of blacks to a
jury venire if it included less than 20 percent blacks
(their proportion of parish population).

The court affirmed

the procedure to enable the parish to meet the requirement
that the venire represent a true cross-section of the
community, even though it had to consciously take race into
consideration.74
With the repeal or voidance of segregation laws and the
inauguration of a more moderate state administration by the
early 1970's, most state courts and jury commissioners were
in compliance with federal guidelines for jury selection.
Perhaps, the following case illustrates how far the courts
of the state had gone in a few short years toward establish
ing equal justice for black defendants.

In a 1971 case

charging Ouachita Parish with racial discrimination in the
composition of parish juries, the state supreme court held
that the representation of blacks on the parish jury venire
was substantial, that its jury commissioners had used a wide
variety of sources for acquiring the names of prospective
jurors, that selections of jurors from the lists had been

^United States ex rel. Wilson v. Walker, 263 F.Supp.
289 (E.D. La. 1967), 301 F.Supp. 95 (E.D. La. 1969).
^State v. Peters, La., 204 So.2d 284 (1976).
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conducted randomly, and that the defendant had produced no
proof of actual intentional or purposeful discrimination by
parish officials.75

Of course, discrepancies still

occurred, but the days of blatant discrimination in the
formation of jury venires was ended.
Another racial issue that confronted the courts during
the

1 9 6 0 ' s

jury.

was the utterance of prejudicial remarks to the

In 1957, the state supreme court affirmed the deci

sion of a trial court judge, who had allowed a juror to
serve on a jury after having acknowledged his belief in
"white supremacy."

The judge stated that the juror was not

prejudiced, and that his selection did not jeopardize the
black defendant's right to a trial by a jury of his peers.76
However, in a rehearing of another case in 1961, the state
supreme court decided that a defendant’s attorney was enti
tled to ask prospective jurors whether they belonged to
religious, integrationist or segregationist groups for the
purpose of uncovering the possibility of prejudice, thus
enabling the defense to make a peremptory challenge of a
juror.

In a major breakthrough, the court held that member

ship in an organization advocating racial segregation "might
be regarded as proper notification" of possible

p r e j u d i c e .

75State v. Millsap, La., 248 So. 2d 324 (1971).
76State v. Edwards, La., 94 So. 2d 674 (1957).
77State v. Hills, La., 129 So. 2d 12 (1961).
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However, as late as 1967, the state supreme court still
affirmed some cases where there were obvious prejudicial
remarks

made during the course

of a trial.

Among the

grounds

presented by one black defendant in motioning for a

new trial, were prejudicial comments made at the time of
jury selection by the parish district attorney, who acknowl
edged his membership in a White Citizens Council, and error
by the trial court judge in refusing to allow the defense
inquire

of ajuror whether his

members of the Ku Klux Klan.

to

friends or associates were
The state supreme court denied

the motion and affirmed the conviction because of failure to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the jury
selection process, the removal of any prejudicial effect of
alleged prejudicial comments when the trial judge instructed
jurors to disregard it, and because the refusal to allow the
inquiry of the juror was

p r o p e r . 78

The possible use of peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner was the issue in three cases involving
the State of Louisiana during the first half of the 1960's.
In one trial, a prosecuter in Plaquemines Parish used
peremptory challenges as a means of excluding blacks from a
petit jury.

However, the state supreme court declared that

such action, along with the small number of blacks on a
convicted black defendant's jury venires, did not show a
planned or continued exclusion or inclusion of a token

^®State v. Rideau, La., 193 So.2d 264 (1966).
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number of blacks from the jury list.79

in a similar case

decided in 1964, the court held that peremptory challenges
could be exercised without the assignment of any cause,
reason or inquiry into the motive.®®

By 1965, it appeared

that the Supreme Court had removed peremptory challenges
from prosecutors as a jury discrimination device, but
defendants were still required to prove that the prosecution
had used such a method over an indefinite period of time to
exclude blacks from juries.

In order to allow lawyers to

exercise freedom of discretion in removing jurors for valid
reasons, the high court refused to seriously interfere with
peremptory challenges.®*
During the 1970's, the state supreme court solidified
its support for virtually unlimited discretion by attorneys
in their use of peremptory challenges of prospective jurors.
In 1971, the court once again ruled that it would not
reverse the conviction of a defendant because of peremptory
challenges of one or two blacks on a jury venire that has
resulted in no blacks being seated on the jury.®^

Then, in

1975, the court ruled that there were no grounds for review
if the state used peremptory challenges allegedly to remove
all blacks from the jury venire who were not earlier removed

^State v. Clark, La., 140 So.2d 1 (1962).
80State v. Ward, La., 167 So.2d 359 (1964).
8*Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965).
O O

State v. Square, La., 244 So.2d 200 (1971).
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a s late as 1976, the state supreme court ruled

that the state's exercise of its peremptory challenges of
prospective black jurors did not constitute denial of due
process or equal protection if there was no evidence of a
historical pattern of black exclusion from

j u r i e s .

In the forefront of the civil rights struggle by blacks
in Louisiana was the attempt to secure dignity, due process
and equal treatment under the laws of the state.

With the

Brown decision of 1954, black citizens of Louisiana began to
envision the possibility of the first real progress in race
relations since the end of Reconstruction.

Beginning in the

latter half of the 1950's, a few daring black leaders in New
Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport launched nonviolent
protest movements to crack the facade of the de jure system
of segregation.

Although supported by large numbers of

black college students, they were frequently alone in their
fight as hundreds of thousands of blacks, made timid by the
system of segregation, watched hopefully but silently.
Entrenched in every political, economic and social
position within the state, the segregationists used the
police powers at their disposal to counter every attempt by
blacks to reverse their second-class citizenship.

The

state's leaders reacted to black demands for equal treatment
by enacting a multitude of new legislation to thwart any

®^State v. Anderson, La., 315 So.2d 266 (1975).
®^State v. Haynes, La., 339 So.2d 328 (1976).
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possibility of black equality with whites, and by launching
crushing attacks upon any individual or organization appear
ing to lean toward integration.

As sit-ins, boycotts and

demonstrations spread during the early 1960's, along with a
new invasion of Northern "agitators" and "communist agents"
seeking to destroy the Southern way of life, the state's
white leaders expressed their alarm by unrelenting attacks
upon them by legal means.

Only through the intercession of

the federal courts, which neutralized the effectiveness of
most of the arbitrary state legislation and restrained state
leaders through injunctions from interfering with peaceful
expressions by blacks against segregation, could any sem
blance of progress be made.

Not until then was the power of

the segregationists broken and the first real promise of
hope brought to the masses that real change in racial rela
tions was present.
Among the most vexing problems in the state was the
judicial system itself, where blacks were systematically
excluded from juries prior to I960.

Although the state

supreme court and the federal government had banned such
practices since the end of the nineteenth century, legal
loopholes were found to prevent all but a handful of token
blacks from serving.

Tied to the jury system was voter

registration, since the list of registered voters was used
by parish jury commissioners to compile venire lists.
Because few blacks were registered to vote prior to I960,
the system virtually assured the selection of all-white
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juries.

Then, legal maneuvers such as peremptory challenges

or exemptions of prospective jurors could be used to remove
any remaining blacks from them.
Once again, it took vigilant federal efforts to break
the hold of segregationists on the jury system.

By 1970,

overt discrimination in jury selection had become unten
able.

Although the legal system had come a long way by the

early 1970's, isolated incidents of racial discrimination in
the state's legal process continued, but with decreasing
frequency as federal and state guidelines made it increas
ingly difficult to escape from inspection when charges sur
faced of discriminatory practices in violation of due pro
cess and equal treatment under the law.

However, as in

other areas of civil rights, the federal government began
retreating in its protection of black protests by the early
1970's.

Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

remained vigilant, the United States Supreme Court became
less willing to support civil rights activities, or to
interfere within court proceedings unless substantial evi
dence was offered by a defendant that racial discrimination
had been practiced on a systematic basis.
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Chapter III
DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING AND ELECTIONS
Introduction
The federal government was the primary agent in the
eradication of discrimination in the area of voting and
elections in Louisiana.

The promise of political equality

that was extended to the freedmen during Reconstruction
quickly faded with the accession of the Bourbon Redeemers in
1877.

By 1900, 95 percent of blacks residing in the state

had been disfranchised by de jure pronouncements.

Not until

the federal courts began the cumbersome process of unravel
ing the intricate web of legal electoral barriers did the
abandoned black citizen see a glimmer of hope for improve
ment in his political situation.
After 1900, white leaders of Louisiana adopted the
white primary to exclude the few remaining black voters and
any viable Republican opposition.

Under this system, candi

dates for various offices were selected by party members in
state primaries prior to a general election.

Since only

whites were allowed to belong to the Democratic Party and
over 90 percent of the state's voters were registered as
Democrats, selection in the white Democratic primary was
tantamount to election.

With the voidance of the white
60
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primary by federal courts in the 1940's, sizable numbers of
blacks resumed registering to vote in the state.

The flood

of registrations in the 1950's alarmed conservative whites
and prompted a racist attack and purge of registration rolls
in various parts of the state beginning in 1956.

Unlike the

situation in the late nineteenth century, this time the
federal government did not shirk its responsibilities but
lauched a sustained and effective attack on efforts by
election officials and white supremacy organizations to
stifle black electoral aspirations.

Assisting the federal

courts were efforts by the Justice Department and Congress,
which passed a series of civil rights bills to strengthen
and encourage the endeavors of the judicial and executive
branches to insure voter equality.
By 1964, the end of discrimination in voting was within
sight.

The poll tax had been outlawed by constitutional

amendment and overt measures aimed at mass disfranchisement
of blacks had been voided.

Parish registrars were under

strict inspection by the federal courts and the Justice
Department for any indications of discriminatory operation
of their offices, while the state's interpretation and citi
zenship tests for registration were placed under a freeze in
areas with a long history of voter discrimination.
The enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 tight
ened loopholes in the Fifteenth Amendment and subsequent
election laws.

Thereafter, it became next to impossible for

any overt discrimination in electoral procedures to pass the
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scrutiny of the federal government.

By the late 1960's, the

federal government shifted its attention to the issue of
reapportionment plans for public bodies, many of which
grossly underrepresented blacks.

By 1972, blacks were

beginning to take an active political role in the state, and
de jure means of discrimination in voting and in the conduct
of elections were fading into history.

In the same year,

the state saw the Inauguration of a liberal, neo-populist
governor who had been elected by a coalition of blacks and
South Louisiana Cajuns.
Disfranchisement of Blacks After Reconstruction
The first Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, imposed
black suffrage on the ten Southern states that were subject
to military reconstruction.

Prior to that time, Louisiana

officials had refused to take any action on the enfranchise
ment of freed black males, despite strong encouragement of
delegates to the 1864 state constitutional convention by
President Abraham Lincoln and General Nathaniel Banks, who
directed the federal occupation of southern Louisiana.
Despite fierce opposition to any suffrage concessions to
blacks, the convention adopted a resolution permitting the
state legislature the discretion to extend the vote to some
free blacks.

Later suggestions to the new legislature by

President Andrew Johnson and Governor James M. Wells to
enfranchise loyal free blacks or black Union Army veterans
fell on deaf ears.

When the governor tried to force the
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issue by reconvening the 1864 constitutional convention, a
riot ensued in New Orleans in 1866.

This event became grist

for nascent Radicals in Congress and helped persuade many
Northern moderates to support harsher reconstruction mea
sures.

An investigation of the riot by the Joint Committee

on Reconstruction recommended in February of 1867, that
Louisiana be placed under a military government until such
time as a "loyal" state government could be formed.1
The second Reconstruction Act of March 23, 1867, pro
vided for the calling of a state constitutional convention
and outlined the procedures to be followed in writing a new
state constitution.

General Philip Sheridan, who commanded

the troops occupying the state at this time, immediately
complied with the Reconstruction Acts and began the task of
registering qualified voters.

When voters went to the polls

to decide on the question of whether to hold a new constitu
tional convention, there were over 78,000 blacks and over
48,000 whites (down from 94,711 white adult males in i860)
registered.

In September of 1867, blacks cast their first

ballots in Louisiana history, with the vote being 75,083 for
and 4006 against holding the constitutional convention.^
Subsequently, the new constitution written by this legal
body included a severe clause disfranchising disloyal

*Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974)
112-13.
2Ibid., 143-47,
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persons (later repealed by constitutional amendment in 1870)
and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of
citizenship.
Between 1869 and 1898, the federal government safe
guarded, or at least abstained from interfering with, black
suffrage.

In 1869, Congress passed a constitutional amend

ment which became the Fifteenth Amendment in the following
year.

Under it, the federal government undertook to estab

lish the

right of blacks tovote on a constitutional basis.

Unfortunately,

in 1876, the United States Supreme Court

struck a major blow to the amendment in ruling that the
measure did not confer suffrage on anyone, but merely pro
hibited the states from denying the suffrage on certain
grounds.3

in 1870, Congress enacted the Enforcement Acts,

one provision of which declared that voting for federal
Representatives was a constitutional right, and it was
upheld by the federal courts in the 1880's.^

In the follow

ing year, Congress made it a federal crime for any officer
of a Congressional election to violate an electoral obliga
tion imposed on him by state or federal law.

By 1880, the

Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to adopt state
election laws and to add Congressional penalties to enforce
such acts.5

^United

States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).

^Ex

parte Yarbrough, 4S.Ct. 152 (1884).

5Ex

parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
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Within the State of Louisiana, an 1879 constitutional
convention controlled by Bourbon Redeemers (Conservative
Democrats who replaced the Radical Republicans in 1877)
tried to undo the work of the 1868 Radical constitution.
Blacks were not yet disfranchised, primarily because of
fears of reawakening Northern wrath and beliefs by white
Conservatives that black votes could be controlled or manip
ulated to their own advantage.

William Hair, historian of

Bourbon Louisiana, contends that "Bourbon misrule" began
with the inauguration of Governor Louis A. Wiltz in 1880,
and was based on the Constitution of 1879 which "anchored a
regime that was remarkably powerful, backward, and corrupt."
He affirms that Bourbon power rested on the manipulation of
black votes, because blacks outnumbered whites on the regis
tration rolls until 1890.

Republican voting strength in the

state disappeared following the return of the pre-Civil War
leadership, as predominantly black parishes consistently
sent in overwhelmingly Conservative Democratic returns in
elections wracked by fraud and intimidation.^
In 1898, a major downturn occurred in black suffrage in
Louisiana.

In the pivotal Supreme Court decision reached in

Williams v. Mississippi, the court assented to an 1890 state
literacy test for voter registration and a poll tax, holding
that, if the two requirements were applied to whites as well

^William I. Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest:
Louisiana Politics 1877-1900 (Baton kouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1969) 107, 113.
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as blacks, they did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment,
because they did not deny the right to vote on the grounds
of race or color to a n y o n e . ?

In effect, this decision

opened the way for mass disfranchisement of blacks through
out the South.
With the advent of a strong Populist challenge to the
Bourbon oligarchy in the 1890's, the administration of
Conservative Democrat Governor Murphy J. Foster became
determined to rid the state of "the mass of ignorance, vice
and venality without any proprietary interest in the State."
Beginning in the election of 1892, Populists (a loose polit
ical alliance of primarily poor and rural whites and blacks)
posed a threat to the hierarchy of Conservative Democrats.
During the 1896 general election, the governor's supporters
controlled the election machinery in many key parishes,
and only through this means succeeded in securing his
re-election in one of the most fraudulent elections in
Louisiana history.

Dissatisfied Democrats had joined

Republicans and Populists in the most serious electoral
challenge since the end of Radical Reconstruction in 1877.
A constitutional amendment recommended by Governor Foster
and passed by the legislature in 1894 to restrict the suf
frage by literacy and property requirements was also on the
ballot, but failed to pass.

Therefore, the legislature of

1896 passed complex registration and election laws to break

^Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
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the back of Louisiana Populism, which had succeeded in
appealing to the sympathies of a majority of the black
voters of the state.

Tens of thousands of poor whites and

over 90 percent of blacks were disfranchised when the new
election laws took effect on January 1, 1897.

The legisla

ture then took steps to assure the success of its actions by
authorizing an election of delegates to a new constitutional
convention.

To seal the doom of both black and white

Populists, the legislature decreed that the work of the 1898
convention would not be submitted to the voters for their
approval
The delegates to the 1898 constitutional convention
were quite efficient in their aim to disfranchise a majority
of the state's voters.

By and large, the Constitution of

1898 was essentially the Constitution of 1879. with the
addition of measures restricting the suffrage.

To eliminate

migrant sharecroppers, requirements were imposed establish
ing residency at two years in the state, one year in the
parish, and six months in the precinct.

Voters were com

pelled to demonstrate their ability to read and write in
their native language, or to show proof that they owned
property assessed at not less than $300.

Although blacks

were hit hardest by this provision, many poor and illiterate
whites were also entrapped.

Electors were also subjected to

a poll tax of one dollar per year, with receipts for the

Q

Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 234-35, 268-69.
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previous two years having to be presented at election time.
This requirement was designed on the assumption that blacks
were more likely to fail to pay their poll taxes during non
election years, or to misplace their receipts.

A provision

was then added for poor and illiterate but loyal whites in
the form of the nation's first "grandfather clause."

Under

this device, a man could register to vote if he, his father
or his grandfather had been a registered voter in 1867.
However, persons eligible under the grandfather clause were
allowed only three and a half months to comply.9

Approxi

mately 40,000 whites and 111 blacks were later registered
under this provision.^

In order to make it easier for

illiterate whites to identify Democratic candidates, the
convention adopted the rooster emblem as the symbol on
Louisiana election ballots for the state Democratic Party
and white supremacy.^
After 1898, the only men who could still vote in
Louisiana were literate, tax-paying property owners and
their sons, and men who had voted in 1867, or their descen
dants.

The result of these electoral maneuvers was a dras

tic decline in voter registration and voter turnout for sev
eral decades, as presented in table 1.

The number of black

^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1898, Articles
197, 198; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana; A Bicentennial
History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976) 144.
*^Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 277.
^Taylor, Louisiana, 144.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69
voters declined from 130,444 or 44 percent of the state's
registered voters in 1897, to a paltry 5,320 or 4.1 percent
by 1900, when the full impact of the disfranchisement move
ment was in effect.

The lowest point in black voter numbers

was reached in 1940, when only 886 blacks were registered,
comprising 0.1 percent of the state's voters.

Not until

1948, was there significant improvement in the registration
of blacks within Louisiana.*2
It is quite evident from the figures presented in table
1, that Louisiana's Bourbon Democrats had succeeded in
erasing all political progress made by blacks since
Reconstruction, and had removed many of the "disloyal" poor
whites from the rolls as well.

Although blacks were the

main target of the disfranchisement movement, the number of
white registered voters in the state declined from 164,888
in 1897 to 125,437 in 1900, and then to 106,360 in 1904.
Another casualty of the disfranchisement movement was the
decline in voter turnout, once elections had been "purified"
of "corrupt tendencies" by the removal of black voters, and
white men "were free to divide on the issues."

Instead,

voter apathy set in and viable opposition to the hegemony of
Conservative Democrats was almost nil, as table 2 demon
strates.

With the elimination of 55.6 percent of the voters

of 1897, the near record 73.7 percent turnout of 1896 was

12

Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana,
1812-1952 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Btate University Press,
T97TTT9TJ, 492.
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Table 1
Registration of White and Black Voters, 1897-1964

Voter Registration

Year

State
Total

White

Percent
White

•

Black

Percent
Black

1897

294,432

164,888

56.0

130,444

44.0

1900

130,725

125,437

95.9

5,320

4.1

1904

108,079

106,360

98.4

1,718

1.6

1908

154,142

152,142

98.9

1,743

1.1

1912

154,828

153,044

98.9

1,684

1.1

1916

187,312

185,313

98.9

1,979

1.1

1920

260,815

257,282

98.6

3,533

1.4

1924

323,555

322,600

99.7

955

0.3

1928

379,270

377,246

99.5

2,054

0.5

1932

559,233

557,674

99.7

1,559

0.3

1936

643,632

641,589

99.7

2,043

0.3

1940

702,545

701,659

99.9

886

0.1

1944

722,715

721,043

99.8

1,672

0.2

1948

924,705

896,417

96.9

28,177

3.1

1950

818,031

756,356

92.5

61,675

7.5

1952

1,056,720

945,038

89.8

107,844

10.2

Source:

Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana,

1812-1952 (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press,

1971) 190, 422.
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not breached until 1912, and surpassed but six times in the
fourteen gubernatorial elections held after 1896.*3
Allan Sindler finds that the alleged aim of the
Bourbons to establish class harmony by placing all whites in
one large political party united by race was a monumental
failure.

Instead of whites being free of the worry of a

black challenge to white supremacy and the possibility of a

Table 2
Percentage of State Voter Turnout, 1896-1952

Year

Guberna
torial

Presi
dential

Year

Guberna Presi
torial dential

1896

73.7

36.1

1928

76.2

56.9

1900

55.9

51.9

1932

67.9

48.1

1904

50.2

49.9

1936

83.9

51.2

1908

69.3

49.0

1940

78.8

53.0

1912

79.7

50.9

1944

66.3

48.3

1916

61.1

49.6

1948

70.9

45.0

1920

55.0

48.5

1952

74.2

61.7

1924

74.0

37.7

Source:

Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana,

1812-1952 (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press,

1971) 421-22.

13lbid., 190, 421-22.
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return to "black Republican rule," the disfranchisement
movement brought about a dulling of the issues, low voter
turnout, continued party control by an inner clique, and
separation of the state from national issues and politics.*4
Roger Fischer claims that blacks submitted to the new
disfranchisement measures and increased segregation by law
after 1890, because they had lost all means by which to
oppose their relegation to a lower caste.

With no hope of

relief through the political process or through the courts
during the next few decades, any attempt to protest their
condition by physical resistance would be suicide.

Accord

ing to Fischer, segregation hardened in Louisiana after
1890, because whites of the state "had sampled the frighten
ing fruits of black power before 1877," and Conservative
leaders were adamant about preventing its recurrence by any
means.*5
Federal Action to 1955
The federal government took very little action during
the first quarter of the twentieth century to protect the
rights of blacks, much less to begin the process of rolling
back restrictions on black suffrage.

Although the United

^Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana: State
Politics, 1920:1952 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956)

TT.

15

Roger A. Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in
Louisiana, 1862-77 (Urbanal University of Illinois Press,

i$74) 154-57.--------
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States Supreme Court struck down the grandfather clause in
1915, as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, it was
inadequate in preventing other more effective means of dis
franchising blacks.

By 1921, the State of Louisiana had a

network of safeguards to prevent massive registration of its
black residents.

Among the devices used were strict regis

tration requirements, a poll tax, the white primary, and
various local election gimmicks to make it difficult for
blacks to register or to cast a meaningful vote.

Not sur

prisingly, most whites easily met all electoral qualifica
tions, while few blacks could satisfy either local or state
regulations for registration.

It is no small wonder, then,

that blacks made up less than one percent of the registered
voters between 1924 and 1944, although they made up from 39
to 34.5 percent of the state's voting age population in 1920
and 1940, respectively.

It was not until the intervention

of the federal courts in the late 1940's that blacks finally
began to make progress in voting in the state.
In 1921, the state constitutional convention estab
lished several qualifications for voter registration.

Pro

spective voters must have attained the age of twenty-one and
resided in the state for one year, in the parish for six
months, and in the precinct for three months prior to an
election.

In addition, a prospective voter was required to

be able to read and write in English or in his mother
tongue, to "be a person of good character and reputation,"
to "be able to understand and give a reasonable
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interpretation of any section" of the state or national
constitutions, and to pay a poll tax.

The section dealing

with "good character" could be used to eliminate a host of
"undesirable" registrants, including persons in common law
marriages and those who gave birth to or fathered illegiti
mate children.

Finally, the constitution provided the means

for private citizens to be able to challenge the names of
illegally registered voters.1®

In effect, the new consti

tution extended the power of disfranchisement to local par
ish registrars and vigilant white supremacists.
Besides registration requirements, Louisiana had an
exclusive white primary to prevent the few qualified blacks
from voting.

As late as 1921, the view of the United States

Supreme Court was that a party primary was not to be con
strued as an election within the meaning of the
Constitution.

Therefore, the state's white primary was

indirectly safeguarded by the nation's highest court.1^
The process of overturning the white primary began in
the late 1920's and culminated with the Smith v. Allwright
decision in 1944.

A successful NAACP suit of 1927, chal

lenging a Texas law that excluded blacks from participating
in a Democratic Party primary election opened the way for
future litigation on the suffrage issue.

Then, in 1932, the

Supreme Court voided another law that gave the Texas

^ Constitution of 1921, Article 8.
^Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
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Democratic Executive Committee the power to determine its
own membership, thus excluding blacks from participation in
its elections.

When the high court finally invalidated the

white primary itself in 1944, the way was legally opened for
a return to massive voter registration and re-entry of
blacks into Southern politics.

However, it did not prevent

the states from adopting other quasi-legal artifices and
subterfuges to hamper black registration for another two
decades.
Louisiana election laws first came under attack by the
Supreme Court in 1941, in connection with a 1900 statute
which provided for all political parties to nominate candi
dates for United States Representatives by direct primary
elections.

The court declared that a citizen had the right

to vote in a Congressional primary and to have his vote
honestly counted.

Since the state required that all poli

tical parties nominate candidates for Representative in
primaries, they were an integral part of the election proce
dure and were thus subject to constitutional protections.
The Supreme Court was also cognizant of the reality that
winning the Democratic primary in Louisiana was equivalent
to election, and that general elections were mere formali
ties .

^Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
19

Acts of Louisiana, 1900, Regular Session, no. 46.
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The Southern states did not immediately comply with
Smith v. Allwright, but resorted to such stalling devices as
the "South Carolina Plan" and the "Bosworth Amendment."

In

the former scheme, South Carolina sought to circumvent
action by the federal courts by deleting all references to
"state" primaries from its constitution and laws, in an
attempt to disguise its elections as being free of state
action.

Under the "Bosworth Amendment," Alabama required

all voters to demonstrate their ability to understand and
explain parts of the United States Constitution to the
satisfaction of local registration officials.

However, both

contrivances were nullified by the federal courts in the
late 1940's.20

Blacks in Louisiana won a somewhat limited

victory in 1951, when the Democratic State Central Committee
dropped its requirement that voters and party candidates be
white.

Any further resistance by the Southern states in

maintaining white primaries or other devices to forestall an
end to the all-white Democratic primary ended with the
Supreme Court's decision in 1953, to outlaw sophisticated as
well as simple modes of discrimination in the conduct of
state primary elections.21

19

Acts of Louisiana, 1900, Regular Session, no. 46.

20Rice v. Elmore, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); Schnell v.
Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
21
Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D'Amato and Rosemary
Metrailer, Desegregation from Brown to Alexander: An
Exploration of Supreme Court Strategies (Carbondale;
Southern Illinois University I*ress, 1977) 34; Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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In the State of Louisiana, thousands of black residents
began to resume registration for the first time since the
1890's, but as Democrats rather than Republicans.

This

transformation of party allegiance began across the nation
during the 1930's with the influence of such factors as the
Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, the outmigration of blacks
from the South to Northern urban centers, the dominance of
the Republican Party by conservatives, and by the influence
of Huey Long within Louisiana.

Although the state's poll

tax was repealed in 1934, it was the voiding of the white
primary in the 1940's that resulted in a dramatic increase
in the number of black voter registrations, especially in
the more tolerant areas of New Orleans and South Louisiana.
Black registration rose from 886 in 1940, to 28,177 in 1948,
and to over 150,000 by 1956.

According to Louisiana politi

cal sociologist Perry Howard, the increase in black voters
by 1948 became a factor to be reckoned with in close elec
tions, and helped to give Earl K. Long his first primary
gubernatorial victory in 1956.

Blacks received their great

est benefits through welfare legislation enacted during the
tenure of Long governorships, and showed their appreciation
to their benefactors at the

p o l l s .

^2

New Orleans Mayor

DeLesseps S. Morrison, who had received strong support from
the city's 13,000 black voters, had won his first mayoralty
election with a 4,372 vote margin of victory.
22

The near

Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 275-77,

422.
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doubling of black registration in the city by 1950, made him
extremely mindful of the importance of the black vote in his
re-election campaign of that year.

Therefore, he openly

gave black New Orleanians assistance and attention, and was
rewarded with their overwhelming support throughout his sub
sequent political career in Louisiana.^3
Outside of New Orleans, the situation for blacks was
less promising.

Prior to 1956, blacks in northern and cen

tral Louisiana, the Florida Parishes (the area which was
formerly part of the West Florida territory until 1813), and
in St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes in southern
Louisiana, were strongly dissuaded from registering by

Table 3
State Voter Registration, 1948-1956

Year

Total
Voters

Total
White

Percent
White

Total
Black

Percent
Black

1940

702,545

701,659

99.9

886

0.1

1944

722,715

721,043

99.8

1,672

0.2

1948

924,705

896,417

96.9

28,177

3.1

1952

1,056,720

756,356

89.8

107,844

10.2

1956

1,057,687

945,038

85.6

152,073

14.4

Source:

Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 422.

23

Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the Image
of Reform: New Orleans Politics, j-946-1961 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1974) 39, 67.
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various means.

In the parishes of East Carroll, Madison,

Tensas and West Feliciana, there were no blacks registered
at all.
The Voter Registration Purges of 1956
The two Brown cases of 1954 and 1955 served as cata
lysts for the resumption of the race question in Louisiana
politics.

With the political advent of the Longs, the race

issue was pushed into the background, but in the mid-1950's,
race re-emerged as a potent force in the state's political
arena.

Since the Longs depended on both black and white

votes for power, they largely remained silent on racial
issues.

As long as they kept race out of the forefront of

politics, their power and the bifactional system operating
in the state continued.

However, Brown fractured whatever

racial compromise had existed in Louisiana politics and led
to the rise of a rabid racist faction that inflamed public
opinion on a level unprecedented in twentieth century
Louisiana.

The state became divided over the racial issue

and anyone who appeared bold enough to take a moderate stand
on race was politically ruined by a nascent cadre of racist
politicians determined to preserve white

s u p r e m a c y .

^4

By 1956, State Senator Willie Rainach of Claiborne
Parish in North Louisiana and Leander Perez, boss of

^Earlean M. McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official
Resistance to Desegregation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1964) 11.
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Plaquemines Parish, had emerged as the foremost leaders of
racists bent on preventing any cracks in the bulwark of
segregation.

At this time, Rainach served as the leader of

the Louisiana Association of Citizens' Councils, the fore
most white supremacy group in the state, and as the chairman
of the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation, formed in
1954

to serve as a watchdog committee of the state legisla

ture

to

oversee de jure segregation in Louisiana. From

within his dual posts, Rainach was able to amass great power
and influence over the state until his unsuccessful run for
the governor's office in 1959.
As 1956 began, black voter registration in the state
was over 151,000, a nearly 50 percent increase since 1952.
Rainach warned that this was a dangerous trend and had
"disastrous consequences" which portended a return to the
days

of Reconstruction.

He alleged that the voter rolls

were

filled with thousands of illegally registered voters in

violation of the state constitution's literacy clause.
Therefore, under the auspices of the Citizens' Councils, a
drive was pushed in 1956 to reverse the trend of black voter
registration by challenging their names in primarily North
Louisiana parishes.

Directed by Rainach, Council members

used a state constitutional provision that allowed private
citizens to challenge the qualifications of any name on a
parish voter registration list.

A person whose name had

been challenged then had to be notified by mail by the
parish registrar, and had ten days to appear before the
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registrar to refute the challenge or his name would be
removed from the voter

l i s t . ^ 5

The effectiveness of the voter purge drew the attention
of the Justice Department, which launched an immediate
investigation into voter irregularities in ten Louisiana
parishes.

Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on

Privileges and Elections, United States Assistant Attorney
General Warren Olney III presented evidence of gross viola
tions in the application of the state's voter registration
laws.

In these ten parishes alone, where only a scant per

centage of the black residents were previously registered,
8552 black voters were purged from parish registration
rolls.

In Ouachita Parish, where the most extreme voter

purges had occurred, over 3400 names had been challenged "by
a scheme and device to which a number of white citizens and
certain local officials were parties."

Olney disclosed that

the scheme had begun to eliminate all black voters residing
in Wards 3 and 19 of the parish in January of 1956.

In

March, the Ouachita Parish Citizens' Council began challeng
ing names and induced the parish registrar to notify those
challenged to appear before her within ten days to prove
their qualifications by the affidavits of three witnesses.
In April and May, Citizens' Council members were allowed to
examine voter records and to prepare lists of black voters,

25

New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 26, 1956;
Constitution of 1921, Article 8 .
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at which time they filed 3420 documents (only twenty-three
of which were against whites) with the registrar, alleging
that the persons challenged were illegally registered.26
When large numbers of blacks appeared at the regis
trar's office to respond to the challenges, they were
informed that only fifty names would be reviewed per day,
which effectively eliminated over 2700 of the 3240 persons
soon to be removed from the voter list.

The registrar then

refused to accept as witnesses any parish voters living in a
precinct other than that of the challenged voter, or persons
who had already acted as witnesses for any other challenged
voter.

Thus, most of the deleted voters were unable to
Table 4
Voters Removed in Ten Parishes by Purges of 1956

Parish

Voters
Removed

Parish

Voters
Removed

Bienville

560

LaSalle

345

Caldwell

330

Lincoln

325

DeSoto

383

Quachita

3240

Grant

758

Rapides

1058

Jackson

953

Union

Source:

600

2 Race Relations Law Reporter, 478 (1957).

262 RRLR, 469-71, 478 (1957).
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reply to their challenges and had no other recourse except
to re-register.

Blacks who then attempted to do so, were

required to give a "reasonable interpretation" of a clause
of the state or federal constitutions, while whites were not
given such a test.

Regardless of their interpretation, all

blacks who submitted to the test were informed that their
responses were "unreasonable".^7
Similar problems were encountered in the other parishes
which had conducted voter purges.

In Rapides Parish, two

hundred blacks were improperly eliminated from the registra
tion rolls within a ten-day period.

The registrar of

Caldwell Parish refused to accept witnesses unless they were
accompanied by a law enforcement official and by a member of
the local Citizens' Council to identify them, and would not
allow whites to serve as witnesses for challenged blacks.
In several of the parishes, registrars allegedly did every
thing in their power to discourage deleted voters from fil
ing statutory reply affidavits as required by state law,
then refused to accept them when proffered.

Blacks were

also told in several cases that they would need to contact
an attorney to straighten out their registration.^8
As 1956 came to a close, Rainach announced "Operation
Cleanup," a new Citizens' Council drive to purge state voter
lists of "illegally registered voters," beginning January 1,

27Ibid., 477.
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1957.

By the end of 1956, 11,000 blacks had been removed

from the rolls in thirteen North Louisiana parishes.29
In January of 1957, United States District Judge Ben
Dawkins ordered the registrars of Bienville, Jackson,
DeSoto, and Grant parishes to submit their voter registra
tion records to a federal grand jury meeting in Shreveport
to investigate the possibility of violations of civil rights
laws.

Rainach referred to the investigators as "Yankee

lawyers" who were trying "to intimidate our people."30
Less than a month later, Louisiana Attorney General
Jack P. F. Gremillion explained to the Civil Rights
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee the process
for voter challenges and due process available to persons
challenged and removed from the voter rolls.

He contended

that state laws were being fairly applied to both whites and
blacks on a nondiscriminatory basis, and that "there has not
been any deprivation of Civil Rights regardless of any
minority group" in the state.31

Assistant Attorney General

Olney refuted Gremillion's testimony, presenting further
allegations of voter registration irregularities in the ten
parishes under investigation.

Among his charges was that

some registrars did not give registrants the option of
selecting a constitutional clause to interpret, as

29

Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 15, 1956.
New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 29, 1957.

312 RRLR, 418-14 (1957).
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Gremillion had declared.

Also, in none of the parishes did

registrars routinely send a reply affidavit form to chal
lenged voters.32
The registrar of Ouachita Parish was the subject of two
suits in conjunction with the 1956 voter purges.

In the

case of Sharp v. Lucky, a black attorney claimed that the
registrar had injured him in his status as an attorney by
refusing him permission to inspect a client's registration
in her office, and by refusing to permit blacks to use her
office for registration matters.

When the United States

District Court dismissed the case, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed on the grounds that a registrar may not
operate a segregated office.

On remand, the district court

ruled that the registrar had acted in good faith and with
good will in providing services when segregation had been
practiced, but that this policy had been discontinued.
Thus, the court declined to take any action, and its
decision was affirmed on

a p p e a l .

33

The case of Reddix v. Lucky involved a black man whose
name had been challenged and removed from the Ouachita
Parish voter registration list in 1956.

Claiming that

racial discrimination had led to the illegal removal of his
name, he brought suit against the registrar in federal

32Ibid., 477.
33Sharp v. Lucky, 148 F.Supp. 8 (W.D. La. 1957), 165
F.Supp. (W.D. La. 1958), 266 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1959).
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court.

The district court held that the registrar had only

done what she was required to do by state law, and that the
plaintiff had failed to exhaust available legal remedies,
including attempting to re-register.

On appeal, the United

States Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that Reddix
had a case under the requirements of the Fifteenth
Amendment, and because the actions of the registrar in
removing 2500 names from the voter roll within thirty days
of an election was "shockingly unfair."34
Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1957
A major step was taken by the federal government in the
protection of the right to vote with the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957.

Though modest, it aimed at

strengthening the enforcement of voting rights by the fed
eral courts, created a Civil Rights Commission to investi
gate alleged racial discrimination in voting, created the
Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice, and
granted the United States Attorney General power to insti
tute suits in conjunction with

v o t i n g .

35

Within Louisiana, the Citizens’ Council of New Orleans
declared that the act was "calculated to destroy the
American right of local self-government" and was "the first

34Reddix v. Lucky, 2 RRLR 426-27 (1957); 252 F. 2d 930
(5th Cir. 1958).
3^Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 83-315, 71
Stat. 634 (1957).
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step in the federal government taking over complete control
of the election processes of the state."

Among the few

supporters of the act was Camille Gravel, Jr., chairman of
the Democratic State Central Committee and a national com
mitteeman from the state, who defended the civil rights law
as a way to prevent "un-Christian, un-American, and unDemocratic" anti-black activities in Louisiana.

In 1957,

Gravel affirmed his support of the Brown decision and his
opposition to segregation and the efforts to remove thou
sands of black voters.

His outspoken attitude resulted in

several attempts to remove him from his position of leader
ship in the state Democratic Party.

However, the chairman

of the Democratic National Committee refused to remove him
and Gravel would not resign.

Gravel avowed that he was "a

moderate, loyal, realistic Louisiana Democrat" who believed
in respecting and recognizing human rights of minority
groups, and that the "right to vote is a fundamental right
in a democracy."

He charged Senator Rainach with trying to

destroy the Democratic Party in the state and trying to make
a name for himself in preparation for a run for governor.^
Using the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Justice
Department initiated suits against various parish registrars
and other persons who allegedly deprived blacks of their
right to vote.

In Washington Parish, the local Citizens'

og
New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 31, July 7, 17,
1957.
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Council and the registrar were charged with acting "under
color of law" and conspiracy in fraudulently purging parish
voter registration rolls.

The federal district court

rejected claims that parts of the Civil Rights Act were
unconstitutional, and enjoined Council members from further
vote challenges and interference with the rights of citizens
to

v o t e .

37

Xn a Bienville Parish case, local officials

claimed that the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments were unconstitutional.

Rejecting their

contentions, the court held that the local Citizens' Council
had deprived blacks of their right to vote by its purge of
voter rolls, during which 95 percent of registered blacks
were challenged for registration errors, while white voters
with similar errors were ignored.

Since the registrar had

continued to discriminate against blacks seeking to regis
ter, it ordered the reinstatement of the names of those
persons deleted from the registration list in 1956, and
enjoined the registrar from such action in the future.38
State Legislation and Politics, 1958-1960
By 1958, the atmosphere in the state legislature had
changed dramatically since 1956 (sessions held in

374 RRLR 962-63 (1959), 5 RRLR 112-13 (I960); United
States v. Mcfilveen, 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La. 1959), 180
F.Supp. 10 (E.D. I960).

38 5 RRLR 773 (I960); 6 RRLR 802-03 (1961); United
States v. Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana, 196
F.Supp. 908 (E.D. La. 1961).
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odd-numbered years were devoted exclusively to fiscal mat
ters).

The state hovered on the brink of disaster as segre

gationists under the influence of Senator Rainach reigned
supreme over the regular legislative session, with only
feeble opposition to the demands of racist legislators.

To

oppose them was to risk being accused of integrationist or
communist sympathies.
Among the numerous segregation measures enacted in
1958, were three which dealt with voting.

One statute

empowered the attorney general to defend parish registrars
from suits involving federal rights, while other acts con
tinued the salary of voter registration officials who were
called away from their official duties because of federal
litigation relating to voting and extended the prohibition
against the selling of votes to include registration.39

By

the end of the 1958 session, tensions ran so high that
absence or abstention from a vote on segregation laws made a
solon suspect, placing him at risk of political suicide.
One senator, J. D. DeBlieux of Baton Rouge, counselled mod
eration and was defeated for re-election by a racist chal
lenger in the 1959-60 state elections.^
Continued voter purges in 1958 resulted in open opposi
tion from parish registrars in Winn and St. Landry Parishes,

39

Acts of Louisiana, 1958, Regular Session, no. 482,
no. 483, no. £>17.
^McCarrick, "Louisiana’s Official Resistance," 81.
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in a federal investigation, and in a clash between Governor
Earl K. Long and Senator Rainach.

A report released in 1958

showed that four parishes had no blacks registered to vote,
while nine others had less than one hundred registered. 41
After receiving sixty-eight complaints of discrimination
being practiced in registration, the United States Civil
Rights Commission met at Shreveport to investigate charges
against seventeen registrars, whose records were subse
quently subpoenaed.

State Attorney General Gremillion por

trayed the commission as "a grand inquisition by the federal
government," and accused it of "threatening, coercing and in
a tyrannical manner bringing unlawful procedures to bear,
causing great injury" to the registrars as well as to quali
fied

v o t e r s .

42 jn October of 1959, a three-judge federal

court decided that the commission had exceeded its powers,
and had threatened the registrars with "immediate and irrep
arable damage" by failing to advise the accused registrars
of charges against them.

The court then enjoined the com

mission from conducting further hearings in Shreveport.

Not

until I960, did the United States Supreme Court reverse the
lower court ruling and affirm the actions of the Civil
Ri g h t s

C o m m i s s i o n . 43

^Burton, On the Black Side, 114.
^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, June 25, Aug. 1, 1959.
^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 8, 1959; Larche v.
Hannah, 177 F.Supp. Bib (W.D. La. 1959).
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During the first half of his term, Governor Long
refrained from any serious attacks on Rainach or his sup
porters.

However, when the senator interfered with voter

registration in Winn Parish, the governor's home base, to
influence the outcome of the Eighth Congressional District
election in 1958, Long unleashed a scathing attack on him.
The governor, not known for mincing words, declared that
many people were following Rainach "not because they agree
with you but because they are scared of you," and inferred
that the senator was raising the segregation issue in order
to further his own political ambitions.

Long then avowed

his "1000 per cent" support for segregation and declared
that segregation should not be used as an issue for running
for- political

office.

Senator Rainach achieved his revenge during the 1959
legislative session, when he and John Garrett, the leading
racist in the House of Representatives, succeeded in defeat
ing two administrative measures that were designed to break
the power of the racists.

One bill would have allowed voter

challenges only where names had been on the registration
list more than twelve months prior to the challenge, while
the other bill would have prohibited the removal of a voter
for "an inconsequential or inadvertant error."

Although

Rainach's allies defeated the measures in the Senate on the

^St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, June 27, 1958; New
Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 10, 1958.
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grounds that they were not fiscal items, the senator encoun
tered his first strong opposition in the process.

Governor

Long had been tardy in confronting the racists earlier when
their power was in its infancy, and now, with the first
gubernatorial primary scheduled for late 1959, and with the'
racists in ascendance nationwide, taming the movement proved
to be too great for Long.45

Louisiana historian Glen

Jeansonne observed that as the governor approached the end
of his political career, he had never really decided what
kind of stand to take on the race issue.

For fear of losing

the small but increasing black vote, he rarely resorted to
race-baiting, but to champion blacks might cost him much of
the white vote.

Therefore, the ill and exhausted Long

straddled the issue until his death in 1960.46
The 1959-60 gubernatorial election was the first state
election since 1924, in which race was the major issue.

No

avowedly segregationist candidate made the second Democratic
primary, although Rainach placed third in the first primary.
However, the apparent failure of the "peace and harmony"
campaign of Jimmie Davis in the first primary led to his
decision to adopt racism in the second, and to abandon all
attempts to win black votes, most of which went to

^McCarrick,
99 -1 0 0 .

"Louisiana's Official Resistance," 93-94,

^ G l e n Jeansonne, "Racism and Longism in Louisiana:
The 1959-60 Gubernatorial Elections," Readings in Louisiana
Politics, ed. Mark T. Carleton, Perry H. Howard and Joseph
6 . Parker (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing, 1975) 475.
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front-runner DeLesseps S. Morrison.

With its obvious impli

cations, Davis announced that he would not accept the sup
port of the NAACP or of Teamster boss Jimmy Hof fa, and would
not tolerate Northern groups coming into the state "with a
designed plan to divide our people and disrupt our Southern
way of life."^7

a Davis ad claimed that Morrison had won

74.84% of the black vote as a result of courting blacks by
placing them on the New Orleans city payroll and by putting
up token resistance to integration of municipal facilities
in New Orleans.

Davis received the backing of Earl Long,

Leander Perez and Willie Rainach, while the influential
New Orleans Times Picayune and Shreveport Times exaggerated
the significance of the bloc of black votes received by
Morrison in the first primary.

Glen Jeansonne holds that

the second primary of I960 revealed that segregation had
become the major single issue in the election and that the
segregation crisis brought out 80.7 percent of the state's
approximately 850,000 white and 150,000 black Democratic
v

o

t

e

r

s

.

Of course, the result of this intensely racist

campaign was disaster for Morrison, as Davis swept into
office with a mandate for white supremacy and segregation.
During the campaign, Davis had committed his adminis
tration to a course of defiance, and he now proceeded to

^ A. J. Liebling, The Earl of Louisiana (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1970) 194-96, 205-06; New
Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 8 , I960.
/ Q

Jeansonne, "Racism and Longism," 453-55.
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steer segregationist forces in the direction of resistance
to federal attempts to eliminate state segregation laws.

In

his May 10, I960, inaugural address, Governor Davis pledged
to preserve segregation and to "maintain our way of life
without compromise,, without prejudice and— without vio
lence," and declared his intention to "cooperate with the
federal government."

However, he would "not permit inter

ference with those rights that the constitution specifically
reserves to Louisiana."^9
The I960 regular session of the state legislature was
preoccupied with preserving racial segregation, and pro
ceeded to enact several measures to prevent large numbers of
blacks from successfully registering to vote.

Three acts

dealt with voter registrars, making it a crime for elected
officials or private citizens to interfere with, coerce or
influence a registrar; empowering the state attorney general
to serve as legal advisor to registrars; and requiring all
registrars to comply "faithfully and without reservation of
conscience or mind" with all state registration and election
laws.50

Another statute specified the form to be used for

voter registration and barred from registration applicants
who had been convicted of a felony, had participated in a
common law marriage or had borne or fathered an illegitimate

^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, May 11, I960.
^ Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 82,
no. 484, no. 485.
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child within the past five years.

This measure was sub

sequently approved by the state's voters as a constitutional
amendment, in the mistaken belief that placing voter
restrictions in the state constitution might dissuade
federal courts from interfering with the wishes of the
people of L o u i s i a n a . a final act required all candidates
for public office to list their race on all forms relating
to nomination and candidacy, and provided for listing their
race on the ballot.

This law was designed to prevent a

recurrence of the success of two black office-seekers who
had qualified in the recent second primary in New

O r l e a n s .

52

Impact of the Civil Rights Act of I960
One bright spot for voter rights in Louisiana was
passage of the Civil Rights Act of I960, which extended
federal authority over registration by granting the Justice
Department additional powers to protect voting rights.

The

United States Attorney General could request that the
federal courts determine whether discrimination was the
result of a "pattern or practice" by the state, and federal
courts were empowered to appoint referees to help determine
qualified voter applicants.53

Ibid., no. 305, no. 613.

52 Ibid., no. 538.
53Civil Rights Act of I960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74
Stat. 86 (1960).
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Prior to its passage, the new Civil Rights Act was
condemned by Third Congressional District Representative
Edwin Willis, with the support of First District
Representative F. Edward Hebert, as "one of a series of
punitive political measures to penalize the Southern States"
in an appeal for the minority vote of Northern and Western
cities in the upcoming Presidential election of I960.
Referring to the act as "unconstitutional" and "devastat
ing," he declared that it restored the old Force Bills of
Reconstruction days "when the people of the South lived
under a government by carpetbaggers," and was sure to breed
"racial troubles of untold proportions."54
Shortly after passage of the Civil Rights Act in May of
I960, Louisiana Attorney General Gremillion sought to ban
its use in a federal probe of voting rights complaints
against several parish registrars.

However, a three-judge

panel upheld the constitutionality of the law and voided
state attempts to prevent the Justice Department from
inspecting, reproducing and copying all records and papers
having to do with registration or voting in federal
elections conducted by the registrar of East Feliciana
Parish.55
In mid-1960, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights conducted additional hearings on voter registration

“*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 7, I960.
^Ibid., May 26, July 28, I960; In re Palmer, 5 RRLR
774 (19W T
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in Louisiana.

Witnesses from East Carroll, Madison,

Claiborne, Caddo, and Jackson parishes testified before the
commission that they had tried numerous times to register,
only to be denied for various reasons.

They were informed

that they needed two registered voters to identify them,
that the time had not yet come for blacks to register, that
blacks would get too much power if they were allowed to
vote, that the registrar was out of application forms, that
they had failed the constitutional interpretation test or
that they had spoiled their registration forms by omissions
or

e r r o r s .

56

As the year came to an end, former State

Senator J. D. DeBlieux, a racial moderate, was appointed
chairman of the Louisiana Advisory Committee of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights.

Its main function was to

study the state's achievements and problems in voting,
administration of justice, public employment, employment by
federal contractors and public

e d u c a t i o n . 57

In hearings conducted by the Commission on Civil Rights
in May of 1961, voting rights violations in Plaquemines,
Bossier, Webster, St. Helena and Jackson parishes were
investigated.

State Attorney General Gremillion testified

that there was no discrimination against blacks in the
state, and charged that federal officials were "far more
interested in forcing Louisiana Negroes to vote than are the

■^New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 28, I960.

57Ibid., Dec. 15, I960.
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Negroes themselves."

He then proceeded to outline benefits

accorded to blacks in the state:

72 percent of aid to

dependent children, 46 percent of old age assistance, 53
percent of disability payments and 66 percent of all
admissions to charity hospitals, despite the fact that only
32 percent of state population was black.
testify were several registrars.

Also called to

The registrar of Jackson

Parish required perfect spelling and the ability to inter
pret parts of the United States Constitution, but had rarely
asked whites to interpret provisions because "they were more
intelligent along these lines."
Parish informed
with people

The registrar of Webster

the commission that she skipped

she knew, most of whom werewhite.

the test
However,

records showed that of the 15,035 white adults residing in
the parish, 11,881 were registered, while only 125 of 7313
black adults were registered.

The registrar of Plaquemines

Parish required applicants to calculate their ages in years,
months and days.
strate with
By the

When asked by the commission to demon

her present age, she failed

her ownt e s t . 58

end of November of 1961, voter registration in

Louisiana had reached 1,071,242 (919,520 white and 151,722
black).

As the year came to an end, the Justice Department

challenged the voter interpretation test, claiming that its

58Ibid., May 5, 6 , 1961.
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purpose was to allow parish registrars arbitrary discretion
to deprive otherwise qualified blacks to register to vote.59
Slow Progress in Black Registration, 1962-1964
During the early 1960's, the Justice Department and the
federal courts took the leading role in removing the legal
obstacles preventing blacks from mass voter registration.
The Louisiana State Legislature continued to impede federal
attempts to equalize voting rights for blacks by the passage
of additional measures to forestall the inevitable.

How

ever, the federal judicial and executive branches conducted
a relentless attack upon the state and its subdivisions
through litigation and voidance of de jure statutes and
other discriminatory actions in registration and voting.
Congress joined them by its passage of Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which established the legal framework
for the momentous Voting Rights Act of the following year.
In the 1962 regular session of the Louisiana State
Legislature, additional registration laws were enacted.

One

act established the procedure for conducting a new citizen
ship test and required the state board of voter registration
to direct parish registrars to use the test for voter eligi
bility.

A companion statute prescribed a form to use for

voter registration, including restrictions on felony

•^Ibid., Dec. 29, 1961; Baton Rouge State Times,
Nov. 30“ 19bl.
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convictions, common law marriages and fathering or giving
birth to an illegitimate child.

A constitutional amendment

was sent to the voters directing the state voter registra
tion board to adopt a specified written test on the obliga
tions of citizenship for use by parish registrars.^0
The federal courts granted the Justice Department per
mission to inspect and reproduce past and present records of
several registrars in 1962.

They also ordered the registrar

of East Carroll Parish to accept specific documents such as
drivers' licenses as identification for voter registration,
enjoined him from requiring that black applicants be person
ally known to him or be identifiable by a white registered
voter, and required the registrar to submit monthly progress
reports showing the names of all persons rejected for regis
tration and the reason for their rejection.

In July, the

United States District Court certified twenty-eight blacks
who had applied and qualified for registration in East
Carroll Parish, but who were unable to register due to the
resignation of the registrar.

Following this action by the

court, the state again challenged the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act of I960, alleging that it violated the
Tenth Amendment.

However, the court upheld the right of a

federal court to certify applications, and declared that the
state's exercise of powers under the Tenth Amendment (powers

^ A cts of Louisiana, 1962, Regular Session, no. 62,
no. 63>~no. 53^.
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reserved to the states) was subject to the Fourteenth (due
process and equal protection of the laws for all citizens)
and Fifteenth Amendments (prohibited denial of suffrage on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude).
A year later, the federal district court held that the Tenth
Amendment did not impinge on expressed or implied powers
delegated to the federal government, even where those powers
were in conflict with state powers.

Since Article I,

Section 4 of the United States Constitution gave the federal
government power over the holding of federal elections, it
also had control over registration for such elections.
Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, voter quali
fications had to be nondiscriminatory.^l
During 1963, the federal courts continued to review the
past and present actions of primarily North Louisiana regis
trars.

The actions that resulted in the removal of 85 per

cent of the voters of Jackson Parish in 1956 were voided,
public officials and the local Citizens' Council were
enjoined from such action in the future, and registration
officials were enjoined from requiring applicants to pro
nounce or define any words or statements in the application
form or to give an interpretation of a provision of the
constitution.^2

Another registrar was enjoined from

617 RRLR 327 (1962); United States v. Manning, 215
F.Supp. 272 IW.D. La. 1963).
62United States v. Wilder, 222 F.Supp. 749 (W.D. La.
1963).
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refusing to accept certain types of documents of identifi
cation and from using different and more stringent proce
dures on registration tests for blacks than for whites in
Madison Parish.^3
A major breakthrough in the destruction of Louisiana's
de jure attempts to restrict black suffrage came in 1963,
with the voiding of the state's laws which permitted local
registrars to test voter applicants on their ability to
interpret provisions of state or federal constitutions.

In

United States v. State of Louisiana, the federal courts
enjoined the use of such testing throughout the state, in
order to reverse the effects of past discrimination in the
use of the interpretation test.

It was held that the inter

pretation test had been in every state constitution since
1898, but had never been enforced until August 3, 1962, and
that it was another grandfather clause that effectively
disfranchised blacks.

The courts also placed a freeze on

the use of the new citizenship test in twenty-one parishes
where there had been evidence of discriminatory application
of the interpretation test between 1956 and I960.

Black

registration in these parishes had declined from 28,504 in

1956, to 10,256 in I960, out of a total black population of
107,446 within this region.

By comparison, 162,427 whites

were registered in these parishes in I960, out of a total

^United States v. Ward, 222 F.Supp. 617 (W.D. La.
1963).
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white population of 212,273.

Therefore, the federal courts

forbade the use of the citizenship test in all of these
parishes until black applicants could be judged by standards
equal to those persons already registered, and until there
was no further evidence of discriminatory effects of past
tests.

However, the citizenship test could be administered

to persons not yet of voting age by August 3, 1962, to
persons who had not met residency requirements by then or
for a general re-registration of an entire

parish.

Following this decision, the federal judiciary
continued to keep a watchful eye on these parishes during

1963, to detect any signs of maneuvering to defer action on
registrations and to accelerate the registration process.
When- the registrars of East and West Feliciana Parishes
closed their offices with the excuse that they had no legal
standards to use in testing applicants for registration, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered them to reopen their
offices in accordance with hours specified by state law and
to "process expeditiously" all applications of qualified
v o t e r s . j n Red River Parish, which had 93 percent of its
adult white population registered but less than 2 percent of
its adult blacks, the registrar had rejected 70 percent of
black applications and accepted 90 percent of white ones

^United States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. 353
(E.D. La. 1963); New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 28, 1963.
^United States v. Palmer, 230 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La.
1964); 9 RRLR 783 (1964).
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since the registration purge of 1956.^6

In Webster Parish,

the courts discovered that the registrar had administered an
oral constitutional interpretation test to blacks from 1957
to 1962, and then had reintroduced the test in 1963, when
large numbers of blacks had begun to register and to pass
the new citizenship test.

Also, she would not process the

applications of blacks when alone in her office, had
required blacks to produce witnesses for identification and
had used the registration application in a discriminatory
way as a testing device for blacks from 1957 to 1963.

By

September of 1962, 53 percent of white adults and only 1.3
percent of black adults in the parish were registered.

In

all cases, the federal courts ordered registrars to cease
discriminatory operation of their offices, to make their
records available for inspection and duplication, to notify
each voter applicant of the reason for his rejection and to
file regular registration reports with the courts.^7
During 1963, CORE conducted voter registration drives
in various parts of the state.

In 1963, their target was

the Sixth Congressional District, which had Baton Rouge as
its hub.

There were over 800,000 Louisiana residents of

voting age in the state who were not registered at this
time.

In the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts,

United States v. Crawford, 229 F.Supp. 898 (W.D. La.
1964).
67United States v. Clement, 9 RRLR 772-73 (1964).
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there were more persons nonregistered than those who were.
By November of 1963, there were 1,182,676 persons registered
to vote in the first Democratic primary for governor in
December.

Of this total, 86.4 percent were white and 13.6

percent were black registrants.

Tensas Parish still had no

blacks registered, while Claiborne, Plaquemines, Red River,
West Carroll and West Feliciana parishes had less than a
hundred blacks registered.

Not until December of 1963, did

the first black resident since Reconstruction register to
vote in Tensas Parish.
The 1963-64 Democratic primaries for governor were the
last blatantly racist gubernatorial elections in Louisiana
history.

As in the 1959-60 primaries, race played a major

role in determining the final outcome.

During the first

primary in December of 1963, the extreme segregationists
were again unsuccessful in placing a candidate in the run
off, and two moderates emerged to run in the second primary.
DeLesseps S. Morrison placed first ahead of newcomer John J.
McKeithen, who ran a distant second.

As in the first pri

mary in 1959, Morrison received a lopsided majority of the
black vote and was immediately placed on the defensive.
Backers of McKeithen accused Morrison of secretly collabo
rating with the NAACP for the black vote in exchange for a
promise to liberalize the state's voter registration laws.

68

Baton Rouge State Times, Aug. 9, Nov. 22, Jan. 17,
1964; New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 27, 1963, Jan. 8,
1964.
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Because Morrison failed to extricate himself from allega
tions of being an integrationist conspiring to amass enough
black votes to propel himself into the governor's office,
the extremists threw their weight behind McKeithen in the
second primary as they had done for Davis in I960, and waged
a bitterly racist campaign.

The result was Morrison's

defeat in his third and last try for the governorship of
Louisiana.

According to the Public Affairs Research Council

of Louisiana (PAR), McKeithen's victory was due primarily to
the issue of race, religion and urbanism.

At his inaugura

tion, however, Governor McKeithen disappointed the rabid
segregationists when he spoke in favor of reason and modera
tion on the race issue.^9
In early 1964, the United States Supreme Court struck
down Louisiana's I960 law which required that the race of
all candidates for public office be designated on all nomin
ation and candidacy forms as well as on the election ballot.
In Anderson v. Martin, a lower federal court ruling that had
affirmed this statute was overturned by the Supreme Court,
which held that compulsory designation of race violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
placed the state behind an attempt at racial discrimination
at the polls.

Further, the indication of race or color on

69

William Greer McCall, "School Desegregation in
Louisiana: An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues" (Ph.D
dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1973) 192-93; New
Orleans Times Picayune, May 12, 1964.
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the ballot furnished a means for arousing prejudice for or
against individual candidates.70
Two major federal enactments had a major influence on
the franchise in the South in 1964:

the Twenty-Fourth

Amendment and the Civil Rights Act.

Although Louisiana had

repealed its poll tax in 1934, the new federal amendment had
a major impact on the few Southern states still requiring
this device for voting.

Of more far-reaching importance was

Title I of the new Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohib
ited the unequal application of requirements for voter
registration in federal elections, prohibited denial of the
vote because of minor errors and omissions on registration
applications, denied the use of all but written literacy
tests for registration, made a sixth grade education in
Erglish sufficient proof of literacy and empowered the
United States Attorney General to expedite electoral suits
by requesting a three-judge federal court to hear cases of
alleged discriminatory application of election laws.?*
During the summer of 1964, CORE once again conducted a
voter registration drive among blacks in Louisiana.
Although there were 1,193,775 persons qualified to vote in
the second primary in January of that year, the number of
registered voters declined and had only risen to 1,191,021

70

Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 538;
Anderson v. Martin, 84 S.Ct. 454 (1964).
71Civil Rights Act of 1964, 18 USCA Section 101.
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by the end of the summer (86.3 percent white and 13.7 per
cent black).

For the Presidential election in November,

totals rose to 1,202,056, but then dropped back down to
1,197,766 (1,033,915 whites and 163,851 blacks) by the end
of the

y e a r .

^2

Impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
All federal forces united in 1965, to deliver a crush
ing blow to remaining organized attempts to discriminate in
registration and voting.

The United States Supreme Court

affirmed the right of the federal government to sue a state
and its officials in order to safeguard voting rights,73 and
upheld a lower court ruling that had voided Louisiana's
interpretation test.

In turn, Congress broadened its role

in protecting the right to vote and strengthened the powers
of the executive branch by passage of the Voting Rights Act,
which undermined further de jure attempts to prevent massive
black registration in the Southern states.
In March of 1965, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the federal district court decision of 1963, which
had voided Louisiana's constitutional interpretation test
and enjoined the use of the citizenship test in parishes
which showed evidence of past discrimination in the use of

72

New Orleans Times Picayune, May 28, Sept. 22, 1964;
Baton Rouge State Times, Oct. 2 8 , Dec. 2 2 , 1964.
^United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
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tests for voter registration.

The 1965 Louisiana State

Legislature promptly amended and re-enacted a 1962 law that
prescribed a form for use in the registration of voters.
Essentially, this form was the same as the one provided for
in 1962.7*
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 protected the right of
citizens to register as well as to vote, and opened the
floodgates for black registration in Louisiana for the first
time since the 1890's.

The statute waived the use of the

poll tax in certain state elections, prohibited the use of
literacy tests and unfair devices to restrict the suffrage
in any state or county where less than half of the voting
age population was registered or had voted in the 1964 elec
tions, extended the 1964 Civil Rights Act's sixth grade
literacy requirement, and empowered the United States
Attorney General to appoint federal examiners to register
voters and federal observers to supervise elections in areas
with a history of practicing discrimination in voting.

In

addition, the act granted the Attorney General and the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
prior approval of voting laws in areas suspected of practic
ing discrimination, and authorized the Attorney General to
begin legal proceedings to end state and local poll taxes.
In the following year, the United States Supreme Court

^Louisiana v. United States, 85 S.Ct. 817 (1965); Acts
of Louisiana, 1965, Regular Session, no. 165.
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upheld the validity of the Voting Rights Act and voided
state poll taxes because they denied equal protection.75
Using the Voting Rights Act, the federal courts issued
five-year freezes against the use of registration tests in
Louisiana parishes with long histories of voter discrimina
tion, and ordered registrars to accept authentic licenses,
permits, military identification documents and records of
real property as proof of identity.76

Also in 1966, the

state's laws regarding the procedure for identifying voter
applicants and residency requirements for voting were
upheld, but the statute which denied assistance to illiter
ate voters in casting ballots was voided as a violation of
the Voting Rights Act.

The state was ordered to provide

assistance for illiterate voters as it did for handicapped
voters.

However, the courts upheld the state's contention

that federal election officials in Louisiana were misapply
ing the 1965 act, and ordered them to comply with the
state's residency requirements.77
Beginning in 1965, dramatic changes became evident in
voter registration and in the conduct of elections in
Louisiana.

In a ten-year period between 1964 and 1974, the

75Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79
Stat. 437 (1965); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966 ).
7^United States v. Clement, 358 F.2d 89 (5th. Cir.
1965).
77United States v. Louisiana, 265 F.Supp. 703 (E.D. La.
1966 ).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill
Table 5

Registration of White and Black Voters, 1960-1974

Year

State
Total

White

Percent
White

Black

Percent
Black

I960

1,152,000

993,000

86.2

159,000

13.8

1962

1,087,000

935,000

86.0

152,000

14.0

1964

1,202,000

1,037,000

86.3

165,000

13.7

1966

1,315,000

1,072,000

81.5

243,000

18.5

1968

1,438,000

1,133,000

78.8

305,000

21.2

1970

1,462,000

1,143,000

78.2

319,000

21.8

1972

1,785,000

1,388,000

77.8

397,000

22.2

1974

1,718,000

1,330,000

77.4

388,000

22.6

Source:

United States, Bureau of the Census, Statistical

Abstract, 1972-1975.

number of qualified black voters in the state more than
doubled, from approximately 165,000 in 1964, to about
388.000 in 1974.

Also, between I960 and 1974* percentages

of the black adult population that were registered to vote
increased from 31.1 percent to 58.9 percent (table 5).

The

number of blacks who were registered to vote in the eleven
former Confederate States rose from 1,463,000 in I960 to
3.449.000 in 1971; and black registration percentages
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Table 6
Registration of White and Black Voters in the South,
1960-1971

Percent
White

Percent
Black

Total

White

I960

13,739,000

12,276,000

89.4

1,463,000

10.6

1962

13,591,000

12,110,000

89.1

1,481,000

10.9

1964

16,428,000

14,264,000

86.8

2,164,000

13.2

1966

16,999,000

14,310,000

84.2

2,689,000

15.8

1968

18,814,000

15,702,000

83.5

3,112,000

16.5

1970

20,342,000

16,985,000

83.5

3,357,000

16.5

1971

20,837,000

17,378,000

83.4

3,449,000

16.6

Source:

Black

United States, Bureau of the Census, Statistical

Abstract, 1972-1975.

expanded respectively from 29.1 percent to 58.6 percent
(table 6).
In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a
lower court ruling and declared that federal courts had
jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, granting a
person the right to recover damages from private individuals
who had conspired to deny him the right to vote.^9

At this

7 8

U. S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
1975, 449.
79Payne v. DeLee, 377 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1967).
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time, the federal courts also affirmed a 1916 Louisiana
statute that required each elector to vote for as many can
didates as there were offices to be filled, or the entire
ballot would be invalidated.

The courts were persuaded that

this measure was designed simply to assure full participa
tion of voters in elections.®®

A town marshal's election

was overturned in Tallulah, Louisiana, in 1969, because
voters had not been adequately informed that the use of a
master lever would not automatically cast a vote for town
marshall.

A federal district court held that part of the

Voting Rights Act had been violated because of the imposi
tion of a

practice that had the effect of "denying or

abridging

the vote on account

of race or color," and because

public officials had failed in their duty to accurately and
fairly tabulate, count and report a qualified voter's
ballot.81
Political Changes in the State, 1967-1969
The 1967 Democratic state primary for governor was the
first since 1955, in which race was not the major issue.
Governor John J. McKeithen ran for re-election after secur
ing voter

approval of a state

1966, allowing him to succeed

constitutional amendment in
himself.

With little viable

80Amedee v. Fowler, 275 F.Supp. 659 (E.D. La. 1967).
8*United States v. Post, Wyche v. Post, 297 F.Supp. 46
(W.D. La. 1969).
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opposition, and riding a crest of popularity, the governor
won handily with 70 percent of the votes cast.

Later, in

the summer of 1968, the state sent its first integrated
delegation to the Democratic National Convention meeting in
Chicago.

Eleven blacks served among the delegates.

A major sign of political change within the state
occurred in the 1960's with the mayoral elections in New
Orleans, where the black vote became the decisive element
for the first time and coalition-style politics became the
key factor for election.

The groundwork had been laid

between 1946 and 1962 by Mayor DeLesseps S. Morrison, who
had established a firm electoral basis on upper class white
moderates and the increasing black vote.

In the 1965

mayoral election, Victor Schiro (Morrison's successor)
quietly courted the city's black vote, winning 35 percent of
it to defeat James Fitzmorris.

In the 1969 Democratic first

primary, Fitzmorris emerged as the frontrunner along with
Maurice "Moon" Landrieu in the run-off.

The strategy of

Fitzmorris was to rely heavily on white support along with
significant black support that he had received in 1965.
However, he misunderstood the black disposition when he
endorsed a white candidate over black State Representative
Ernest "Dutch" Morial in a race for councilman-at-large on
the New Orleans City Council, and refused to declare pub
licly that he would appoint a black to head a city depart
ment.

Landrieu acceded to both requests, actively sought

black support and received assistance from influential civic
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and business leaders of the city.

In the second primary,

blacks made up 30 percent of New Orleans voters, and over 75
percent of both white and black electors turned out.

The

result was that Landrieu won the election with 40 percent of
the white vote and over 90 percent of the black

v o t e .

82

The results of the 1969 New Orleans mayoral election
demonstrated that ignoring an increasing black electorate
could be politically self-destructive.

Conversely, a candi

date who could win overwhelming black support, along with a
decent percentage of the white vote, could win an election.
Blacks continued to register in large numbers, and had
become the balance of power in New Orleans politics.

In

fact, the city already had a black population of between 45
and 50 percent, and was expected to top 50 percent in 1971.
The old campaign strategy of race-baiting in areas of the
state where a significant black vote existed had become, by
1969, doomed to defeat.®^
Reapportionment Struggle, 1969-1972
While by 1969, the Voting Rights Act had accomplished
its task by destroying de jure means to prevent blacks from
registering, voter apathy still immobilized tens of thou
sands of adult blacks and whites.

Electoral litigation in

82

James Chubbuck, Edwin Renwick and Joe E. Walker, "The
Emergence of Coalition Politics in New Orleans," Readings in
Louisiana Politics, 474-77.
Qo

Ibid., 484; New Orleans Times Picayne, Mar. 3, 1970.
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the courts began to focus on the issue of reapportionment of
the state legislature and of local government bodies, such
as the police juries and school boards, because of under
representation of blacks in multi-member districts.
In a Rapides Parish case of 1969, a federal district
court voided a school board redistricting plan in which
eleven members would be elected from eleven wards and seven
from the parish at-large, because members of a racial
minority would be a minority in the parish as a whole and
thus would be unable to elect a candidate of their choice
under such a districting plan.

Instead, the court approved

a "weighted vote plan" in which each board member would be
allotted a vote weighted from one to eight, in proportion to
the approximate percentage of persons he represented follow
ing the 1970

c

e

n

s

u

s

.

in a Caddo Parish case involving the

reapportionment of its police jury, a federal court over
turned the local government body's plan to redraw district
lines and to designate incumbent police jurors as represen
tatives of the newly drawn districts.

The court ordered the

police jury to choose between a weighted vote plan based on
the number of registered voters in each ward, and holding
new elections from the newly drawn districts.
a/

LeBlanc v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 315 F. Supp.
783 (W.D. La. 1969).
Fain v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 312 F.Supp. 54
(W.D. La. 1969, 1970).
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In 1971, the federal courts ordered the reapportionment
of the state legislature.

A new legislative apportionment

plan was adopted by the state legislature in June of 1971,
to replace the current one drawn up in 1966.

The new stat

ute created a patchwork of single-member, multi-member and
“floating" member districts.

An amendment to create single

member districts was proposed by Republican Representative
James Sutterfield of New Orleans and was rejected, although
it had the support of black groups, the state chamber of
commerce and the Louisiana Municipal Association.

In July,

Louisiana Republicans asked the United States Justice
Department to void the legislative reapportionment plan in
favor of statewide single-member districts.

In the follow

ing month, the Justice Department rejected the plan on the
grounds that it would discriminate against blacks by dilut
ing their voting power.

Under the 1971 statute, Orleans

Parish, which was 45 percent black, would have been divided
into eleven districts, electing eighteen representatives to
the legislature, but with only two of these districts having
a black majority.®*’
Less than a week after the decision by the Justice
Department, United States District Judge E. Gordon West
approved a plan designed by the court's special master,
Edward J. Steimel (executive director of the Public Affairs

86

Atlanta Constitution, June 6, 1971; New Orleans Times
Picayune, July 24, l97l; New York Times, Aug. 21, 1971.
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Research Council), but without a public hearing.

Under the

Steimel reapportionment plan, statewide single-member dis
tricts were created and several incumbent legislators were
forced to run against one another because of new district
lines.

A suit was quickly initiated by the state attorney

general's office, three New Orleans solons (Adrian
Duplantier, Nat Kiefer and Michael O'Keefe) and the state
branch of the AFL-CIO, which favored multi-member districts.
In early September, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned the district court's decision
because Judge West had failed to conduct a public hearing.
Time was now a major factor because of the approaching state
primary, scheduled for November 6, 1971.
Within a week, Judge West held a public hearing on the
Steimel reapportionment plan, and restated his approval of
it.

The opposition again appealed the decision, but the

Fifth Circuit Court refused to delay implementation of the
new plan, although it did modify the Steimel plan slightly.
Governor John J. McKeithen and other state officials then
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to postpone the
legislative primary, but their request was denied in midOctober of 1971.

Under the West-Steimel reapportionment

plan, one senatorial and five house of representative
districts in New Orleans had a black majority.

Several

parishes in North Louisiana, as well as Republicans, also

87

New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 26, Sept. A, 5,

1971.
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had a better chance of electing blacks under the new plan
because of the creation of new single-member districts and
the redrawing of district boundaries.®®
In a case involving a suit to order the reapportionment
of judicial districts of the Louisiana State Supreme Court,
the courts ruled that the concept of "one-man, one-vote"
reapportionment did not apply to the judicial branch.

Since

the judicial districts had been created by the 1921 state
constitution, the federal courts felt that they could not be
changed by state legislation.®^
By 1974, the federal courts stated their preference for
single-member districts for reapportionment of public
bodies, because they tended to preserve the voting rights of
minorities.

However, the courts were willing to approve

multi-member districts if they were justified by other valid
considerations and did not involve attempts at racial dis
crimination.
During the early 1970's, the federal government tackled
two major voting issues.

In 1970, Congress voted to extend

the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for another five years.

The

law also extended the suffrage to eighteen year olds in all
national, state and local elections; abolished literacy

88Ibid., Sept. 11, 18, 1971; National Observer,
Oct. 16,' 1971.
89Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972).
Q0
Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 376 F.Supp. 690
(W.D. La. 1974).
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tests for five years; and reduced residency requirements to
thirty days for voting in presidential elections.

In the

same year, the United States Supreme Court upheld the liter
acy ban and the residency requirements.91
The next voting issue confronted by the federal courts
was Louisiana residency requirements in 1971.

It was deter

mined that the states had broad powers over suffrage so long
as they did not apply their election laws in a discrimina
tory way, and that no federal constitutional objection was
presented by a state requirement of age, literacy and lack
of a previous criminal record as a condition for suffrage.
Upholding Louisiana's residency requirement of one year in
the state and six months in the parish preceding an elec
tion, the courts declared that there was no inherent right
to vote, but that voting was a privilege granted by the
state.

A resident of a state did not have a right to vote

in state elections, the United States Constitution as
amended did not grant the right to vote and suffrage was not
derived from United States citizenship.92

However, in 1972,

the United States Supreme Court struck down Tennessee's law
requiring one year residency in the state and ninety days in
the county as being too lengthy and discriminating against
new state residents.

Although the court did not mandate the

^Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat.
314; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
^Fonthem v. McKeithen, 336 F.Supp. 153 (E.D. La.
1971).
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amount of time that would be considered the maximum waiting
period, it did say that "30 days appears to be an ample
period of

t i m e .

"93 xhe other states, including Louisiana,

took note and reduced residency in all elections to thirty
days.
Evidence of Real Change for Blacks, 1972-1974
In 1972, the fruits of two decades of efforts in the
state to bring about changes in the voting status of blacks
became apparent.

With federal laws to prevent discrimina

tion in voting in full operation, blacks desiring to vote or
run for political office in Louisiana were free to do so.
The election of Edwin Edwards as governor was a historic
moment in race relations in the state in 1972.

This was the

first time that a neo-populist coalition of blacks and
whites had elected a governor, although it had come close to
occurring in the Populist-Republican fusion ticket in 1896,
and had been a possibility in the I960 and 1964 gubernato
rial elections when Morrison had sought the office.

How

ever, the school desegregation issue and heightened racial
tensions within the state had denied him the chance.

A

similar coalition was currently operating in New Orleans
under the Landrieu Administration, which was elected in
1969.

The Cajun-black coalition of 1972 brought to fruition

a long-standing dream of political unity between

the races

^ D u n n v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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on the statewide level, when Edwards was elected with a
solid South Louisiana French-Catholic vote and a bloc of the
state's black vote.

The major differences between the

Morrison defeats and the Edwards victory were the presence
of a significantly larger black vote in Louisiana in 1972
than in I960 or 1964, and Edwards' reception of 75 percent
of the Cajun vote, while Morrison could get only 60 percent
of it.9^
One of the most striking changes in Louisiana during
the early 1970's, was the election of numerous blacks to
various local offices.

Blacks elected to office prior to

1970 were indeed rare occurrences, although several had run
during the 1960's and a few had reached the second primary.
By 1971, there were seventy-four blacks serving in elected
offices, but their number had more than tripled by 1975.
Although nearly all of these positions were minor offices, a
definite trend had developed, encouraging other black asp
irants to enter the political field (table 7).^5
The early 1970's witnessed the continuation of efforts
by the federal government to assure that suffrage was pro
tected, though the Nixon Administration relegated civil
rights to a diminished level of priority.

The vigorous

desegregation policies of the Johnson Administration were

q/

Charles E. Grenier and Perry H. Howard, "The Edwards
Victory," Readings in Louisiana Politics, 488, 497.
^Statistical Abstract, 1971, 1975.
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Table 7
Black Elected Officials in Louisiana, 1971-1975

State
Legis
lators

City and
Parish
Of fices

Law
Enforce
ment

Year

State
Total

1971

74

1

37

23

13

1972

119

8

59

29

23

1973

149

8

74

26

41

1974

237

9

114

34

80

Source:

Educa
tion

United States, Bureau of the Census, Statistical

Abstract, 1971-1975.

replaced by a federal policy that appeared to become
actively involved only when blatant de jure action was
detected, while de facto or cultural forms of discrimination
went largely unnoticed.Even the federal courts

appeared

back away from vigorous

involvement in the civil rights

struggle.

country was tired of the movement

Perhaps, the

and desired a breathing

to

spell after two decades of disquiet.

It may also have been due to the tremendous success of the
movement itself, because black citizens now had the ability
to utilize the political process to effect change and had
legal channels to vent their anger and frustration at illtreatment .
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Over the more than seven decades since black residents
of Louisiana had been disfranchised, various artifices had
been implemented by white leaders of the state to prevent
mass black voting.

Segregationists, fearing a return to

conditions prevalent under Radical Reconstruction, desired
to keep blacks in a subservient position.

If their vote

could not be controlled, then they would be disfranchised.
Until 1944, no progress was made in black suffrage in the
state, with less than one percent of the black adult-aged
population registered.
Not until the late 1940's did a few thousand blacks
succeed in registering to vote, primarily in South Louisiana
and in the New Orleans area.

When large numbers of blacks

sought to register in the 1950's, white registration leaders
employed several remedies to discourage them from seeking to
register.

However, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act

of 1957, the federal government began to take an increas
ingly active role in extending the vote to black citizens of
Louisiana.

Federal investigations of registration proce

dures were conducted in parishes where few if any blacks
were registered, or in those where Citizens' Council purges
had removed hundreds of thousands of blacks and few whites
from the voter rolls.

Local registration officials were

ordered to justify their operations, became subject to
inexpedient and costly litigation, and were ordered to cease
discriminatory operation of their offices henceforth.
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With the racist atmosphere that prevailed in the late
1950's and early 1960's within Louisiana, segregation
leaders utilized de jure means to thwart federal intentions
to dismantle racial barriers that intimidated blacks from
asserting their right to full participation in the political
process.

Not until these contrivances were voided would

blacks be able to right other injustices through the
democratic process.
In the early 1960's, with the passage of new civil
rights legislation in I960 and 1964, the federal government
actively protected the right to register to vote and elimi
nated state attempts to retain or reinstitute measures that
perpetuated past racial discrimination in voting.

With the

enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and a vigorous
effort by all three branches of the federal government,
racial barriers to political equality in Louisiana crumbled.
State leaders found it virtually impossible to prevent
blacks from registering by de jure means, as litigation made
it unwise if not counterproductive to continue resistance at
the state level.
As larger numbers of blacks began to register under
federal protection, they began to voice their opinions and
vent their anger and frustration within the political
process.

Uniting together and often forming coalitions with

racially moderate whites in local areas, blacks succeeded in
getting elected persons who were sympathetic or at least not
hostile to black aspirations.

For the first time in nearly
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a century, blacks were elected to local offices or had
spokesmen who took an active role in safeguarding their
interests and future.

No longer did the overwhelming

majority of black citizens of Louisiana need to await the
sympathy and assistance of forces outside of the state to
rescue them from an oppressive and subservient situation.
Of course, much work still had to be done, and an ever
vigilant effort had to stand guard to prevent a recurrence
of former conditions.
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Chapter IV
DESEGREGATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Introduction
Public institutions of higher education in Louisiana
were the first de jure segregated facilities in the state to
fall when seriously challenged in federal courts.

The

federal district court in New Orleans issued initial deseg
regation orders in the early 1950's, supported by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, that brought about the destruction
of the century-old system of segregated operation of the
state's colleges and universities.
Unlike the chaos and violence that accompanied the
onset of desegregation of major universities in neighboring
states, desegregation of Louisiana's institutions was accom
plished with relative calm through litigation.

State offi

cials resorted to the use of various legal and extra-legal
artifices to forestall the dismantling of the segregated
system and to wear down the opposition.

However, no gover

nor or other important state official "stood in the doorway"
of a state-supported university spouting platitudes for the
mob and vowing to defy federal marshals and court orders to
the death, only to have to turn aside later and humbly allow
desegregation to proceed anyway.

There were no displays of

127
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massive resistance, defiance or riots as had occurred over
the brief enrollment of Autherine Lucy at the University of
Alabama in 1956, or with the enrollment of James Meredith at
Ole Miss in 1962.

Instead, desegregation in Louisiana

proceeded gradually, orderly and cautiously without the
explosive scenes accompanying that of several other states
in the Deep South.
The first challenges to the segregated system of col
leges and universities maintained by Louisiana were filed
prior to 1950.

As in other Southern states, desegregation

efforts were focused initially on graduate and professional
schools, usually targeting the states' largest universities.
After limited integration had been achieved on some level,
it then trickled down to undergraduate programs, smaller
public colleges and finally to private institutions.

Unlike

the situation in other Southern states in the 1950's and
early 1960's, governors of Louisiana did not play forceful
roles in attempts to prevent desegregation in higher educa
tion.

Instead, a handful of vocal racists led the state

legislature and were instrumental in the passage of massive
resistance measures to prevent, delay or curtail desegrega
tion orders.

However, by 1958, the federal courts had

broken the state's organized resistance and then proceeded
on a case-by-case basis to create a nondiscriminatory system
in admissions policies in the state's public colleges and
universities.

By 1965. this goal had been reached.
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In the late 1960's, a major problem continued to plague
higher education.

The disestablishment of the dual system

of public colleges and universities was unlike the situation
present in the dismantling of the separate systems provided
for blacks and whites in elementary and secondary schools.
There, a racial balance could be achieved often by simply
busing students or redrawing school district lines.

How

ever, over the past century, a dual system of parallel sepa
rate but unequal colleges for blacks and whites had sprung
up within some of the same cities in Louisiana.

Often

referred to as "sweetheart schools," they presented an
apparently unsolvable problem in the 1970's, being the de
facto relics of the de jure system and causing major concern
for the NAACP and the Justice Department because of their
very existence.

Renewed challenges were made to the state's

system of colleges and universities in the 1970's, resulting
in intensive negotiating sessions that led to a compromise
between officials of the state and federal governments in
the form of the Consent Decree of 1981, under which the
state's institutions of higher learning were to operate for
the next six years.
Higher Education in Louisiana Prior to 1950
Four of Louisiana's predominantly white institutions of
higher education were created prior to the Civil War, three
as private institutions and one public.

The three private

schools were Centenary College, Tulane University and
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Louisiana College.

The only public institution was

Louisiana State University.

All were designated for the

education of whites only, and no antebellum facilities were
provided for the higher education of blacks in the state.
Centenary began operation in 1825, as the College of
Louisiana in Jackson, Louisiana.

In 1845, it came under the

control of the Methodist Conference of Louisiana and
Mississippi and was merged with another Methodist college in
Mississippi to become Centenary College of Louisiana at
Jackson.

In 1908, Centenary was relocated to its present

site in Shreveport.*
Tulane was founded by several physicians as the Medical
College of Louisiana in 1834.

After the state legislature

of 1845 provided for the creation of the University of
Louisiana at New Orleans, the Medical College became its
medical department in 1847.

As with other existing colleges

in the state, its existence was threatened by the Civil War
and a shortage of funds.

However, the generosity of Paul

Tulane in the 1880's put the college on a sound financial
basis.

The state legislature rewarded his benevolence by

renaming the institution in his honor in 1884, but also
stipulated that the college would be for the education of
white students

on l y . ^

^State of Louisiana, Board of Regents. The Master Plan
for Higher Education in Louisiana (April 1984TJ
2Ibid.
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Louisiana College, the last of the present private
colleges dating prior to the Civil War, began as Mt. Lebanon
College for males under the auspices of the North Louisiana
Baptist Convention in Bienville Parish in 1852.

A similar

facility for women was established nearby in DeSoto Parish
by another Baptist organization as the Keatchie Female
College 1857.

Both colleges were later closed and merged

into the new Louisiana College, beginning operation at
Pineville, Louisiana, in

1 9 0 6 . 3

The state's largest institution of higher learning,
Louisiana State University, was first provided for by the
legislature in 1855, as a public university with a strong
military leaning.

The new Louisiana State Seminary of

Learning and Military Science began operating on January 2,
i860, in Pineville, Louisiana, under the superintendency of
William T. Sherman of later Civil War fame.

With the seces

sion of the state and the impending war, the new institution
was closed in the following year as its superintendent
returned to the North and most of the cadets and instructors
joined the ranks of the Confederate Army.^

After the Civil

War, the seminary resumed operations primarily through the
efforts of former Confederate Colonel David F. Boyd, who
secured the position of superintendent when it reopened in
October of 1865.

Two years later, the seminary came under

heavy criticism from Radicals for being "an enclave of the
3Ibid.
*Ibid., 2.
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Confederacy," because of the presence of several former
Confederate soldiers or their sons on the faculty and within
the student body.

According to Boyd's biographer, Germaine

Reed, the seminary was not integrated after the Civil War
principally because of its remote location from New Orleans,
the hub of Radical Reconstruction in the state, and because
of the efforts of political defenders of the institution.5
When the seminary burned in 1869» it was transferred "tempo
rarily" to Baton Rouge, where it has remained, and was
renamed Louisiana State University.

In 1876, the state

legislature merged the university with a land grant college
that it had authorized two years earlier, and formed
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical
College
After the Civil War, the state legislature gradually
expanded educational opportunities in higher education for
whites across the state.

In 1884, Northwestern State

University began operation as Louisiana Normal School, a
two-year teacher college in Natchitoches.

Louisiana Tech

began operation as the Industrial Institute and College of
Louisiana at Ruston in 1894, with the purpose of educating
students in "the practical industries of the age."

The last

white public institution of higher learning created before

5

Germaine M. Reed, David French Boyd: Founder of
Louisiana State University (baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1977) 55-62, 68-69.
^The Master Plan for Higher Education, 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
1900, was the University of Southwestern Louisiana, estab
lished as Southwestern Louisiana Industrial Institute in
1898.7

Prior to 1900, only one public and four small private
colleges were established for blacks in Louisiana.

In 1869,

Straight University, Union Normal School and Leland College
began operation in New Orleans, while Coleman College opened
in Gibsland in 1890, and remained in operation until 1929.
Straight and Union Normal, founded by the Congregational and
Methodist Episcopal Churches respectively, merged in 1930 to
become Dillard University, and remains in operation.

Leland

College closed in 1915, reopened in Baker, Louisiana in
1923» and then closed permanently in I960, for financial
reasons.®
The first state-supported institution of higher learn
ing for blacks was Southern University, created by the state
legislature in 1880 (under an 1879 constitutional mandate)
as the Louisiana State Institute for the Higher Education of
Colored Youths.

In theory, it was supposed to be the "sepa

rate but equal" equivalent of Louisiana State University
(LSU), but meager funding kept it operating at a mere
subsistence level.

Originally located in New Orleans, the

property was sold and the institution relocated to

7Ibid., 3.
8Ibid., 2.
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Scotlandville north of Baton Rouge, where it has been in
operation since 1914.9
Between 1900 and 1920, several more private colleges
were established in the state.

Grambling University began

as a private industrial school for blacks in 1901, and
became a public training school under the authority of the
Lincoln Parish School Board in 1918.

In New Orleans, four

private Catholic colleges were created, three for whites and
one for blacks.

The white colleges included Loyola (1904),

St. Mary's Dominican (1910) and Our Lady of Holy Cross
(1916).

The only black Catholic college in the state,

Xavier, was created as a high school in 1915, and added a
university division in 1917.*®
The 1921 State Constitution and subsequent legislation
stemming from its provisions were the basis for the later
court battles to dismantle the de jure system of segregation
in higher education in Louisiana.

Each institution that

operated in the state first had to secure a charter from the
state legislature.

When this document was granted, it

included a statement stipulating that the institution would
be operated as a white or black college.

Article 12,

Section 1 of the 1921 State Constitution required separation
of the races in the state's public schools, and later became
the focal point for basing massive resistance measures to

9lbid.
10Ibid., 3.
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harden segregation in the 1950's and early I960's.
Section 24 of the article applied segregation to private
institutions as well.

The constitution also created two

governing boards for all public colleges and universities.
The Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors was
established to rule over the expanding empire of the state's
oldest and largest public institution of higher learning,
while the State Board of Education would exercise jurisdic
tion over all other public elementary, secondary and higher
learning institutions in the state.^
Between 1921 and 1950, new public institutions of
higher learning for whites mushroomed across the state.
Delgado Community College was opened by New Orleans as a
vocational trades school in 1921.

Tangipahoa Parish opened

Hammond Junior College in 1925, which later became
Southeastern Louisiana University.

In 1931, the legislature

authorized the creation of Louisiana State University
Medical Center in New Orleans, while Ouachita Parish Junior
College (the future Northeast Louisiana University) opened
branches at Lake Charles in 1939, and at Thibodaux in 1948.
The former became McNeese State University and the latter
Nicholls State University.^

**State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1921, Article 12,
Sections 1, 24; The Master Plan for Higher Education, 4.
12

The Master Plan for Higher Education, 4.
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While opportunities for whites expanded rapidly in the
field of higher education, black gains in the state were
almost nil.

Grambling was transferred from the control of

Lincoln Parish to that of the state and became a black
junior college in 1924.

It was reorganized in 1936, to

offer a rural teacher education program, and in 1940, began
offering a four-year curriculum.

The only other provision

made for blacks was the hasty creation of a law school as
part of Southern University in 1948.

This action was

primarily a response by fearful white Louisianians to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Sipuel v. Board of
Regents (1948), which reaffirmed the court's earlier
decision in Gaines v. Canada (1938), involving black
requests for admission to white state-supported law schools
in Oklahoma and Missouri, where no separate black law
schools were available.
Heretofore, the state had largely neglected black
education.

On the eve of the issuance of the first deseg

regation order to the state's ins*itutions of higher learn
ing, there were only two small, inadequately supported
public colleges for blacks:

Grambling in North Louisiana

and Southern University in the southern part of the state,
both of which were far inferior on all levels to any of the
institutions provided for whites.

By contrast, there was an

^ Ibid., Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631
(1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938).
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expanding network of white public colleges and universities,
with LSU having become one of the foremost universities in
the nation as well as in the South, with its own separate
governing board and further plans for expansion.

In

addition, whites were able to take advantage of public
colleges located in every corner of the state:

Northeast,

Northwestern and Louisiana Tech in North Louisiana;
Southwestern and McNeese in Southwest Louisiana; and LSU,
Southeastern and Nicholls in Southeast Louisiana.
The decision by the Supreme Court in Sipuel in 1948, to
reaffirm its stand concerning the right of blacks to attend
professional schools, shook the leaders of the South from
their complacency in neglecting to provide at least marginal
educational opportunities for blacks.

Many of the more

realistic leaders discerned that the seeds of destructionfor the de jure system of segregation in education lay in
the doctrine of "separate but equal," upon which the entire
system was based.

Therefore, several Southern states

embarked upon a massive building program to provide separate
facilities for blacks, particularly in education, that were
more closely "equal" to those provided for whites.

However,

such an undertaking could not be completed in the short
space that the South had remaining to persuade the courts
that segregation was neither unfair nor a violation of
rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Louisiana's leaders were slow to respond to the Sipuel
decision, creating a law school for blacks on the Southern
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University campus but providing nothing else of substance.
The real question of "equality" now arose.

Was the estab

lishment of a separate law school in the state for blacks
the same as equal treatment, and was such action sufficient
to justify the continued operation of a dual system of
public higher education?
Desegregation of Higher Education, 1950-1954
In 1950, the United States Supreme Court handed down
two significant decisions affecting the segregated operation
of public colleges and universities.

In Sweatt v. Painter,

the court challenged the doctrine of separate but equal in
education by working within the framework of the Plessy
case.

Since the Southern states based their legal founda

tions for the creation of a dual system of higher education
on this theory, the court challenged them to prove that the
"separate" facilities provided were truly "equal." Address
ing the question of "substantial equality," the Supreme
Court overruled an attempt by the State of Texas to create a
separate law school for blacks in order to keep the
University of Texas Law School white.

It determined that

the black law school was inferior to the one provided for
whites and could not stand the constitutional test.

On the

same day, the Supreme Court decided in McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, which involved seating restrictions placed on
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a black graduate student, that the state must accord equal
treatment to all students.^
Between 1947 and 1954> the primary targets of desegre
gation suits in Louisiana were the graduate and professional
schools operated under the LSU system.

The filing of two

suits against its medical and graduate schools in 1947,
resulted in the establishment of a law school at Southern
University.

The case of Wilson v. Board of Supervisors

involved the rejection of applications by twelve blacks for
admission to the LSU School of Law solely because of their
race and color.

The plaintiffs argued that it was the only

law school in the vicinity where they could receive the high
degree of training that they needed, and that the "separate
but equal" law school provided by the state for the use of
blacks at Southern University nearby was not a suitable
substitute.*5
Evidence presented in the case attested that the two
law schools did not meet the test of "substantial equality."
The LSU system had an estimated plant value of $35,000,000;
was approved by every applicable accrediting agency in
America; had twelve colleges and several divisions within
them; and offered various undergraduate, professional,

^Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
^Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F.Supp. 986 (E.D.
La. 1950); Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 14, 1950.
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masters and doctoral degrees.

Its law school was founded in

1906, while the Southern University Law School had been
created reluctantly in 1948, in order to provide an educa
tion in law for blacks.

Southern University had an esti

mated plant value of only $2,500,000; had the highest rating
offered but was not a member of the Southern Association of
Colleges and Secondary Schools; and except for its meager
law school facilities, was merely a college instead of a
university.^
Excluding the fact that they were not white, the court
found that the plaintiffs met all of the qualifications
necessary for admission to the LSU Law School.

Therefore, a

three-judge federal panel granted Roy Wilson and the other
plaintiffs their request for admission on the grounds that
they had been denied their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Although one state representative wired the governor
requesting that he close the law school immediately, nine
blacks were enrolled in the LSU Law School in 1950.

Four of

them took non-degree courses, three were dropped or withdrew
and two were subsequently admitted to the Louisiana State
Bar Association.
In two other cases involving LSU in 1950, its medical
school and graduate school of arts and sciences were ordered

^Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F.Supp. 986 (E.D.
La. 1950).
17

Ibid., Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Oct. 15, 1950;
New Orleans Times Picayune, Oec. 1, 1957.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
desegregated, but its undergraduate school remained rela
tively segregated until 1964.

By 1956, the graduate school,

school of social welfare, law school, and combined arts and
sciences and law undergraduate program were subject to
desegregation.

However, all black students in attendance at

LSU were graduate or professional students, with the excep
tion of one black undergraduate student admitted briefly in
the fall of 1953.18
In 1953, a suit to desegregate LSU's undergraduate
Junior Division was brought on the behalf of A. P. Tureaud,
Jr., by his father, a prominent New Orleans civil rights
attorney who represented black plaintiffs in most of the
early desegregation cases filed in Louisiana.

Upon applying

for admission to LSU to pursue a six-year combined curricu
lum of arts and sciences and law courses, Tureaud was
informed by the Registrar's Office that his application was
rejected because of the university's policy not to admit
blacks.

In the subsequent lawsuit, the LSU Board of

Supervisors argued that Southern University was equal to
LSU, and that black students could take their arts and
sciences program there, then transfer to LSU School of Law
if they were dissatisfied with the one provided for them at
Southern.

However, Judge J. Skelly Wright investigated the

"substantial equality" between the two universities, taking

18

Foister v. Board of Supervisors, Payne v. Board of
Supervisors (unreported cases, 1950); confidential communi
cation.
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into consideration the education and reputation of the
faculty, variety of courses offered, physical facilities,
library facilities, position and influence of the alumni,
standing of the university in the community, and traditions
and prestige.

He concluded that the programs offered by LSU

and Southern in the six-year combined arts and sciences and
lav courses did not pass the constitutional test, and thus
ordered the admission of Tureaud and other qualified
students "similarly situated."^
Tureaud became the first black undergraduate student to
enroll at LSU in the fall of 1953, but was dropped in
October when the university successfully challenged the
district court ruling.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

reversed the lower court's decision in Tureaud's favor on
the grounds that a three-judge tribunal needed to hear the
case since it involved a ruling on laws and policies that
violated the United States Constitution.

Several months

later, Tureaud won an appeal to the Supreme Court, which
vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the case
"in light of the Segregation Cases decided" by then in
Brown.

In March of 1955, the district court reinstated its

1953 desegregation order that Tureaud be admitted to LSU's
Junior Division to take an arts and sciences and law pro
gram.

Tureaud had attended Xavier University and wanted to

I Q

Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 116 F.Supp. 248
(E.D. La. 1953).
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transfer his education courses to the undergraduate division
when he sought to enroll at LSU for the fall term in 1955.
However, he was informed by the registrar that the court
order allowed him to "enroll as a combination student in
arts and law" only, and that all other undergraduate schools
were closed to him.

At this same time, a United States Army

veteran was denied the right to transfer from Southern
University to the LSU college of commerce.

In October, the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals returned to its previous
position that a three-judge panel was necessary to decide
Tureaud's case, then cancelled this decision in early
January of 1956, and upheld the district court's earlier
desegregation order.

However, by then, Tureaud had aban

doned his suit to become a student at LSU, frustrated by
legal maneuvering and having lost valuable time necessary,
for his education and training.^
While Tureaud was battling unsuccessfully for admission
to LSU, another suit was being fought by black students to
gain admission to Southwestern Louisiana Institute (SLI) in
Lafayette and McNeese State College in Lake Charles.

In

September of 1953, black students residing in the Lafayette
area sought to enroll at SLI, but they were denied admission
because of their "race and color."

After an unsuccessful

appeal to the State Board of Education, which administered

20Ibid., 207 F.2d 807 (5th. Cir. 1953), 74 S.Ct. 784
(1954), 225 F .2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955), 228 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.
1956).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144
over SLI, suit was filed in federal court in January 1954.
During the trial, the State Board of Education maintained
that it based its decision to deny blacks admission to SLI
on Act 62

of the 1898 legislature and on Article 12,

Section 1 of the 1921 State Constitution.

Act 62 created

SLI "for the Education of the white children of the State of
Louisiana in the arts and sciences," while Article XII,
Section 1 provided separate public schools for blacks
whites of

and

six to eighteen years of a g e . 21

The court decided that a denial of the request by the
plaintiffs would cause hardships by either precluding them
from the opportunity of receiving a college education, or
subjecting them to undue hardships commensurate with having
to commute to or reside in a distant locality in order to
attend a black college.

The alternatives to SLI were

Grambling and Southern, one hundred twenty-six and eightynine miles respectively from Lafayette.

The court felt that

all three public institutions were equal in physical facil
ities, and that to deny qualified black students the oppor
tunity to attend college at home, while whites in the area
had that benefit, "constituted an unlawful discrimina
tion."22

21

Constantine v. Southwestern Louisiana Institute, 120
F.Supp. 417 (W.D. La. 1954); Acts of Louisiana, 1898,
Regular Session, no. 62; Constitution of 1921, Article 12,
Section 1.
22

Constantine v. Southwestern Louisiana Institute

(1954).
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In November of 1954, a federal district court ruled
that sixteen blacks residing in the Lake Charles area were
entitled to attend McNeese State College since no similar or
equal institution for blacks existed in the vicinity.

In

the following May, the state legislature approved an appro
priation of $5,000,000 for the construction of a branch of
Southern University in the Lafayette area to dissuade blacks
in southwestern Louisiana from attending McNeese or SLI.
However, no further action was taken on this matter.

A year

later, federal courts ordered Southeastern Louisiana College
in Hammond to admit qualified blacks.

Therefore, by the

middle of 1956, LSU law and graduate schools, and the under
graduate schools of SLI, McNeese and Southeastern were
desegregated with litigation being the only organized oppo
sition encountered.23
Collapse of Massive Resistance
The Louisiana State Legislature met in an atmosphere of
emotion, tension and frustration in the spring of 1956.
Since its last meeting, the United States Supreme Court had
voided a Baltimore ordinance providing for segregated public
beaches and bathhouses, as well as segregated operation of a
municipally-owned golf course in Atlanta in 1955.24

in

27

Pittsburgh Courier, Dec. 4, 1954; New Orleans Times
Picayune, May 30, 1955, Apr. 2, 1956.
^Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 350 U.S. 877 (1955);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
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addition, the first decision had been rendered in Bush v.
Orleans in early 1956, ordering the desegregation of Orleans
Parish public schools and invalidating a package of state
lavs that had been enacted in 1954, to circumvent the first
Brown ruling.

The order handed down in Bush was applicable

to higher education, since it declared that all federal,
state or local laws requiring or permitting" racial
discrimination in public education "must yield to" the
principle established in the first Brown ruling.^5
Alarmed at this progress being made in the desegrega
tion of public education, the state legislature of 1956
enacted thirteen separate segregation laws without a dis
senting vote.

Two of them, Acts 15 and 249» applied to

higher education.

Act 15 required all persons seeking

admission to a public college or university in the state to
submit a certificate signed by the principal of the high
school and by ihe superintendent of the school system from
which they graduated, attesting to the applicant's eligibil
ity and "good moral character."

Act 249 amended the teacher

tenure laws of the state, making it possible to remove
public school teachers found guilty after a hearing : ^
of being a member of or contributing to any group,
organization, movement or corporation that is pro
hibited by law or injunction from operating in the

^ B u s h v. Orleans, 138 F.Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956).
26
Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 15,
no. 249.
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State of Louisiana, or of advocating or in any
manner performing any act toward bringing about
the integration of the races within the public
school system or any public institution of higher
learning of the State of Louisiana.
If there was any doubt about the true intent of the
legislators in passing these two acts, it was dispelled by
its proponents shortly after the adjournment of the session.
State Senator Willie Rainach declared that Act 15 would be
applied to both new and current students at public colleges
and universities, while other proponents boldly stated that
the two acts were intended to prevent the further enrollment
of blacks in predominantly white institutions and to force
out blacks already in attendance under federal court orders.
However, State Attorney General Jack P. F. Gremillion said
that certificates were only required of new students.^7
The two acts apparently had their desired effect
because the four desegregated state institutions of higher
learning all reported reductions in black registration.

At

LSU, it fell from a high of three hundred two in the summer
of 1955, to a low of sixty-two in the fall of 1956.

Black

registration at Southeastern fell from forty-nine to six
teen, and similar reductions were reported at McNeese and
SLI in the fall of 1956.

In addition to all black appli

cants, hundreds of whites were also rejected at these

27

Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, July 17, 1956; New
Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 2FJ T956; State of Louisiana,
Report and Opinions of the Attorney General of the State of
Louisiana From May 18, 1956— March 1, 195B, 710.
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institutions because of their failure to submit the required
certificates in the spring of 1957.^®
In the midst of the controversy over Acts 15 and 249,
LSU President Troy Middleton submitted a list of questions
and answers to the LSU Board of Supervisors regarding the
treatment of blacks at the university, and they were subse
quently adopted by the board as controlling regulations on
September 1, 1956.

Under the new guidelines, segregation

was required at any function defined as social, but no
segregation was imposed on truly educational activities.
Blacks would be segregated at athletic and entertainment
events, but could attend educational meetings with whites.
They could be elected to honor societies but could not
attend the organization's annual banquet or university-wide
dances or use the swimming pools.

On campus, blacks would

not be segregated in dormitories or in classrooms and could
use common restrooms, cafeterias, dining halls, utensils and
drinking fountains.

At commencement, black guests would be

placed in segregated seating, but black graduates would be
seated and awarded degrees together with whites.^9
In early 1957, the validity of Acts 15 and 249 was
challenged in federal courts.

Because black registration

was placed in jeopardy by Act 15, federal judges issued

28

New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 28, 1956, Feb. 8,
1957; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Oct. 11, 1956.
29

New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 2, 1956.
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temporary restraining orders in January, ordering the regis
tration of twelve blacks at McNeese, SLI and Southeastern.
Three separate discrimination cases filed by plaintiffs
presently attending LSU, Southeastern or SLI were consoli
dated for judgment in Ludley v. Board of Supervisors.

After

an investigation, the court could find no incidence where a
single principal or superintendent had signed a certificate
as required under Act 15> which effectively barred all
blacks from admission to any predominantly white college.
Furthermore, Acts 15 and 249 had the effect of resegregating
the state's colleges and universities by providing another
legislative method for preserving segregation in education
by de jure means.

Thus, the court voided Act 15 because

"the obvious intent of the legislature in passing the act
was to discriminate against Negro citizens," and Act 249 .
because it violated equal protection.30
The LSU Board of Supervisors and the State Board of
Education appealed the decision on the grounds that they
were agencies of the state, which had not only withdrawn its
consent to be sued but had acquired immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed the lower court decision, then produced letters
from black principals who had refused requests for their
signatures on certificates because of fear of reprisals by

30

Ludley v. Board of Supervisors, Bailey v. Louisiana
State Board of Education, Lark v. Louisiana State Board of
Education, 150 F.Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957).
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their white superiors.

The court construed the offending

legislation as attempts to grant arbitrary power to certain
officials in order to deny students admission to public
colleges without establishing objective standards which they
could attempt to satisfy.

In reference to the state consti

tutional amendment withdrawing the consent of the state to
suits against itself through its officials, the appellate
court held that this did not prevent a federal court from
determining that a suit against an official was not a suit
against the state.31
Massive resistance efforts to maintain the state's dual
system of colleges and universities were delivered a major
blow with the

settlement of the case of Fleming

Supervisors in 1958.

The suit arose out of the

v. Board of
decision by

the LSU Board

of Supervisors todeny blacks admission to its

new branch in

New Orleans.

Theboard responded

in court

that previous injunctions and court orders had applied
exclusively to the main campus in Baton Rouge.

After only

thirty minutes of deliberation, the federal district court
ordered the board to admit blacks at its branch.

The board

then appealed for a stay of the order, hoping to lengthen
the process of desegregation and to wear down the opposi
tion.

However, the appellate court denied its request

within ten days from the date of filing of the appeal.

Such

•ji

Ludley v. Board of Supervisors, 252 F.2d 372 (5th
Cir. 1958).
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quick action was a major defeat for segregationists, who
were not sufficiently prepared to defy the federal courts as
swiftly and deftly.

Thereafter, attempts to block desegre

gation of public colleges were only face-saving maneuvers
with little chance of

s u c c e s s .

32

A historic event occurred in September of 1958, when
the new Louisiana State University at New Orleans (LSUNO)
registered more than fifty blacks, thus becoming the first
state college to begin operation on a desegregated basis.
Although the campus was plastered with Ku Klux Klan banners
and racist grafitti a week later, few incidents marred its
initial semester.33
In 1958, LSU faced a State House of Representatives
probe because of the actions of sixty-six of its professors
who had signed a Louisiana Civil Liberties Union petition
which expressed opposition to segregation bills to close the
public schools.

Among the leaders of the LSU protests was

English Professor Waldo McNeir.

LSU President Troy

Middleton was summoned to a legislative hearing, where he
avowed his support for segregation and declared his inten
tion to follow "whatever the law is."

His responses to

questions posed by legislators assuaged their concern, and
the matter was dropped temporarily.

However, McNeir's use

^Read, Let Them Be Judged, 200; Fleming v. Board of
Supervisors, 265 F*.2d 73b (5th Cir. 1959).
^Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 19, 1958.
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of LSU letterhead stationery in late I960, to send letters
to two racist legislators protesting against interposition
and declaring the actions of the legislature in two special
sessions in I960 as "a disgrace and a national scandal"
which "seriously damaged this country in the eyes of the
world," resulted in another probe of the university for
alleged subversive activities.

Following another appearance

before a legislative hearing, Middleton issued new rules for
faculty conduct on matters of public controversy.

Quoting

from the manual of the American Association of University
Professors, he declared that a teacher was not to use his
position to discuss in class controversial topics that were
not within his field of study, and stated that any member of
the university who could not act in the best interest of LSU
was "a handicap and a burden to the organization he serves."
Two weeks later, McNeir resigned (effective June 1, 1961)
because of "outside threats and outside pressures," although
both he and Middleton denied that this was the actual cause
for his leaving LSU after eleven years.34
In early 1959, the LSU Board of Supervisors again
appealed the lower court's decision to allow blacks to
enroll at LSUNO.

Its new appeal was on the grounds that the

board was a specific agency of the state, which could not be

New Orleans Times Picayune, June 11, 1958, Dec. 19,
I960, Jan. 5, 1961.
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sued without its consent.

In a more formal opinion, the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the desegregation
order and overruled the board's claim of exemption from an
injunction prohibiting its attempts to segregate LSUNO.
Additionally, the court held that an individual officer or
corporate agency that acted on the behalf of the state,
ceased to represent the state when it attempted to exercise
power in violation of the

C o n s t i t u t i o n .

35

Hence, the

state's largest university had failed to dissuade the fed
eral courts from desegregating its branch in New Orleans as
well as its own graduate and professional schools.

It would

now be only a matter of time before the entire edifice of de
jure segregation in the state's colleges and universities
would crumble.
Desegregation of Higher Education, 1959-1965
By 1959, the back of massive resistance attempts to
halt or delay desegregation in higher education in Louisiana
had been broken.

The attention of segregationists in the

legislature was now focused on preventing the desegregation
of public elementary and secondary schools in New Orleans.
During the next six years, the remaining undergraduate
departments of the sprawling LSU system and other state
colleges were peacefully desegregated on a case-by-case

Fleming v. Board of Supervisors, 265 F.2d 736 (5th
Cir. 1959).
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basis.

There were no further legislative attempts at mas

sive resistance, and neither did any Louisiana governor
stand in a university doorway, nor did campus riots prevent
the registration and admission of blacks to the state's
colleges.

The major weapon used by the state was its con

tention that its institutions of higher learning were agen
cies of the state and were thus protected by state immunity
from suit without its consent.
The scenario for desegregation of a college typically
followed the pattern of filing a discrimination suit, fol
lowed by a hearing within a few days in federal court.

At

that time, attorneys for the State Board of Education would
admit that the board was maintaining a policy of segregation
and would justify its actions by hiding behind the Eleventh
Amendment.

The district court would promptly issue a deseg

regation order, which would be followed by an immediate
appeal for a stay order by the state attorney general.

This

request would then be denied quickly by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and desegregation would proceed.
Prior to I960, the campuses of Southeastern, the
University of Southwestern Louisiana (formerly SLI) and
McNeese had been desegregated, as had most of the LSU
system, with the exception of the undergraduate division on
its main campus in Baton Rouge.

In the fall of 1962, there

were 50 black graduate students at LSU's main campus (108 in
the previous summer semester), over 250 undergraduate black
students at LSUNO (an additional 217 graduate students in
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the summer semester) and no blacks at its Alexandria campus.
Southeastern had 20 black undergraduates, McNeese had
approximately 150, and USL had 247.

There were no blacks

enrolled at the other state colleges:

Louisiana Tech,

Nicholls, Northeast and Northwestern.3®
In the fall of 1963, fifty-nine blacks were enrolled in
LSU graduate and professional schools, but none in its
undergraduate schools since the brief admission of A. P.
Tureaud, Jr., in 1953.

In November of 1963, a black appli

cant for admission as an undergraduate student was denied.
However, in May of 1964, LSU acknowledged that it would
admit a black woman in pre-law during the summer semester
under the 1953 court order to enroll blacks in arts and
sciences.

University officials took this opportunity to

state that the school's policy on segregation remained thesame.

Less than two weeks later, the NAACP filed a suit

against LSU to force it to admit six blacks to other under
graduate departments.

In early June, LSU registration offi

cials were ordered to admit seven blacks, but by the middle
of the month, twenty black students were enrolled.37 Racial
discrimination at the university did not end here, though.
LSU President John A. Hunter ordered the closing of the
university swimming pool on June 15, 1964, reportedly to
og

Baton Rouge State Times, Oct. 3, 1962.
*^Ibid., Jan. 21, June 8, June 16, 1964; Anderson v.
Board of Supervisors, 9 RRLR 603-04 (1964).
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repair damage caused by an Alaskan earthquake of the previ
ous March.

However, the campus newspaper alleged that the

closure resulted from a black undergraduate's attempt to use
the pool, which led to the circulation of a petition by
students and faculty in protest of the pool closing.

The

denial of the use of the pool and the refusal of the LSU
Union barbershop to give a haircut to another black student,
despite earlier pronouncements by university officials that
blacks would be accorded all rights and privileges of white
students, were the two most significant incidents brought on
by integration, which otherwise proceeded quietly.3®
The same scenario of litigation was followed in the
desegregation of Nicholls, Northeast, Delgado, Northwestern
and Louisiana Tech between 1963 and 1965.

Nicholls was

ordered to desegregate in the fall of 1963, complied, then
filed an appeal which it lost in the following year.

The

same situation occurred with Northeast and Delgado in 1964,
and Northwestern and Louisiana Tech in 1965.39

The deseg

regation of Grambling brought an end to the last segregated
state-operated college, when it was ordered to admit a

3®Baton Rouge State Times, June 26, 1964.
39
Baker v. Louisiana State Department of Education,
339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); McCoy v. Louisiana State
Department of Education, 229 F.Supp. 735 (E.D. La. 1964);
Williams v. Board of Managers, 9 RRLR 1783 (1964); Burton v.
Louisiana State Department of Education, 10 RRLR 116 (1965);
Potts v. McKeithen, 10 RRLR 116 (1965); New Orleans Times
Picayune, Oct. 23, 1964; Baton Rouge
State Times, Feb. 3,
# ------------
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white student in its summer session of 1965, despite a state
law that forbade the enrollment of whites at black colleges
(the same order had been given to the Southern University
branch at New Orleans in 1964).4° Therefore, by 1965, both
blacks and whites were free to attend any public institution
of higher learning in Louisiana without fear of denial
because of race or color under

jure restrictions.

During the 1960's, another question arose in Louisiana
concerning the right of a private college to racially
discriminate in its admissions.

Such a case arose over

Tulane University, which claimed to be an entirely private
university.

In April 1961, the administrators of the Tulane

Educational Fund declared that they would admit qualified
black applicants "if it were legally permissible" to do so.
However, Act 43 of the 1884 state legislature and Article
12, Section 24 of the state constitution prevented it from
desegregating, and university officials were concerned with
the issue of restrictive covenants, since bequests by Paul
Tulane and Sophie Newcomb were restricted to white students
only.41

^ Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 3, 1965; Jamieson v.
Louisiana State Department of Education, 10 RRLR 1004
(1965); Welch v. State Board of Education, 9 RRLR 1737
(1964).
^*Acts of Louisiana, 1884, Regular Session, no. 43;
Constitution of 1921, Article 12, Section 24; Guillory v.
Administrators of tulane University, 203 F.Supp. 855 (E.D.
La. 1962); New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 14, 1961.
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When Barbara M. Guillory and Pearlie H. Elloie were
denied admission to Tulane's graduate school on racial
grounds in 1961, they brought suit in federal court.
Tulane's response was that it was not subject to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of its
private character, that state laws prohibited the university
from admitting blacks, and that past donations to Tulane had
clauses restricting their use to whites only.

In one of his

last decisions as a federal district judge in New Orleans,
J. Skelly Wright ruled that Tulane was a public institution
by virtue of the substantial support and management in its
affairs that it had received from the state since its incep
tion, and therefore, was subject to the Fourteenth Amend
ment.

He found the question of previous donations to the

university to be moot, since the Supreme Court had already
declared such restrictive covenants to be judicially unen
forceable.

In regard to state prohibitions on Tulane which

mandated its operation on a segregated basis, judge Wright
professed that Louisiana "can no more dictate discrimination
in private institutions than it can segregate its own
facilities."

Thus, if Tulane officials desired, there was

no legal impediment to the enrollment of black student s.^2
Less than two months later, a new federal judge ordered
another trial because of unresolved issues concerning

/9

New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 2, 1961;
Guillory v. Administrators of tulane University, 207 F.Supp.
554 (E.D. La. 1962).
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Tulane's status as a public school and the degree of
involvement by the state in its operation.

In a new trial,

Tulane was declared a private institution and not subject to
Fourteenth Amendment restrictions.

However, racial restric

tions on the use of state funds and private donations to the
university were voided because they were restrictive cove
nants, and thus judicially unenforceable.

Since Tulane was

private, Act 43 was unconstitutional to the extent that it
restrained the university from desegregating, because "a
state may not compel racial segregation in private affairs."
Therefore, Tulane had no legal requirements by restrictive
covenants or by state statute to retain segregation, and
could validly admit black applicants if it desired.43*
A week later, in December of 1962, Tulane announced
that it would begin accepting qualified black students in
its spring semester.

In January, eleven black graduate

students (including Guillory and Elloie) enrolled without
incident.

In a campus newspaper interview in April, several

of the students reported that they were treated fairly, had
found no distinction made because of their race in social or
class activities, were allowed full access to university
facilities available to other students, and had encountered
no problems from either students or professors.

When

Newcomb College, the seventy-five year old exclusive women's

Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 212
F.Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
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adjunct to Tulane, admitted its first black student in the
fall semester of 1963, the Tulane system became fully
integrated.^4
Higher Education in Louisiana Since 1965
By 1965, de jure segregation in higher education in
Louisiana had been brought to an end.

However, the more

difficult problem of de facto segregation had replaced it.
In the course of establishing a dual system of higher edu
cation for blacks and whites in the state since 1880, the
legislature sought to mute black protests at being excluded
from white institutions by establishing black colleges in
some of the same cities where white colleges existed.

As a

result of this policy, the LSU and Southern University
systems rose side-by-side, with "sweetheart schools" being
established for each race at state expense and usually
located at opposite ends of the same city.

It was the

existence of these parallel schools which perplexed the
NAACP and the federal government from the late 1960's, and
has yet to be resolved.
LSU became established in Baton Rouge as a white
institution in 1869, while Southern University arrived there
in 1914, after a brief tenure in New Orleans.

By 1948, each

university had its own law school, though the one at LSU

^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 13, 1962, Jan. 26,
1963; Tulane University Hullabaloo, Apr. 5, 1963; Pittsburgh
Courier, Oct. 5, 1963.
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antedated Southern's by over forty years.

In 1956, the

legislature authorized the construction of branches of both
LSU and Southern in New Orleans.

Another expansion

was

approved in 1964, when two branches of LSU were created at
Eunice and Shreveport, and a branch of Southern at
Shreveport-Bossier City.

Therefore, with the rapid

dismantling of the segregated de jure system in higher
education, the state continued to fund and establish a dual
system of predominantly white and black colleges, further
entrenching a de facto system.
In 1965, J. D. DeBlieux, chairman of the Louisiana
Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, reported that fifteen colleges and universities in
the state had signed compliance agreements under the
requirements established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. •
These institutions agreed not to discriminate because of
race, color or national origin in the admission or treatment
of students in all academic programs as well as social,
recreational and extracurricular activities.

There would

also be equal access by all students to dormitories,
cafeterias and other facilities on

c a m p u s .

^5

In the fall of 1967, there were 85,140 students
enrolled in public colleges and universities in Louisiana.
Of this number, 68,907 (80.9 percent) were white and 16,233
(19.1 percent) were black.

However, 13,597 (83.8 percent)

/c

Baton Rouge State Times, May 21, 1965.
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of the total black enrollment were attending a predominantly
black institution, and only 2636 (16.2 percent) a predomi
nantly white institution.

The percentage of blacks

enrolled at formerly white universities ranged from 0.83
percent at Southeastern to 9.00 percent at McNeese.

No

white students enrolled at Southern University at New
Orleans (SUNO) and Shreveport-Bossier City (SUSBO), one at
Grambling and only nine at Southern in Baton Rouge (table
8).

On the three Southern University campuses, only 9

whites were enrolled out of 9453 students.

On the six LSU

campuses (including the Medical Center in New Orleans), only
884 blacks were enrolled out of 28,429 students (table 9 ) . ^
The NAACP, the Justice Department, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and the federal courts
viewed the continued existence of the dual system in higher
education in Louisiana with increasing interest.

HEW was

particularly concerned with "trouble spots" arising over
separate branches of LSU and Southern at Baton Rouge, New
Orleans and Shreveport, and with the existence of Grambling
and Louisiana Tech within three miles of one another.
Beginning in January of 1969, HEW suggested "a system-wide
plan of cooperation between institutions involving consoli
dation of degree offerings, faculty exchange, and general
institutional sharing of resources."

Since all of these

^ Southern Education Research Service, "School Desegre
gation in the Southern and Border States (October 1967).
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Table 8
Enrollment at Louisiana Universities, 1967

University

Total
Enroll
ment

White
Enroll
ment

Per
cent
White

Black
Enroll
ment

Per
cent
Black

Grambling

4,154

1

0.02

4,153

99.98

La. Tech

7,147

7,058

98.75

89

1.25

28,429

27,545

96.89

884

3.11

McNeese

4,542

4,133

91.00

409

9.00

Nicholls

3,727

3,611

96.89

116

3.11

Northeast

6,740

6,472

96.02

268

3.98

Northwestern

6,333

5,877

92.80

456

7.20

Southeastern

5,283

5,239

99.17

44

0.83

SUBR

7,338

9

0.12

7,329

99.98

SUNO

1,758

0

0.00

1,758

100.00

357

0

0.00

357

100.00

9,332

8,962

96.04

370

3.96

85,140

68,907

80.93

16,233

19.07

LSU

SUSBO
USL
Totals

Source:

Southern Education Research Service (October 1967).

universities received federal funding, the continued opera
tion of an alleged dual system of higher education by the
state placed approximately $30,000,000 in federal funds in
jeopardy.^

^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 19, 1969.
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Table 9
Black Enrollment at LSU Branches, 1967

Black
Enrollment

Location
Alexandria

25

Baton Rouge
Eunice

Source;

350
44

Location

Black
Enrollment

New Orleans

450

Shreveport

12

Medical Center-NO

3

Southern Education Research Service (November

1967).

Beginning in 1969, the Justice Department initiated
efforts to secure voluntary cooperation with state and
university officials in arriving at a satisfactory desegre
gation plan.

However, the state and LSU officials main

tained that it was already in full compliance with federal
guidelines, and William Arceneaux, director of the Louisiana
Coordinating Council for Higher Education, responded that
submitting a plan "would be an admission of guilt."

In

October, Governor John J. McKeithen informed HEW officials
that he would not comply with federal demands for complete
desegregation of Louisiana colleges, which had been deseg
regated "since the Brown decision," and that further
desegregation would have to be enforced by federal marshals
because he would not force anyone to attend a college that
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was not his choice.

Following a meeting between state and

federal officials in November, the governor pledged full
cooperation in efforts to encourage students to attend
various state institutions of higher learning, and renewed
his refusal to order any student to attend a college other
than his own preference.
Although some progress was reported between Louisiana
Tech and Grambling in the fall of 1969, HEW was not satis
fied with the responses from state and university officials,
and declared that Louisiana (and subsequently the states of
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Virginia) was operating
a racially segregated system of higher education in viola
tion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In

January 1970, LSU President John A. Hunter declared that HEW
plans would result in the closure of Southern University in
Baton Rouge, that LSU was in compliance with desegregation
orders and that the only way to eliminate the racial iden
tity of Southern was to eliminate Southern. ^
During the next four years, only limited action was
taken by any of the parties, primarily because of their
common realization of the innumerable problems inherent in

48

United States v. State of Louisiana, 527 F.Supp. 509
(E.D. La. 1981); Miami Herald, Oct.31, 1969; New Orleans
Times Picayune, May 23, June 20, Nov. 16, 1969.
^United States v. State of Louisiana (1981); New
Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 17, 1970.
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this enigma, which had no simple resolution.

Colleges and

universities were not cost-free, so such factors as student
transportation, finances and personal preference had to be
taken into consideration.

Since the state no longer had

laws requiring the segregated operation of any of its insti
tutions of higher learning, it was difficult to arrive at a
prompt solution as was often available in the dismantling of
dual systems in public elementary and secondary education.
Another vexing problem that needed to be addressed was the
division of opinion among blacks themselves concerning
federal pressure to dismantle the dual system in higher
education.

With the disestablishment of public schools in

Louisiana during the late 1960's and early 1970's, black
pride and heritage had taken a beating as former black
schools were either closed or absorbed into the previously
all-white system.

Blacks were proud of the strides made by

Grambling and Southern over the past century and were
opposed to seeing them absorbed into the predominantly white
LSU system or into Louisiana Tech.
Although no real progress had been made to dismantle
the dual higher education systems in Louisiana by 1974,
blacks did achieve a few gains in the limited attempts by
university officials to assuage federal concern.

In the

fall of 1969, Louisiana Tech and Grambling began conducting
joint programs and allowing students from each university to
take courses on either campus, while pursuing a degree pro
gram at one of the institutions.

It was also agreed upon to
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conduct faculty exchanges between the two campuses and to
merge the agricultural programs of the two universities.
After July 1972, agricultural majors of both universities
would graduate from Louisiana Tech.50
In 1970, LSU and Southern University (SU) in Baton
Rouge began a cross-registration program, which by 1974,
permitted any student at either university to take a course
each semester at the other campus without charge.

In 1974,

one hundred twenty-four LSU and SU students were involved in
this and other "special cooperative student exchange pro
grams" in education, ROTC, engineering and graduate school.
Besides employing blacks in faculty positions at LSU, a
faculty exchange program was conducted between the two
universities.

Between 1967 and 1969, fifty-nine LSU faculty

members and ten from SU participated in the program.

By .

1974, faculty exchanges and cooperative programs had been
instituted in many of the departments of both institutions.
LSU and SU also began sharing facilities, such as the LSU
library and gym-auditorium.51
Because not enough action had been undertaken to bring
about a resolution of the dual system in higher education,
the Justice Department brought suit against the State of
Louisiana and university officials in 1974.

50

Grounds for the

New Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 30, 1969.

51

Louisiana State University, Report on Compliance with
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Nov. 6, l9B6.
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suit included the defendants' establishment, maintenance and
perpetuation of "an unlawful dual system of higher education
based on race;" failure to comply with Title VI and HEW
guidelines concerning the nondiscriminatory expenditure of
federal funds; and failure to voluntarily submit a constitu
tionally acceptable plan to disestablish the dual system of
universities.52
As if to exacerbate the existing problems, a new state
constitution was approved by the voters in 1974, and took
effect in 1975.

Under the new plan of government, voters

rejected a proposed plan to create a single governing body
over all institutions of higher learning, choosing instead
to create four boards to oversee the operation of higher
education in the state.

The Board of Trustees for State

Colleges and Universities was given jurisdiction over
Delgado, Louisiana Tech, USL, Southeastern, Nicholls,
Northwestern, Northeast, Grambling and McNeese.

The

Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors would govern
the main campus in Baton Rouge; branches in Alexandria,
Eunice, New Orleans and Shreveport; the Paul M. Hebert Law
Center on the Baton Rouge campus; and the Center for
Agricultural Sciences and Rural Development in Baton Rouge.
The Southern University Board of Supervisors would have
jurisdiction over its main campus north of Baton Rouge and
branches in New Orleans and Shreveport-Bossier City.

52

United States v. State of Louisiana (1981).
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Finally, the Board of Regents was set up as a super board,
serving as a statewide planning and policy-making agency to
help coordinate the activities of the other three boards.
Unfortunately, the actual power lay within the three sepa
rate boards, while the Board of Regents would serve merely
in an advisory capacity.53
During the next six years after the Justice Department
suit was filed in 1974, little was accomplished to resolve
the problems that resulted in the suit.

Beginning in 1980,

a series of intensive meetings was held, which resulted in
the formation of a compromise that became known as the
Consent Decree of 1981.

A three-judge court approved it in

the belief that it was a sound, reasonable and systemwide
desegregation plan that offered realistic hopes for the
creation of a unitary system of higher education and held
out the promise of enhancing predominantly black universi
ties in the interim.54

The decree was scheduled to end on

December 31, 1987, but continued until the middle of 1988.
At that time, the federal government scrapped the decree,
declaring it to be a failure, because the system of predom
inantly white and black universities was no nearer to con
solidation in 1988, than it had been in 1981.
In 1988, the composition of Louisiana's public univer
sities was little different from that of 1974.

However, it

^ T h e Master Plan for Higher Education, 7; Constitution
of 1974.
■^United States v. State of Louisiana (1981).
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was a vast change from 1954, when only two meagerly funded
and equipped black colleges served the needs of the state's
black population, while whites had access to a system of
colleges and universities spread across the state.

Begin

ning in 1880, provisions for the higher education of blacks
had slowly advanced and survived for a century despite innu
merable burdens and hardships, while being considerably
outdistanced by white institutions.
Desegregation was imposed by federal courts on white
institutions of higher learning, beginning with the LSU Law
School in 1950, then spreading to smaller state colleges
after 1954.

As the courts became increasingly involved in

the dismantling of the dual system of public elementary and
secondary school systems in the early 1960's, scant atten
tion was focused on the state's colleges and universities.
By 1965, qualified black and white Louisiana citizens were
able to attend any public institution of higher learning
within the state, without fear of denial because of race or
color.

In contrast to the situation in several nearby

Southern states, desegregation of the state's colleges had
proceeded rather smoothly, the major challenge being
litigation.
After 1965, de jure segregation ceased to be a problem,
but its residual effects continued to operate on a de facto
basis.

The operation of separate LSU and SU systems within

the state since 1880, had resulted in the establishment of
predominantly white LSU and black SU branches in Baton
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Rouge, New Orleans and Shreveport-Bossier City.

De jure

segregation had also resulted in the creation of predomi
nantly white Louisiana Tech and black Grambling only three
miles apart in North Louisiana.

The continuation of these

separate, virtually one-race, universities in close proxim
ity but without laws mandating attendance of one or the
other, became the major concern of the NAACP and the federal
government after the termination of de jure segregation in
1965.
Today, one of the major problems facing higher educa
tion in Louisiana is determining how to consolidate the dual
system without unintentionally discriminating against minor
ities or violating the right of Louisiana citizens to attend
the university of their choice.

This enigma continues to

perplex state and university officials, black groups and the
federal courts as they seek an equitable resolution to this
winless situation.
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Chapter V
DESEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1954-1962
Introduction
Prior to 1954, conditions for black children in public
education were deplorable, both in the South as well as in
many Northern cities with large black populations.

Although

the two decisions rendered in Brown v. Board of Education in
1954 and 1955 had declared de jure segregation in public
schools unconstitutional, and had ordered the dismantling of
all dual school systems for blacks and whites, the actual
process of disestablishing the system was painfully slow.
This was because the decision when and how to desegregate
each individual Southern school district was left up to the
local

federal district courts, which had to deal with

widely differing circumstances and patterns of resistance.
No other issue had the emotional impact on citizens of
Louisiana that public school integration did.

Although

still behaving in a rational manner in 1954, Louisiana
officials immediately invoked the powers of the state to
conduct a campaign of "massive resistance" to federal orders
to desegregate the state's public schools, and periodically
added laws later to reinforce an already weighty defense of
segregation.

The segregationist atmosphere that dominated
172
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the state legislature peaked with a crisis over the deseg
regation of public schools in New Orleans in the fall of
I960.

However, the defeat of the segregationist forces in

that battle did not dissuade them from continuing their
efforts to resist integration.

If integration could not be

prevented, then it might be delayed or circumvented.
By the end of 1962, the public schools of Orleans
Parish were under court orders to increase integration, and
desegregation orders were pending against the parishes of
St. Helena and East Baton Rouge.

In addition, the Roman

Catholic schools of the Archdiocese of New Orleans were open
to all qualified black applicants and had enrolled several
black students in the fall of 1962.

However, public schools

outside of New Orleans and parochial schools outside of the
archdiocese, still rigorously maintained segregation.
Pre-1954 Federal Court Decisions and State Actions
Beginning with the case of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896,
the federal courts gave legal sanction to the principle of
"separate but equal."

Previously, the executive and legis

lative branches of the federal government had relinquished
their obligations to protect the equal rights of all
American citizens, and would not re-assume those responsi
bilities for another half century.

Following the lead of

the Supreme Court, the courts took a conservative approach
toward segregation and allowed the doctrine of "separate but
equal" to flourish across the nation.

Thus, the South was
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permitted to erect a bulwark of segregation laws based on
Plessy.
Although Plessy established court approval of segrega
tion in the area of transportation, it became the legal
basis for a discriminatory policy that culminated in the
creation of a dual system of education in Louisiana.

By

then, the leaders of the state realized that the federal
government would not come to the aid of blacks, and tragi
cally, "separation" came to mean "exclusion."
Within the next thirty years, the Supreme Court
extended constitutional protection of segregation to the
dual school systems of the South.

In 1899, it affirmed

"separate but equal" in public schools when it upheld the
closure of a black high school in Georgia, allegedly for
economic necessity.

Remarkably, the court decided that the

board's actions were not based on race and that no one’s
rights had been violated by the closure.*
In the next decade, the Supreme Court entered the field
of private education, when it upheld a Kentucky statute that
prohibited private schools from admitting blacks and whites
to the same institution.^

The last overt decision by the

court in upholding segregation in education came in 1927,
when it affirmed the decision by a Mississippi county to
exclude a Chinese girl from attending the county's only high

^Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
^Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
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school on the grounds that she was not "Caucasian."3
Unfortunately, the high court failed to address the central
question of equality presented by this case.

How "equal"

was a situation in which a high school existed in a school
district for whites, but none existed for non-whites?
The situation for blacks residing in Louisiana was
similar to that of other Southern states.

In many areas of

the state, dilapidated one-room schoolhouses or abandoned
buildings served as the only school for blacks to attend
within a parish, if a black school existed at all.

Black

students received little, if any, supplies or funds from
parish and state coffers, while black teachers were often
paid less and had a much higher pupil-teacher ratio than
their white counterparts.

Black education was frequently

only an after-thought, receiving meager funding from the
inadequate appropriations with which the white school system
was willing to part.
The first mention of the state's public school system
was in the Constitution of 1845, with the simple sentence
that "(T)he Legislature shall establish free public schools
throughout the State," and would support them by taxation on
property or by other means.4

The Constitution of 1852

provided that free public schools were intended for free
white children, while the Constitution of 1864 extended the

3Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1845, Article 134.
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provision for education to all children between the ages of
six and eighteen residing in Louisiana, although it was
popularly interpreted to mean the "white" children of the
state.5
A native white supremacist government dominated state
government from 1865, until military reconstruction was
imposed in 1867.

State Superintendent of Schools Robert M.

Lusher envisioned an excellent system of public education
for white children as an assurance that white citizens would
continue their intellectual and cultural dominance over
Louisiana, while the education of blacks was left to the
federal government under the Freedmen's Bureau.

Lusher

rejected as too radical the proposal of Governor J. Madison
Wells to create black schools with black tax money, and
opposed any education for blacks, much less the creation of
a dual system of segregated s c h o o l s . ^
When a Radical-dominated convention met to draft a new
constitution for the state in 1867» one of the major
achievements for blacks was the adoption of Article 135,
which provided for the establishment of at least one taxsupported public school in each parish for "(A)11 children
of this State," between the ages of six and twenty-one.

The

article also stipulated that children would be admitted to
c

State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1852, Article 136;
State of Louisiana, Constitution of 18b4, Article 141.
^Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in Louisiana, 28.
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all "institutions of learning sustained or established by
the State . . . without distinction of race, color, or pre
vious condition," and that there would be "no segregated
schools or institutions of learning, established for any
race by the State of Louisiana."7
In 1869, the state legislature created a public educa
tion system without a compulsory attendance provision, but
with stiff penalties for refusing to admit any child to
state-supported schools.

Louisiana historian Roger A.

Fischer found that rural parishes either ignored, disobeyed
or circumvented the law.

In some North Louisiana areas,

blacks and whites quietly agreed to establish a dual system
of separate schools for each race, while segregated Catholic
schools and private academies in the southern part of the
state served as alternatives to mixed schools.®
Only in New Orleans was there a serious attempt to
desegregate the public schools.

The city's residents vainly

set up a dual system of schools after 1867, in hopes of
preventing desegregation.

When integration came in 1871,

white flight caused private and parochial schools to mush
room across the city.

Fischer points out that desegregation

was effective only from 1871 to 1874, and that whites were
tranquil and tolerant of the five hundred to a thousand

^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1868, Article 135.
g

Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in Louisiana, 90-91,
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blacks scattered among several thousand white students only
because of their helplessness to prevent it at that time.
Meanwhile, five thousand black students attended all-black
city schools.

Although white parents sent their children to

integrated public schools, they never accepted the situa
tion, and the desire to resort to violence and intimidation
was always at hand.

When racial violence broke out in New

Orleans at the end of 1874, progress in the desegregation of
city schools was halted, and whites awaited the opportunity
to resegregate their schools.9
The return of Conservative Democrat leaders to power in
Louisiana in 1877, resulted in the rapid dismantling of the
desegregated school system in New Orleans.

Lusher returned

as superintendent of public schools, with the desire to
relegate blacks to a position bordering on slavery.

In the

fall of 1877, the new school board in Orleans Parish quietly
and in an orderly manner reassigned blacks to all-black
schools, and the dual system became entrenched in the city.
When appeals to Governor Francis T. Nichoils brought the
response that he had not promised integration but "equal
facilities," black activists resorted to litigation.10

Paul

Trevigne and Arnold Bartonneau filed separate suits chal
lenging violations of Article 135 of the state constitution
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

9Ibid., 114-20, 131-32.
10Ibid., 139, 120, 131-32.
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but were denied relief.^

Then, in 1878, the United States

Supreme Court declared Louisiana's Civil Rights Act of 1869
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

.

Finally, the state's new "Redeemer”

government drafted a new state constitution in 1879, which
removed all legal impediments to segregation by maintaining
silence on the issue of equality between the races and by
deleting all references to race or discrimination.
Although it did not provide for a dual system of educa
tion based on race, the 1879 state constitution failed to
provide safeguards for black education and thus prepared the
way for discrimination and exclusion of blacks from the
public schools.

The first mention of separate schools for

the races was made in the 1898 constitution, which declared
that "(T)here shall be free public schools for the white and
colored races, separately established" for all children
between the ages of six and eighteen and supported by taxes.
When the constitution was redrafted in 1913, it simply
restated the 1898 provision regarding public education.13
The 1921 state constitution was the last to be in
effect in Louisiana prior to the disestablishment of the
dual educational system.

Article 12, which dealt with the

creation and operation of all public schools, provided that:
11Ibid., 140-41.
12Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
*^State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1898, Article
248; State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1913, Article 248.
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The educational system of the State shall consist
of all free public schools, and all institutions
of learning, supported in whole or in part by
appropriation of publi c funds• Separate free pub
lic schools shall be maintained for the education
of white and colored children between the ages of
six and eighteen years . . .
The article also provided for the creation of a State Board
of Education to oversee the public school system, and stipu
lated that the board "shall not control the business affairs
of the parish school boards, nor the selection or removal of
their officers and directors."

Provision was made for the

creation and election of parish school boards as well as for
separate municipal boards already in existence.

By the

1950’s, there were sixty-four parish school boards and three
municipal ones operating in Monroe, Bogalusa and Lake
Charles.

Article 12 further declared that no public funds

could be used to support any private or sectarian school.
As desegregation of public schools approached, though, con
stitutional restrictions such as this one were overcome in
the quest for an alternative to court-ordered integration of
the public schools.
Federal Court Policy to 1955
Beginning with the case of Gaines v. Canada in 1938,
the United States Supreme Court began an exceedingly slow
reassessment of "separate but equal" as applied to educa
tion, culminating in 1955 with the order to desegregate

^Constitution of 1921, Article 12.
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schools "with all deliberate speed."

If the Southern states

wished to separate blacks in professional and graduate
schools, the court said, then the state had to provide
blacks with equal facilities to match those provided for
whites.

However willing they may have been to comply, the

Southern states were unable to provide a completely equal
system for blacks, while the Supreme Court would not be
entirely satisfied with separate facilities even if they
were equal.
In 1951, a three-judge federal district court held the
Clarendon County, South Carolina, school system accountable
to the Supreme Court test that was applied to higher educa
tion.

The school district was to immediately improve physi

cal facilities for blacks if it continued to maintain its
dual education system.

However, the judges would not over

turn the Plessy decision.

On appeal by the NAACP, the

Supreme Court consolidated this case with several other
pending school desegregation cases under Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954.
On May 17. 1954. the United States Supreme Court
announced in its first Brown decision by a unanimous vote
that de jure segregation in the public schools was
unconstitutional.

It was no longer a matter of making dual

systems truly equal, because the entire system was declared

1SBriggs v. Elliot, 98 F.Supp. 529 (E.D. S.C. 1951).
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patently unfair and unconstitutional.

Instead of establish

ing a timetable for the actual dismantling of the dual
school systems, time was given to interested states and
other parties to send representatives to enlighten the court
on the amount of time sufficient to complete the transition
to a completely unitary system.^
Prior to this time, there was little doubt or uncer
tainty in the minds of most white Louisianians about the
legal and ethical considerations of segregating whites and
blacks into two separate school systems.

This point had

never before been seriously challenged within the state, and
it had been taken for granted that the majority of whites
across the United States felt the same about segregation as
Louisianians always had.

Therefore, the Brown decision

startled the state's leaders, who quickly attributed it to
the influence of a communist conspiracy to undermine the
values and foundations of the nation.
The major impact of Brown was its destruction of the
moderate course on race that had been followed in Louisiana
for nearly three decades, and allowance of the rise of a
small cadre of segregationist reactionaries to wrest control
of the state's moral conscience.

The decision reinjected

race as an issue into state politics, shattering the compla
cency of many Louisianians and compelling them to take a
position on racial segregation.

For a time, anyone who

*^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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attempted to remain neutral on the race issue was branded as
being "soft" on the American way of life, and his motives
became suspect.

In fact, many Louisianians felt the need to

go out of their way in order to prove their racism and to
allay charges that they were "closet communists" or "integrationists," which were the same thing in the minds of many
white citizens.

Brown was an emotional tug-of-war for

whites, but brought more uncertainty for blacks.

It was a

rare black Louisiana citizen who risked economic reprisal,
as well as the real threat of physical danger to himself and
his family, in order to exert his new-found rights.
Following a year of taking testimony and wrestling with
the problem of setting a feasible timetable for desegrega
tion, the Supreme Court decided that' flexibility was the key
to making its decision work.

In its second Brown decision

in 1955, the court decided that desegregation would proceed
"with all deliberate speed," thus allowing lower federal
courts discretion as local conditions warranted, and grant
ing the public time to become adjusted to the idea of inte
gration.

The high court hoped that its decision would be

carried out steadily and gradually with a minimum of protest
or v i o l e n c e . H o w e v e r ,

the court did not foresee the

campaign of massive resistance soon to be erected by the
Southern states to delay the inevitable and to wear down
those in opposition to segregation.

Fifteen years after the

*^Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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first Brown decision, the dual systems in the states of the
Deep South were basically intact through the employment of
various legal maneuvers to hinder desegregation.
State Action to Prevent Desegregation, 1954-1959
A political effect of the first Brown decision in 1954,
was the predominance in Louisiana of the state legislature
in the struggle to safeguard the security of segregation.
In contrast to later situations in Arkansas, Mississippi and
Alabama, the battle to preserve the system of segregated
schools in Louisiana was led by legislators, while governors
played a minor role.

With a small group of legislative

segregationists seizing the initiative and guiding the state
with or without the assistance of the state's chief execu
tive, a role reversal took place in twentieth century
Louisiana, which heretofore had a reputation for having
virtual despots for governors and rubber stamp legislatures.
The state legislature was in session in 1954, when the
Brown decision was announced,

and action was taken almost

immediately as a typical show of Southern defiance.

Gaining

power gradually between 1954 and 1959, segregationist repre
sentatives primarily from North Louisiana dominated the
state's official response to court orders to desegregate the
state's public schools.

The most determined and vocal of

the legislative racists were John Garrett in the State House
of Representatives and Willie

Rainach in the State Senate.

Together, they were an almost

unbeatable team and succeeded
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in obtaining most of the segregationist legislation they
sought.
Louisiana's governor was the only source of opposition
that might have tempered the meteoric rise of the segrega
tionist legislators and the vitriolic atmosphere of racism
that they created in the late 1950's.

Unfortunately,

Governor Robert Kennon took no action to prevent their
ascendancy, and his successor in 1956, Earl K. Long, tried
to straddle the issues and appear to be all things to all
people.

Long's inaction for three years allowed a ground-

swell of support to rally to the segregationist cause, and
helped propel the state toward a confrontation with federal
authorities.

The legislative segregationists browbeat the

moderates into silence in the late 1950's, planned strategy
for massive resistance to delay integration, and incited *
white public opinion in behalf of defiance that erupted into
violence during the desegregation crisis in New Orleans in
the fall of I960.

As it turned out, the principal antagon

ists in the battle to retain segregated schools were the
legislature and the federal district court in New Orleans.
By the time that Governor Long tried, in 1959, to halt the
movement toward an explosive climax, he was powerless to act
effectively.
Within three days of the announcement of Brown in May
of 1954, the state legislature adopted Resolution No. 22,

18

McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 24.
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which began Louisiana's official resistance to desegrega
tion.

In it, the legislature declared its belief in the

compact theory of the nature of the Constitution of the
United States, in the strict constructionist theory, and in
the state sovereignty theory, although each of these theo
ries had been discarded previously by the federal executive
and judicial branches.

The segregationists were intent on

defying the federal government, and since the moderates felt
that such action was relatively harmless, they allowed their
opponents to win a victory by either voting for the measure
or abstaining.
Of a more serious nature was the decision of the legis
lature to create a joint legislative committee on segrega
tion, that was designed to study the means by which the
state could circumvent the Brown decision, and to carry on
and conduct "the fight to maintain segregation of the races
in the state."

Selected to chair the new committee was

Senator Rainach, who already served as the leader of the
White Citizens' Councils.

Under Rainach, the group sowed

the seeds of massive resistance and served as the state's
official body for advocating a policy of delay, evasion and
defiance.

Next, the legislature adopted a stand of interpo

sition, whereby the state would use its police powers and

IQ

Ibid., 29; Acts of Louisiana, 1954, Regular Session,
Resolution Mo. 22.
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Eleventh Amendment protection of immunity from prosecution
against its consent to deter desegregation.20
Three laws were enacted to strengthen segregation by
erecting a legal framework of resistance.

Article 12 of the

state constitution was amended by Act 752 (approved by
voters later in the year) to read:
All public elementary and secondary schools in the
State of Louisiana shall be operated separately for
white and colored children. This provision is made
in the exercise of the state police power to pro
mote and protect public health, morals, better edu
cation and the peace and good order in the State,
and not because of race. The Legislature shall
enact laws to enforce the state police power in
this regard.
Act 555 prohibited the State Board of Education from approv
ing any public school that violated Act 752, prohibited
state colleges and universities from recognizing diplomas
issued by such schools, and forbade the allocation to these
schools of state funds, free textbooks and other school
supplies.

Lastly, Act 556 extended the powers of local

school boards to enable them to impede racial desegregation
of their school systems.21
In the fiscal session of the state legislature meeting
in 1955, Senator Rainach embarked on a course to persuade
the federal courts in Louisiana to back away from desegrega
tion if there appeared to be no "substantial difference"

20

Acts of Louisiana, 1954, Regular Session, Resolution
No. 27; McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 31.
21

Acts of Louisiana, 1954, Regular Session, no. 752,
no. 555, no. 55b.
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between white and black public schools.

His "School

Equalization Bill" proposed to equalize school facilities
for whites and blacks at a cost of $33.5 million, but failed
because of executive and legislative opposition.

Governor

Kennon wanted a dollar matching program because the proposal
was too expensive, and he preferred to spend the funds on
highway construction.

Meanwhile, many legislators felt that

the Supreme Court would soon outlaw segregation anyway, so
it would be a waste of money.22
When the Supreme Court established the dictum of "with
all deliberate speed" in 1955, Louisiana leaders breathed a
sigh of relief.

In essence, it meant that desegregation

would be left to the local federal district courts, which
would have wide latitude to fashion orders to the specific
needs and circumstances of individual school districts.
]ohn Garrett declared that it was a mild ruling, and that
the court had admitted its "mistake" in the first Brown
decision by returning control to the local level; while
Alexander P. Tureaud, Sr., representing the NAACP in its
struggle to desegregate Orleans and St. Helena Parish public
schools, observed that the decision would place the burden
for desegregation on the parents of black students.

Per

haps, Willie Rainach stated it best when he said that it was
a "milder decree than we expected" and "gives us room to

22

New Orleans Times Picayune, May 20, 1955.
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continue our fight."23

Thus, the segregationists found the

means for deterring desegregation indefinitely through pro
tracted litigation.
Prior to the meeting of the next regular session of the
state legislature, a significant event occurred in February
of 1956.

In Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, Federal

Judge J. Skelly Wright declared segregation in the Orleans
Parish school system unconstitutional and ordered the board
to begin desegregation "with all deliberate speed."

In

addition, he voided Acts 555, 556 and 752 of the 1954
legislature.24
In May, Governor Long opened the regular session of the
1956 legislature with a message calling for "reasonableness
and caution" on race relations, but sought to conciliate the
segregationists at the same time.25

For the next three

years, he steered a neutral course between racist hysteria
on one side and the feeble voice of moderation on the other,
but would not exert forceful leadership on the race issue.
In this vacuum, Senator Rainach and his colleagues thrived.
By a unanimous vote, the legislature quickly adopted a
concurrent resolution interposing the sovereignty of the
State of Louisiana "against encroachment upon the police
powers reserved to" the state by the United States

23Ibid., June 1, 1955.
2^Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board (1956).
otz
New Orleans Times Picayune, May 13, May 18, 1956.
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Constitution.

This measure expressed the intent of the

legislature to use its powers to use force, if necessary, to
interpose the authority of the state to maintain segregated
public schools, parks and recreational activities despite
federal court decisions rendered in Bush v. Orleans and in
other such cases infringing upon the rights of the states. ^
Thus, lawmakers had begun the long trek toward defiance that
would peak during the crisis over the desegregation of New
Orleans schools in I960.
With minor opposition, the 1956 legislature enacted a
series of education laws to insure the preservation of the
de jure system of segregation in public schools.

As

discussed in the previous chapter, several laws were passed
that affected higher education and teacher tenure.

Any

employee of a school board— teachers, school bus operators
or other non-teaching personnel— could be dismissed for
"advocating or in any manner performing any act toward
bringing about integration of the races within the public
school system or any public institution of higher learning
of the state."

Other laws were passed which transferred to

the legislature the authority of local school boards to
classify schools on a racial basis, and suspended the
operation of the state compulsory school attendance law in
any area where integration was required.

Finally, a state

26Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, House
Concurrent Resolution No. H T
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constitutional amendment was proposed which withdrew the
consent of the state to suits against certain agencies of
the state, including the State Board of Education and all
sixty-seven local school systems within the state.27
During the next two years, no action was taken on the
desegregation of any schools within Louisiana, but leaders
continued to pontificate on possible solutions to Brown and
to line up behind measures proposed by the Joint Legislative
Committee on Segregation.

In 1957, Eighth District

Congressman George S. Long suggested that the public school
system be abolished and immediately replaced by a private
school system.

Then, all taxes dedicated to the support of

public education could be repealed.

Governor Earl K. Long

later declared his belief that desegregation would not
improve life for blacks, who he felt were not in favor ofintegration.28

gy 1958, though, the racists were in firm

control of the state legislature, and it was no longer pos
sible to take a moderate stand on segregation.
In 1958, the state legislature enacted several measures
to strengthen the state's position in the event that federal
courts set a date for the desegregation of Orleans Parish
schools.

Among the laws enacted were a new pupil assignment

law, a comprehensive school closure law, and a tuition grant
program.

The school closure law authorized the governor to

^ Ibid., no. 249, no. 319, no. 438, no. 613.
28
New Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 2, Dec. 1, 1957.
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close any school under orders to desegregate, as well as any
black schools still in operation once nearby white schools
had been closed because of desegregation mandates.

In order

to hinder possible integration, the legislature redesigned
the procedure for student requests for transfers and assign
ments, allowed parents to withdraw their children from the
public schools, and declared that no child could be com
pelled to attend an integrated school against the wishes of
his parents.

In the event

that public schools were closed

orthat whites fled schools ordered to

desegregate, the

procedure was established for the formation of "educa
tional cooperatives" as alternatives to integrated schools.
The legislature authorized the payment of tuition grants to
students attending private schools in school districts where
no segregated public schools were available.

In addition,

school boards were authorized to transform the public school
system into a private system by permitting them to:^9
. . . sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of, at
public or private sale . . . any real or personal
property used in connection with the operation of
any school . . . which has been indefinitely
closed by order of the Governor . . . to any
private agency, group of persons, corporation, or
cooperative bona fide engaged in the operation of
a private non-sectarian school . . .
In 1959, fears of desegregation once again swept over
the state.

A political showdown occurred during the fiscal

29

Acts of Louisiana, 1958, Regular Session, no. 256,
no. 257, no. 258, no. 259.
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session of that year between Senator Rainach and Governor
Long in the state legislature.

The result was a crushing

legislative and physical defeat for the governor, whose
power and health had eroded to the point of ineffectiveness.
As the gubernatorial election of 1959-60 approached, many
legislators and state leaders feared that Rainach's popular
ity among voters might elevate him to the governorship, and
that he would vent his wrath on his opposition.

Of major

concern to the state's voters was the federal court order to
the Orleans Parish School Board in the summer of 1959, to
prepare a desegregation plan by March 1, I960 (later changed
to May 16).30

With a date finally set, desegregation was no

longer a theoretical issue but a real threat to the state's
dual education system.

This peril was thrust into the

gubernatorial campaign and resulted in the election of
Jimmie Davis, who received the support of racial extremists
and a bloc of the North Louisiana vote.
The Desegregation Crisis in Orleans Parish, 1960-1961
From I960 to 1961, the nation witnessed a massive
effort by Louisiana legislative and administrative officials
to prevent the desegregation of Orleans Parish public
schools.

Beginning with the passage of pro-segregation

measures in the regular session of I960, the legislature
presented the federal courts with the prospect of closing

3°Bush v. Orleans, L, RRLR 582 (1959).
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the public schools rather than surrendering to integration.
A battle ensued between state legislators backed by Governor
Jimmie Davis on one side, and the federal courts on the
other, with Judge J. Skelly Wright playing the key role in
voiding all attempts by the state to delay desegregation any
further.

Six successive special sessions of the legislature

met to deal with the desegregation crisis in New Orleans in
the space of five months, during which time approximately
one hundred acts and resolutions were adopted to circumvent,
prevent, delay or curtail integration.

By the end of I960,

the fury of the extremists was spent and the federal courts
had triumphed, although the state legislature continued to
vocally resist desegregation in Orleans Parish in early

.

1961

In May of I960, the state's new governor assumed office
with a mandate to do everything within his power to prevent
any crack in the facade of de jure segregation.

Although

Willie Rainach was no longer in the State Senate (because of
his unsuccessful run for governor in 1959), the power and
influence of the segregationists had not diminished, and
their bellicose attitude placed the state perilously near
the brink of a serious confrontation with federal authority.
When the Orleans Parish School Board failed to submit a
desegregation plan by the May 16 deadline, the federal court
established its own, ordering integration to begin in
September, then enjoined the school boards in St. Helena and
East Baton Rouge Parishes from continuing to require the
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segregated operation of their school systems.31

jt was in

this crisis atmosphere that the I960 regular session of the
legislature met.
On the day that Judge Wright issued his desegregation
plan for Orleans Parish, Governor Davis addressed the legis
lature, repeating his inaugural pledge to "maintain segrega
tion without compromise, without prejudice, without vio
lence," and pledged to recommend a number of bills to ful
fill his pledge.

During the regular session of the legisla

ture, most of the laws enacted simply reaffirmed or extended
previous legislation, some of which had been invalidated by
the federal courts.

A new school closing bill authorized

the governor to close all public schools when any of them
was threatened with integration.

Because of the federal

court decision in April to desegregate several state trade
schools, three acts were passed, applying the same regula
tions to trade, industrial and special schools that had been
applied to the public schools, while another law prohibited
the allocation of supplies to integrated public, trade and
special schools.32
Once the state legislature had adjourned, it was up to
the governor to continue to resist or to submit to federal

^ B u s h v. Orleans, 5 RRLR 379 (I960); Hall v. St.
Helena, 5 RRLR 654 (I960); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board, 5 RRLR 653 (I960).
32

Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 542,
no. 495, no. 575, no.
no. 58^7 no. 496, no. 492, no.
581.
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desegregation orders.

On August 18, acting under legisla

tive authority and a state court order of July 29, Governor
Davis announced that he was assuming control of New Orleans
public schools.

Five days later, the governor announced

that the public schools in Orleans Parish would open in
September on a segregated basis through his efforts and that
of the attorney general.

However, on August 29, Judge

Wright enjoined the state from acting under the July 29
state court order and voided several state acts as uncon
stitutional.

Among the acts set aside were those prohibit

ing supplies and funds to integrated schools, placing of the
school board under the protection of the Eleventh Amendment,
and three acts permitting the closure of public schools by
the governor.

Two days later, Judge Wright ordered a delay

in desegregation from September to November 14, because of
the Orleans Parish School Board's assurances of good faith
and additional time needed in order to comply with the court
order.33
Between June and November of I960, various groups rose
in support of keeping the Orleans Parish public schools
open.

The Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and Episcopal

churches stood in the forefront of opposition to closures,
citing the immorality of segregation and the bad effect

33

State of Louisiana v. Orleans Parish School Board, 5
RRLR 656 (I960); New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 26, I960;
Bush v. Orleans, Williams v. bavis, 187 F.Supp. 42 (E.D. La.
I960).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

197
closure would have on the children, the community and
business.

Also in opposition to closure were a group of

Tulane professors, a group of white high school students,
and small groups of white parents, such as "Save Our
Schools, Inc."

( S O S ) . 3 4

After Attorney General Gremillion announced on
September 1, that his office had exhausted all legal means
to prevent desegregation in Orleans Parish, the governor
announced that he would present a program to combat integra
tion.

Although, no action was taken for the next two

months, a nearly endless string of special sessions began to
meet from November until the following spring.
During the first special session (November 4-15), the
strategy of the legislature was to "legislate and litigate."
By enacting and re-enacting segregation laws, it hoped to
postpone desegregation indefinitely.

Once a case had been

decided against the state, the laws would be rephrased and
re-enacted, stalling desegregation until the next court
battle.

Most of the twenty-nine bills presented by the

Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation, chaired by John
Garrett, dealt with preventing desegregation of New Orleans
schools and re-enacting laws already voided by the federal
courts.

The main opposition came from the New Orleans

delegation itself:

Representatives Maurice Landrieu and

Salvador Anzelmo, and Senator Robert Ainsworth.

However,

New Orleans, Times Picayune, June 23, I960.
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their efforts were unsuccessful in preventing overwhelming
passage of the segregationist package.
To prevent the immediate desegregation of Orleans
Parish, the legislature removed "certain powers, duties, and
functions of all parish school boards in parishes of over
300,000 population," transferred its powers to the legisla
ture, and made its employees subject to the exclusive con
trol of the legislature under Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Then, the lawmaking body created a special Board of Trustees
to take custody of all funds accruing to a defunct school
board (which the Orleans Parish School Board had been desig
nated), and established grounds on which it could remove any
board member who failed to carry out the wishes of the state
or of the State Board of

E d u c a t i o n .

35

On November 8, I960, Governor Davis approved all
twenty-nine pieces of legislation that emerged from the
first special session.

Two days later, Judge Wright

enjoined the enforcement of seventeen of the acts.

Not to

be outdone, State Superintendent of Public Schools Shelby
Jackson (a supporter of the movement to abolish the public
school system) announced a state public school holiday for
November 14, the scheduled date of integration of New
Orleans schools.

However, on November 13, the governor

called the closing of the schools "a scorched earth policy,"

35

Acts of Louisiana, I960, 1st Extraordinary Session,
no. 17, no. T87-noT—2TI
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and declared that the state should use legal remedies to
regain control of the public schools but avoid the use of
force.

On the same day, Judge Wright enjoined the closing

of schools in Orleans Parish and restrained the state from
interfering with the duties or officers of the school
board.36
All schools in Louisiana were closed on November 14,
I960, except those in Orleans Parish, where desegregation
proceeded after nearly a decade of litigation.

The state's

de jure system of segregation in its public elementary and
secondary schools had suffered a fatal blow.

Instead of a

prolonged court battle, the special session of the legisla
ture had seen its resistance program voided in less than
forty-eight hours, and state leaders enjoined from further
interference in the desegregation of Orleans Parish.

Having

used every means at its disposal, the state could not pre
vent the transfer of black students to previously all-white
schools any longer.
Neither the governor nor the state legislature were
ready to admit defeat, yet.

Five more special sessions were

held during the next four months to try to reverse the
desegregation of New Orleans schools.

In mid-November,

Governor Davis appealed for calm in the city, requesting
37
that the state legislature "be the battlefield."
In the

New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 14, I960; Bush v.
Orleans, Williams v. Davis, lob F.Supp. 916 (E.D. La. I960).
*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 17, I960.
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end, though, all were forced to admit that segregated
schools would not withstand negation by the federal judi
ciary.

Therefore, the state's leaders changed to tactics

which would bring a delay in the implementation of integra
tion and minimize the impact of desegregation on formerly
all-white schools where segregation could not stand.
The desegregation of two New Orleans schools (Frantz
and McDonough No. 19) led to racial violence and tension in
the last two weeks of November I960, and a lengthy white
boycott of the two schools.

It also created one of the

worst economic slumps to hit New Orleans in the twentieth
century.

Stores reported sales down from 35 to 40 percent,

and restaurant and entertainment establishments reported a
decline of at least 20 percent.

Despite their concern,

though, business leaders were afraid to speak out lest they
incur the wrath of the local Citizens' Councils and other
segregationist groups.38
During the second special session (November 16 to
December 15, I960), the legislature attempted to abolish the
old Orleans Parish School Board and to create another under
its own authority.

It also took this opportunity to exco

riate Judge Wright for his actions in bringing about deseg
regation, and to accuse him
its leaders.

of bias toward the state and

The judge's response came on November 30, when

^ N e w York Times, Nov. 28, I960.
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he declared void twenty-three legislative acts and resolu
tions that interfered with the implementation of his
desegregation orders in New Orleans.

Any lingering hopes

that integration might be reversed were dashed in December
when the United States Supreme Court upheld the lower
federal court's desegregation orders.39
Lawmakers met in a third special session (December 17
to January 15, 1961), consuming most of the time venting
their frustration against the Orleans Parish School Board,
but powerless to reverse the court's actions.

One legis

lator suggested lynching to solve the problem of white par
ents who insisted on sending their children to integrated
New Orleans schools.

Although later declaring that he was

just joking, his statement betrayed legislative frustration
at being unable to restrain the federal courts.40
By the beginning of 1961, opposition to segregationist
measures in the state legislature had waned.

Attempts to

curb, minimize, or alter the course of the extremists or to
circumvent federal authority had been futile.

Besides,

further opposition to the racial extremists was politically
damaging, and the extremists had already demonstrated their
inability to do any serious damage.

Meanwhile, Governor

39

Acts of Louisiana, I960, 2nd Extraordinary Session,
no. 2, 4; House Concurrent Resolution no. 3, no. 5, no. 6,
no. 7, no. 26; Bush v. Orleans, 188 F.Supp. 916 (E.D. La.
I960).
^^Baton Rouge State Times, Dec. 22, I960.
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Davis began concentrating on other state issues, particu
larly repairing state relations with the national government
in order to secure funding for various state projects and a
favorable settlement of the lucrative tidelands oil dispute.
Establishing Freedom of Choice, 1961-1962
Three special sessions were held during the first quar
ter of 1961, but fiery resistance was absent, along with
attempts to erect a wall of legislation to check the federal
courts.

In February, the legislature turned its attention

toward halting the spread of integration to the parishes of
St. Helena and East Baton Rouge.

By then, the issue of

maintaining segregated schools in Orleans Parish was dead,
and the new position was to keep it token integration under
a freedom of choice plan of operation.

Under this plan,

students were permitted to select the school closest to
their home on a non-racial basis, "if space was available."
In February of 1961, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a lower court order to St. Helena Parish to deseg
regate its public schools, and a similar ruling against East
Baton Rouge Parish was pending.

Once again, the legislature

attempted school closing measures to forestall integration.
This time, it provided for a local option closing law, under
which a school board was authorized to conduct a referendum
on school closing.

If successful, the board could suspend

or close all parish public schools.

To counter the possi

bility of desegregation of schools in Baton Rouge, the
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legislature packed the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board
with four additional members appointed by the governor.
Since the board already included two avowed segregationists,
the addition of four more would avoid the recurrence of a
board complying with federal orders in defiance of state
authority.41
At this same time, President John F. Kennedy proposed
federal aid to the public schools.

Under his proposal,

Louisiana would receive $15 million in 1962, $17.5 million
in 1963, and $20 million in 1964.

However, Superintendent

of Education Shelby Jackson ridiculed it as "not even a drop
in the bucket," while the South Louisiana Citizens' Council
opposed all federal aid because it would be a "smokescreen"
by the national government to gain control of education by
interfering with Tenth Amendment guarantees reserving the'
control of public schools to the states.

In May, the state

legislature overwhelmingly adopted a resolution calling on
the Louisiana delegation in Congress to oppose the federal
aid to the schools bill.42
In March of 1961, the federal courts enjoined the state
from additional interference with the operations of the
court-approved "old Orleans Parish School Board," accused

41St. Helena Parish School Board v. Hall, 287 F.2d 376
(5th Cir. 1962); Acts of Louisiana, 1961, 2nd Extraordinary
Session, no. 5, no. 7.
^2Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 20, May 16, 1961; New
Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. T8, 1961.
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the state superintendent of public schools of contempt, and
began discussing local option school closing in St. Helena
Parish.

By now, the legislature realized that it could not

replace the board in New Orleans with one of its own design,
and Superintendent Jackson was compelled to agree not to
interfere with the operation of schools there any longer.
However, federal courts were reluctant to prevent St. Helena
school officials from conducting an election on the issue of
closing public schools to prevent desegregation. ^
In April, St. Helena Parish voters opted to close
schools by a vote of 1147 to 56, in the first referendum on
the state's local option law.

Although over 80 percent of

registered voters had turned out, the total reflected a
voter registration list of only 1572 (111 blacks) in a
parish with over 9000 residents (4700 blacks).

Therefore,

in August, the federal courts voided the results of the
election, referring to the local option school closing act
as a means of continuing

s e g r e g a t i o n . ^

During the 1961 fiscal session of the state legisla
ture, administrative support for measures to defy desegrega
tion orders was lacking.

Perhaps, one calming influence was

the fact that of one hundred thirty-four black applications

^ B u s h v. Orleans, 191 F.Supp. 871 (E.D. La. 1961);
Baton Rouge State Times, Mar. 4, 1961; Hall v. St. Helena
Parish School"Board, ~F~RRLR 416-17 (1961).
^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 23, 1961; Hall v.
St. Helena Parish School Board, T97 F.Supp. 649 (E.D. La.

1961).
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for admission to all-white schools in Orleans Parish in
I960, only five had been accepted to attend two schools.
A sustained boycott of the two integrated schools since
November had nearly shut them down, and only sixty-six
applications were submitted by blacks for admission to white
schools in the next school year.

When schools opened in

September of 1961, only twelve black students were attending
schools with whites in six previously all-white schools in
New Orleans.

Peace and quiet prevailed, but the boycott of

integrated schools continued, as many of the students
transferred to parochial and nearby St. Bernard Parish
schools.45
When the regular session of the state legislature met
in 1962, there was a noted absence of the type of defiance
present in the regular and special sessions of I960, and
business was conducted peacefully.

The consensus among

legislators was to preserve white supremacy, while embracing
freedom of choice as a defense against stronger measures by
the federal courts when complete segregation had become
untenable.

The administration was most concerned in 1962

with fiscal matters and preventing a resumption of discord
with the national government.

Governor Davis felt that

defiance would endanger Louisiana's chances for securing a
favorable resolution of the tidelands issue, by which the

^McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 195-96;
Baton Rouge State Times, Jan. 30, 1961; New Orleans Times
Picayune, Sept. 8"J 1961.
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state stood to gain millions of dollars in needed revenue.
In addition, a new missile plant and investments by private
industry in the state would be placed in jeopardy.

There

fore, race was relegated to a subordinate position and
primary attentidn was focused on other

i s s u e s .

46

Although the Davis Administration shied away from overt
racial measures, legislators continued to enact laws which
assisted parents who sought alternatives to desegregated
schools.

The compulsory school attendance law was repealed;

procedures were established for tuition grants for children
attending non-profit, non-sectarian, private schools; provi
sion was made for a tuition grant program through the
Louisiana Financial Assistance Fund; children were protected
from being compelled to attend a school in which members of
their race constituted less than half of the total student
body; and funds were provided to St. Bernard Parish for the
education of Orleans Parish students fleeing desegregated
schools.47
In April, Judge Wright left New Orleans for a new
appointment and was replaced by Frank B. Ellis, who quickly
rescinded Wright's order requiring desegregation of the
first six grades in Orleans Parish in the fall.

In late

May, Judge Ellis substituted a "grade-a-year" plan by which

^McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official Resistance," 199-02.
/7
Acts of Louisiana, 1962, Regular Session, no. 128,
no.147, no. 148, no. 196, no. 342.
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students would be allowed to attend formerly all-white or
all-black schools nearest their homes under freedom of
choice.

Beginning in September 1963, dual geographic

attendance districts in first and second grades would be
abolished, with an additional grade being desegregated each
succeeding year thereafter.^®
When the new school year began in September of 1962,
the only desegregated public school system in the state was
still that of Orleans Parish.

At that time, a major step in

desegregation was taken with the integration of Roman
Catholic parochial schools in the New Orleans archdiocese.
In early 1956, Archbishop Francis Rummel had announced plans
to desegregate schools of the New Orleans archdiocese (com
prising twenty-three Louisiana parishes at the time).

His

announcement placed the state school hot lunch program in
jeopardy in Catholic schools, as well as its sports pro
gram's affiliation with the Louisiana High School Athletic
Association (LHSAA).

To add to his problems, a lay Catholic

organization (the Association of Catholic Laymen) was formed
to keep the Catholic schools segregated and appealed to the
Pope to halt racial integration.

In addition, following a

Citizens' Council rally which booed the name of the arch
bishop, a cross was burned on the lawn of his residence.
Rummel finally decided to postpone integration until

/o

Bush v. Orleans, 204 F.Supp. 568, 205 F.Supp. (E.D.
La. 1962); 7 RRLR 19, 349, 354 (1962).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

208
September 1957 at the earliest because of "certain diffi
culties ."49
Not until 1962 was action taken by the Catholic Church
on the desegregation of its schools.

In I960, a spokesman

for the archbishop announced that desegregation of New
Orleans archdiocese Catholic schools would not occur until
after public schools were actually desegregated.

The church

then waited nearly two years after Orleans Parish was deseg
regated before undergoing its own integration.

In March of

1962, Archbishop Rummel announced that all schools in the
archdiocese would be open to anyone.

At the time, total

archdiocesan enrollment was 75,907 students in 153 elemen
tary and secondary schools (10,851 blacks were enrolled in
30 all-black schools).

A church spokesman stated that black

students were already enrolled in several former all-white
parochial schools, but would not elaborate.50
Following the announcement by Rummel, the public outcry
among Catholics and non-Catholics alike condemned his deci
sion.

The South Louisiana Citizens' Council called it

"tragic" and predicted that it would turn New Orleans white
Catholic schools into black ones.

Several persons picketed

the archdiocesan chancery to protest against desegregation,
while many predicted a mass boycott of Catholic schools in

^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 8, Aug. 26, 1957.
50Ibid., Sept. 1, Nov. 17, I960, Apr. 29, 1962.
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the fall.

Despite the threats and protests, spring enroll

ment figures demonstrated that 73,514 students were
registered for the fall.51
When the new school year began in the fall of 1962,
there were few major incidents as sixty black students began
attending twenty formerly all-white Catholic schools in the
New Orleans archdiocese for the first time since 1895.

The

most serious trouble occurred at schools in Buras in
Plaquemines Parish and in Westwego near New Orleans.
Leander Perez led a boycott at the Buras school, which
opened with only thirty-eight white students (three hundred
forty in 1961-62) and none within a week because of threats
of violence.

At a Westwego elementary school, two hundred

persons milled around the school protesting desegregation
for a few days.

In addition, about a hundred persons pick

eted the residence of the new archbishop (John Cody) in New
Orleans.

In November, the New Orleans archdiocese reported

a 3 percent increase in enrollment in desegregated schools
over that of 1961, and that one hundred seven blacks were
attending twenty formerly all-white public schools (in the
parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Tammany and St. Mary).
With the exception of a few minor incidents, desegregation
was proceeding quietly along freedom of choice

l i n e s .

52

•**Ibid., Mar. 28, Mar. 29, Apr. 20, 1962.
•^Ibid., Aug. 30, Sept. 5, Nov. 18, 1962; Washington
Post, Sept. 1, 2, 1962.
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Although lauding the actions of Rummel and Cody in the
New Orleans archdiocese, the bishops of the dioceses of
Baton Rouge, Lafayette and Alexandria would not follow their
examples, yet.

The bishop of Baton Rouge declared that the

desegregation of the schools in his diocese (under the
authority of the New Orleans archdiocese until November 8,
1961) was not imminent, while the bishop of Lafayette
responded that desegregation would occur "sometime after the
next school year."
timetable.53•

The bishop of Alexandria also had no

jn essence, they were all waiting for the

federal courts to integrate the public schools within their
dioceses before moving to implement their own desegregation
plans.
By the end of 1962, the state’s public and parochial
schools were still segregated, with the exception of twelve
blacks attending six schools with whites in Orleans Parish
and one hundred seven blacks attending twenty parochial
schools with whites in the Archdiocese of New Orleans. Out
side of Orleans Parish and the archdiocese, no blacks
attended any school with white students.
Between 1954 and I960, leaders of Louisiana fought hard
to maintain the de jure system of total segregation, with
their efforts peaking in the New Orleans desegregation
crisis of I960.

After six special sessions between November

I960 and March 1961, and contempt orders against various

Baton Rouge State Times, Mar. 31, 1962.
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state officials, both legislative and executive leaders
admitted defeat over New Orleans, and adopted a new
tactic— freedom of choice— to keep public schools as white
as possible, if they could not be kept totally white.

Their

strategy turned to fighting to retain total segregation on a
parish-by-parish basis until they were no longer able to
prevent integration.

Then, their approach was to allow only

a limited number of token blacks to transfer to predomi
nantly white schools in order to appease the federal govern
ment.

However, the state's leaders were incapable of

repairing the breach in the segregation facade.

As 1962

came to an end, the federal courts had struck down all
arguments aimed at keeping the public schools of East Baton
Rouge and St. Helena Parishes totally segregated, and it
was but a matter of time before they underwent some form of
desegregat ion.
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Chapter VI
DESEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1963-1974
Introduction
Despite the passage of nine years since the first Brown
decision, sixty-five school districts in Louisiana continued
in 1963 to maintain totally segregated dual public school
systems.

It was not until the enactment of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 that major changes became evident in the state.
Under the various provisions of the Civil Rights Act,
pressure was brought to bear on school districts to deseg
regate in order to continue receiving federal funds.

Using

Title VI of the act, HEW nudged school districts toward
minimum desegregation on the basis of freedom of choice,
then enforced strict application of freedom of choice to
move districts closer to the goal of disestablishing dual
school systems.

Under freedom of choice, students were

theoretically able to select their schools, but it tended to
perpetuate the dual system.
Not until 1965 did a majority of the school systems of
Louisiana submit to any type of desegregation.

Even then,

it was only token integration in the form of freedom of
choice, which left all-black schools intact and with only a
212
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few black students admitted to formerly all-white schools.
Once again, local and state officials in the state employed
the strategy of delay, circumvention and litigation to keep
massive integration at bay.

However, the federal courts

became increasingly suspicious of local intentions, adopting
a progressively harder line toward integration within the
framework of freedom of choice.

While the local school

districts saw freedom of choice as the solution to federal
demands for desegregation, the courts saw it as a means
toward reaching the final goal of a unitary school system
free of racial discrimination.

Beginning in 1967, the

federal judiciary began to abolish freedom of choice plans
that did not promise to bring about a unitary system
quickly.
By 1969, the host of impediments to creating unitary,
nondiscriminatory school systems were swept away when both
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court decided that time had run out, and that
remaining dual systems based on de jure segregation had to
be eradicated immediately.

However, the segregationists

were still not totally vanquished, resorting now to alter
nate means to further thwart the intentions of the federal
courts.

Their machinations compelled the judiciary to

closely monitor every aspect in the conversion to unitary
systems.

Unfortunately, just as the courts were able to

glimpse the conclusion to discriminatory operation of the
public schools, the executive branch under the Nixon
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Administration instituted a "go-slow" policy in the early
1970's that had the effect of decelerating the entire
desegregation process.
Despite major opposition in many areas of the state
when court-ordered dissolution of the dual system of educa
tion was imposed in the fall of 1969, the courts prevailed.
By the end of the 1970-71 school year, all of the state's
local school systems were under a unitary system and the de
jure system of segregation had ceased to operate.

However,

the thornier issue of de facto segregation reared its head,
proving to be a formidable challenge for the federal courts
in the South as well as in other parts of the nation during
the 1970's.
Desegregation by Freedom of Choice, 1963-1964
During 1963, negligible progress was made toward deseg
regating the sixty-seven public school systems of Louisiana.
The fiscal session of the 1963 state legislature was rela
tively quiet on segregation, with only one education law
enacted to increase funding for tuition grants to $300,000.1
During the year, though, race once more intruded into the
gubernatorial elections as DeLesseps S. Morrison was again
accused of being soft on segregation and lost to John J.
McKeithen in a campaign reminiscent of that of 1959-60.

^Acts of Louisiana, 1963, Regular Session, no. 27.
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The desegregation of East Baton Rouge Parish public
schools became the focus of the state's attention in 1963,
although it did not produce anything approaching the emo
tional upheaval that the desegregation of Orleans Parish had
prompted three years earlier.

In March, the parish was

ordered by the federal courts to submit a desegregation plan
by July.

Since student assignments were already made by

then, the courts allowed only twenty-eight blacks to enroll
in the four parish high schools during the 1963-64 school
year.

Thereafter, beginning in 1964, a grade-a-year plan

would operate on the basis of freedom of choice until all
grades had been desegregated.2
In May of 1963, the federal courts approved a longrange plan for Orleans Parish, which established a single
zone attendance system for first and second graders for the
1963-64 school year, with the addition of one grade each
year thereafter.

The courts also approved transfers of

black third and fourth graders who had previously applied
for admission or transfer to white schools under the I960
court order, and ordered the desegregation of a special
school for gifted students in the 1963-64 school year and of
kindergartens in the following year.

However, the courts

delayed the desegregation of faculties until the school
system had made the transition to a single-zone system.3

2
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 214 F.
Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1963), 219 F.Supp. 876 (E.D. La. 1963).
^Bush v. Orleans, 8 RRLR 533-34 (1963).
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Two other desegregation cases arose over Bossier and
Terrebonne Parishes in 1963.

In Bossier Parish, federal

money had been provided for the construction of schools that
the children of military personnel stationed at Barksdale
Air Force Base would attend, and these schools were being
operated on a racially segregated basis.

However, the fed

eral court in the Western District of Louisiana dismissed
the suit for lack of jurisdiction.^

In Terrebonne Parish,

children were being segregated on three levels:
black and Indian.

white,

The federal district court in New Orleans

enjoined the Terrebonne Parish School Board from denying
Indian children equal access to the white public schools,
and gave Indian students in the eleventh and twelfth grades
the option immediately to attend the formerly white or
Indian school nearest their homes.

In addition, the board

was ordered to determine the feasibility of desegregating
the tenth grade, and to submit a plan to the court in August
of 1964, for the "orderly and timely" desegregation of all
other grades.5•
Thus far, desegregation of Southern schools had not
been very successful.

As is demonstrated in tables 10 and

11, only 1.17 percent of blacks residing in the eleven
former Confederate States were attending schools with whites

^United States v. Bossier Parish School Board, 220 F.
Supp. 243 (W.D. La. 1963).
c
Naguin v. Terrebonne Parish School Board, 8 RRLR 1421
(1963); New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 29, 1963.
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Table 10
Blacks in Southern Schools with Whites, 1954-1964

School Year

Percentage

School Year

Percentage

1954-55

.001

1959-60

.160

1955-56

.115

1960-61

.162

1956-57

.144

1961-62

.241

1957-58

.151

1962-63

.453

1958-59

.132

1963-64

1.170

Source:

5 Race Relations Reporter 21 (May 1974).

Table 11
Percentage of Blacks in Schools with Whites, 1959-1964

South

Border

Region

1959-60

.160

45.4

6.4

1960-61

.162

49.0

7.0

1961-62

.241

52.5

7.6

1962-63

.453

51.8

8.0

1963-64

1.170

54.8

9.2

School Year

Source:

1 Southern Education Report 29 (July/August 1965).
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during the 1963-64 school year, while the border states
(Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma and West
Virginia) had 54.8 percent and the entire region 9.2 per
cent.^

Therefore, it would take only drastic and sustained

action by the federal government to bring down the dual edu
cation systems of the South.
Impact of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal govern
ment adopted a more active stand against segregated schools,
with all three branches of government coalescing to break
the grip of de jure segregation.

Title IV and Title IX

brought the Justice Department into active desegregation
efforts, while Title VI brought the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) into the desegregation struggle
through federal funding of education programs.
Under Title IV, the United States Commissioner of
Education was authorized to provide assistance for school
districts that had difficulty in desegregating.

Aid could

be rendered by providing information and personnel to assist
in the preparation and implementation of a desegregation
plan, by establishing special training centers on desegrega
tion for school personnel, and by providing funds for school
boards to conduct in-service training or to employ special
ists to advise the school system on desegregation problems.

^1 Southern Education Report 29 (July/August 1965).
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In the latter part of the 1960's, Title IV came under
increasing attacks by civil rights groups because of its
lack of comprehensiveness and failure to work for the estab
lishment of completely unitary school systems, while encouraging "tokenism" through freedom of choice desegregation
plans.

In addition, both HEW and the Justice Department

viewed Title IV as a "by request" service that could only be
provided to school districts and state agencies requesting
assistance.?
Title IX authorized the Attorney General to intervene
in private suits that were brought to desegregate public
schools.

It also permitted the Justice Department to

initiate suits on the behalf of blacks who were fearful of
inaugurating the suits themselves.&
Title VI had the most impact on school systems since
most of them had begun to rely upon federal funding for
numerous educational programs.

This section of the Civil

Rights Act prohibited racial discrimination in any program
receiving federal financial assistance, and provided for
"the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance" to programs or activities that failed to com
ply. ^

In order to continue to receive funds, a school

^Ibid., 31-32 (March/April 1966); Civil Rights Act of
1964.
®Civil Rights Act of 1964.
9Ibid.
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system was required to comply with Title VI, demonstrating
that it was not operating a racially discriminatory school
system or risk the loss of federal aid.

Beginning in 1965,

HEW implemented Title VI through annual guidelines..
In its first guidelines issued for the 1965-66 school
year, HEW (through the Office of Education) established
three methods by which a school district could comply with
Title VI.

The district could meet federal requirements by:

(1) signing an "Assurance of Compliance" ("HEW-441") form
pledging nondiscriminatory operation; (2) by voluntarily
adopting a plan to desegregate at least four grades per
year; or (3) if it was under a federal court order to
desegregate.*0
By August of 1965, 71 percent of school districts in
the Southern and border states had met federal requirements
and were eligible for a continuation of federal aid.

Of the

5135 school districts in the region, 2722 signed "HEW-441"
forms, 838 voluntarily agreed to desegregate four grades per
year, and 96 were under court orders to desegregate.

Of the

school districts submitting voluntary plans, half were under
freedom of choice, while the remainder used geographic zon
ing, closed black schools or ended student transfers outside
of districts.

Under HEW regulations, these school districts

had three years to achieve full desegregation.^

*®1 Southern Education Report 31 (July/August 1965).
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In Louisiana, school officials declared that they would
not submit voluntary desegregation plans, pending the out
come of litigation.

On February 1, 1965, Attorney General

Jack P. F. Gremillion announced that the State Board of
Education was permitted under state law to sign HEW compli
ance orders if it desired to do so.

However, the board

declined to sign them, leaving the decision to individual
school boards on whether to accept federal funds.

In July,

Governor John J. McKeithen declared that the state was
financially unable to replace federal money that might be
lost due to noncompliance with HEW guidelines, and the State
Board of Education offered to serve "as a pipeline through
which federal money will be sent to schools."

Thus far,

every school system except that of Plaquemines Parish
received some form of federal funding, and the state was ‘in
jeopardy of losing as much as $42 million.

By mid-August,

none of the state's sixty-seven school districts had filed
an "HEW-441" but nineteen court orders had been submitted on
behalf of twenty-five school districts under prior desegre
gation orders.
In September of 1965, the Vernon Parish School Board
was prompted to desegregate because of financial considera
tions.

It prefaced its decision by declaring that it could

lose $330,000 in federal funds, which comprised 20 percent
of its 1965-66 operating budget.

At the same time, Rapides

*^10 RRLR 454 (1965); 1 Southern Education Report
32-33; New Orleans Times Picayune, July 2, 1965.
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Parish voted against compliance, placing $265,000 per year
in federal funds in jeopardy.

Bossier Parish was ordered to

desegregate at this time, partially because of its accep
tance of federal funds to build schools for the use of chil
dren of military personnel stationed in the parish, and had
violated Title VI by segregating those schools.*3
The federal government initiated cut-off action against
sixty-five Southern school districts in October for noncom
pliance with HEW guidelines.
were located in Louisiana.

Thirty-one of the districts
James D. Prescott, executive

secretary of the Louisiana School Boards Association,
responded that the loss would result in the curtailment of
some programs, but that most parishes would "get by with
relatively little discomfort."

However, by the end of 1965,

thirty-three school districts in the state were in compli
ance with Title VI, while thirty-four were not and faced
termination of federal funding.

Among the reasons cited for

noncompliance were that the districts did not want federal
aid, did not want it on HEW compliance terms, or challenged
HEW guidelines on constitutional grounds.^
In March of 1966, HEW issued new guidelines for deseg
regation, including the suggestion that a plan for faculty

13

1 Southern Education Report 33 (September/October
1965); New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. A, 1965; Lemon v.
Bossier Parish School Board, 349 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1965).
*^1 Southern Education Report 30 (November/December
1965).
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desegregation be adopted.

Simply allowing blacks to choose

to transfer to all-white schools within a dual education
system did not overcome the discriminatory effects of segre
gation, while the very existence of all-black schools was
inconsistent with a valid desegregation plan.

The new

guidelines brought freedom of choice plans under closer
scrutiny by HEW, requiring more actual student and teacher
desegregation within the classroom.
No school districts had all federal funds terminated
during the 1965-66 school year, but some failed to receive
allotments under new programs such as the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA).

As the 1966-67 school year

commenced, seventeen districts in Louisiana lost funds, four
had funds deferred because of failure to fully comply with
HEW guidelines, and forty-six were in compliance.

In

December of 1966, the Commissioner of Education reported
that freedom of choice plans presently in operation were "an
interim arrangement which is bringing us toward desegrega
tion but is not the ultimate

s o l u t i o n .

"I®

With this in mind, in the spring of 1967, HEW created
the Office for Civil Rights to oversee school districts in
order to assure that they were in compliance with the
demands of Title VI.

Existing freedom of choice plans were

allowed to continue, but only if they were achieving the

1C

2 Southern Education Report 31-32 (July/August 1966),
31 (January/February 1967).
2 Southern Education Report 31 (January/February
1967), 30 (March 1967).
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goal of bringing about a unitary system.

Nine Louisiana

school districts began the 1967-68 school year without
federal funds.

However, limited progress was made in

faculty integration because 323.8 black and 254.7 white
teachers in the state were teaching in schools predominantly
attended by children of another race.*7
Under Title VI, HEW had moved gradually from requiring
minimum desegregation of students on the basis of freedom of
choice in 1965, to strict application and scrutiny of free
dom of choice plans, forcing school districts to move ever
closer toward disestablishing their dual systems in order to
continue to receive federal funds.

In the ten years follow

ing the 1954 Brown decision, the gain in desegregation in
the Southern states was a negligible 1.06 percent by 1964.
Within four years of the application of Title VI, the fed
eral government reported that 20.3 percent of Southern black
students were attending schools with white enrollments of at
least 50 percent in the 1968-69 school year.*®
Between 1964 and 1969, the State of Louisiana
nearly $150 million in federal funds.

received

Money was received

under the National Defense Education Act of 1957, Elemen
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Smith-Hughes Act,

17

3 Southern Education Report 14 (January/February
1968); Southern Education Reporting Service, "School
Desegregation in the Southern and Border States" (September
1967).
18
4 Southern Education Report 17 (June 1969).
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Vocational Act and George-Borden Act.

Under these various

programs, funds were received for educational functions at
correctional facilities and special schools, and for handi
capped and migrant children, library resources, and voca
tional education.

During the 1968-69 school year alone, the

state received over $40 million for education.

Without

federal assistance, most schools would have had to curtail
or abolish programs, or seek local or state funding to
replace them, which would have been no easy task.

There

fore, economic pressure from HEW was an inducement for
school districts to begin at least token integration.

Once

this had been accomplished, there was no turning back, and
annual revisions in HEW guidelines brought about more deseg
regation until the federal courts were able to order the
complete eradication of dual systems based on law in 1969.^
When the Nixon Administration came to power in 1969, a
major change occurred in the use of Title VI.

While the new

administration decelerated the use of Title VI to gain
compliance with desegregation orders, the federal courts
became more active and overturned most freedom of choice
plans.

On July 3, 1969, in a joint statement by the

Departments of Justice and HEW, the Nixon Administration
announced that it would no longer use the threat of cut-offs
in federal funding to secure the disestablishment of dual

19

Louisiana, State Department of Education. One Hundred
Twentieth Annual Report for the Session 1968-69 (1969).
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education systems, but would rely on the Justice Department
to oversee overt efforts to maintain or to re-establish de
jure systems.
Freedom of Choice, 1964-1968
Between 1964 and 1968, the public schools of Louisiana
were transformed from total segregation to token integration
under freedom of choice.

As the 1964-65 school year began,

only three of the sixty-seven school systems in the state
were desegregated.

The impact of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 was already being felt as school systems sought means
by which to replace federal funds that would be discontinued
if a school district failed to desegregate.

By the fall of

1965,- a majority of school systems in Louisiana were open to
integration, and by 1967, all public school systems were
operating under some type of desegregation plan.

In 1968,

the United States Supreme Court ended all hopes that freedom
of choice plans might be used indefinitely to prevent mas
sive integration.

Thereafter, the explicit objective of the

federal courts was to bring about a swift end to the dual
system of education based on de jure segregation, replacing
it with a unitary system free of racial discrimination.
During the summer of 1964, federal courts in Louisiana
ordered the integration of grades eleven and twelve of the

20

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism and American Law
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) 4b7-68.
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St. Helena Parish public schools in the fall, joining the
schools of Orleans and East Baton Rouge Parishes under a
freedom of choice

p l a n .

21

Although other suits were filed

to desegregate Iberville and Jefferson Parish schools, the
courts proceeded slowly and did not order their immediate
i n t e g r a t i o n .

22

Facing the loss of millions of dollars in

federal assistance, particularly after the enactment of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, school
districts in the state remained obstinate and refused to
complete "HEW-441" forms or to submit voluntary desegrega
tion plans, opting instead to be brought under court order
to desegregate, then becoming eligible for federal funds.
In two cases decided in 1965, the United States Supreme
Court took a harder line on desegregation.

In one case, the

court held that delays in desegregating school systems "are
no longer tolerable," and in another, that a school district
being operated under a grade-a-year plan must admit black
students to grades not yet desegregated in order to take
courses not available at an all-black school where a student
was initially assigned.

In addition, faculty desegregation

was held to be within the scope of the Brown

d e c i s i o n .

23

21

Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 233 F.Supp.
136 (E.D. La. 1964).
^Williams v. Iberville Parish School Board, 9 RRLR
1748 (1964); Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 10
RRLR 1061 (1965).
23

Bradley v. School Board of Richmond 382 U.S. 103
(1965); Rogers v. Paul 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
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During the summer of 1965, the federal courts in
Louisiana accelerated the pace of desegregation.

Twenty-one

new school districts were scheduled to be integrated in the
fall.

As each case was heard separately, the defendant

board admitted that it was operating a biracial system and
had taken no action to grant the relief sought by black
plaintiffs to allow them to attend schools on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Then, the court ordered the board to submit a

desegregation plan on the basis of recent federal court
decisions.

All of the plans that were approved before

June 22, 1965, provided for gradual desegregation beginning
with two grades in the fall of 1965, two in 1966, and four
each in 1967 and 1968.

Pupil transfers and assignments were

to be made on a nondiscriminatory basis, with dual atten
dance zones to be abolished as grades became desegregated.
However, the plans left the dual system of education virtu
ally intact.
On June 22, 1965, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District that school districts must be fully desegregated by
the fall of 1967.

The two Louisiana cases of Lemon v.

Bossier Parish School Board and Valley v. Rapides Parish
School Board, decided by the Fifth Circuit Court in August,
became the standards for desegregating a school system in
Louisiana.

Both cases were placed under the Singleton

decision, ordering that a minimum of four grades per year be
desegregated, and that freedom of choice plans be completed
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by the fall of 1967.

In general, grades 1, 2, 11 and 12

were to be desegregated in 1965-66; 3, A, 9 and 10 in
1966-67; and 5, 6, 7 and 8 in 1967-68.

Applications for

transfers would be granted or denied on the basis of student
requests, scholastic record and aptitude, and space avail
able in the school requested or in a comparable school that
was geographically nearer the student's residence.

As

grades were integrated, dual attendance districts were to be
abolished.

Faculty desegregation was deferred until sub

stantial progress had been made in pupil integration.

All

schools beginning operation under a court-ordered desegrega
tion plan in the fall of 1965 were placed immediately under
the Lemon and Valley

d e c i s i o n .

^A

Nine school systems came under court orders to inte
grate too late to implement desegregation plans in the fall
of 1965, and were ordered to adopt freedom of choice at the
beginning of the spring semester in January of 1966.

In

order to catch up with other school systems and complete
desegregation by the fall of 1967, they were ordered to
desegregate at least four grades at that time.
In the summer of 1965, several black plaintiffs
attempted to prevent the tedious process of parish-by-parish
litigations to disestablish dual systems of education by

2L

Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District, Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 10 RRLR
107A, 1077; Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 3A9 P.2d
1020 (5th Cir. 1965).
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initiating a class action suit to bring about immediate
desegregation of all public schools under the jurisdiction
of the State Board of Education.

However, the federal

courts found that there was no longer any state constitu
tional requirement for segregation in the public schools,
and that the Board of Education was prohibited in the state
constitution from controlling the business affairs of local
school boards.

If segregation was being practiced, it was

being directed by individual school boards, which were the
only agencies that could be held accountable to the charge
of operating a discriminatory school system.

Therefore, it

was necessary to initiate suits against each individual
board.^5
As the 1965-66 school year began, no desegregation
suits were filed against thirty-three school districts,
fourteen districts had two grades desegregated, one had
three grades desegregated, three were awaiting orders to
desegregate four grades, no action had been taken in suits
against five districts, three districts had four grades
desegregated and Orleans Parish had kindergarten through
grade five desegregated.

In addition, Iberia, St. Martin

and Beauregard parishes decided to desegregate all grades
immediately on a freedom of choice basis.

Throughout

Louisiana, only 0.69 perceent of black students attended

2S

LeBeauf v. State Board of Education, 244 F.Supp. 256
(E.D. La. 1965).
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schools with whites.

By contrast, 6.01 percent of blacks in

the entire South and 68.90 percent of blacks in the border
states were enrolled in schools with whites.^6
In the spring of 1966, the Justice Department and
federal courts brought the remainder of parishes still
operating segregated school systems under freedom of choice.
Most often, the courts ordered the desegregation of grades
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 12 in the fall of 1966, and the rest
in the fall of 1967, so that all school systems were fully
integrated by 1967.

Also, any previously issued court order

was amended to reflect the Singleton decision.
During the summer of 1966, the federal district court
in New Orleans issued an opinion in Jenkins v. City of
Bogalusa which was applied to other cases heard by this
court.

Under the decision, every student was required to-

submit an annual freedom of choice form, and school offi
cials and teachers were prohibited from influencing any
student in making his choice of schools.

If no choice was

made, the student was to be assigned to the school nearest
his home where there was available space.

Prior attendance

at a certain school was not to be considered for assign
ments, and no choice could be denied except for the reason
of overcrowding.

Bus transportation was to be provided to

students who lived in excess of one mile from the school
they would attend, and no student was to be subjected to

26

1 Southern Education Report 31 (January/February

19 66 ).
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racial discrimination in any services, facilities or activ
ities conducted or sponsored by his school.

All school

facilities, conditions and instruction were to be equalized,
while schools not meeting these requirements were to be
closed.

To assist black students in adjusting to formerly

all-white schools, remediation programs would be provided
because of past inequities between white and black schools.
Employment, promotion and retention of professional school
personnel were to be made on a non-racial basis, and
teachers were to be encouraged to transfer to schools where
most of the faculty members were of a different race.

In

order to assure that the court's orders were being carried
out, the board was required to file reports stating the
number and disposition of freedom of choice applications,
the names of students requesting withdrawal of their appli
cations and reasons for such action, the manner of faculty
assignment, and a description of steps taken to equalize
schools.27
During the 1966-67 school year, 16.8 percent of black
students in the South were in schools with whites.

In

Louisiana, only 3.5 percent of its black students were
attending integrated schools.

Only Mississippi had a more

dismal record of desegregation.2®

Although desegregation

27

Jenkins v. City of Bogalusa School Board, 11 RRLR
1751-52 (1966).
28

2 Southern Education Report 31 (January/February

1967).
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under freedom of choice was little more than tokenism, it
excited emotional responses in several areas of the state in
the fall of 1966.
Only minor problems were experienced at most of the
schools integrated in 1966, except for a brief period of
picketing at a high school in St. Bernard Parish and a black
boycott of a high school in Pointe Coupee Parish.

The most

successful protest was held in Plaquemines Parish, where
several formerly all-white schools were boycotted by whites.
Of 5400 whites expected to enroll in public schools, over
5000 joined the boycott.

When whites refused to attend

Woodlawn High School with twenty-eight blacks, Leander
Perez, Sr. offered his former residence as the site for a
private school.

All students and teachers of the public

high school promptly moved to the new school, while the
black students attending Woodlawn High under court order
were allowed to return to their former schools.

The

Plaquemines Parish School Board was then authorized by the
federal courts to close the abandoned high school as well as
another school in Belle Chasse which was plagued by low
student attendance and faculty resignations.^9
As private schools for whites sprang up in Plaquemines
Parish as replacements for the public schools, a critical
need for money was identified.

Over 5000 applications for

29

2 Southern Education Report 30, 32 (December 1966);
New Orleans Times Picayune^ Sept. 1, Sept. 4, 1966.
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state tuition grants were distributed throughout the parish,
which would have cost the state an additional $1.8 million.
Since there were already 11,000 persons receiving grants at
the cost of $3.8 million, the influx of these new applicants
placed a serious financial strain on the tuition program.
In addition to tuition, the new segregated private schools
were entitled to the use of free textbooks, supplies and
transportation.

When asked to intervene in the plight of

the grant program,

Governor McKeithen responded that he

would not divert funds from the public schools to the
financially distressed Louisiana Financial Assistance
Commission, which handled the state grants-in-aid tuition
program.

Instead, he would let nature take its course.30

After consolidating seven cases (including those of
Caddo, Bossier, Jackson and Claiborne parishes), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a new ruling in United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education in late
December of 1966.

The court determined that the freedom of

choice plans in operation in the seven school districts
under study had promoted resegregation, and that the only
acceptable desegregation plan was one that achieved the goal
of a unitary, nonracial school system.

A segregated school

system was required to desegregate regardless of whether it
received federal funds; school boards had an affirmative
duty to integrate their student bodies, faculties,

30

New Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 1, Sept. 4,
Nov. 23, 1966.
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facilities and activities; school systems had to convert to
a unitary attendance zone system; and boards were to refrain
from using pupil assignment laws while in the process of
converting to a unitary system.

Any school system that had

a history of segregated faculties or token integration had a
duty to adopt an alternative desegregation plan, such as
geographic attendance plans, the Princeton Plan (assigning
students to schools by grade rather than by location of
residences) or a combination of plans.31
Between May and September of 1967, the district courts
in Louisiana attempted to apply the Jefferson case to all
school districts under their jurisdiction.

Although the

court attempted to implement a new, comprehensive desegre
gation plan, adjustments had to be made for special circum
stances.

In Plaquemines Parish, where the public school

system was on the verge of collapse, the school board was
halted by the federal courts from taking additional steps
toward the dissolution of the public schools.

It was then

ordered to restore bus transportation, lunch programs and
books, equipment and supplies to the schools from which they
had been withdrawn.

In addition, school officials were

enjoined from permitting any public school property to be
used in private schools, discouraging students from attend
ing public schools and encouraging them to attend private

31

United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
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schools, and from interfering with the board's attempts to
comply with desegregation

o r d e r s .

32

Just prior to the beginning of the 1967-68 school year,
private segregated schools across the state were dealt a
major blow when the federal courts struck down the tuition
grant law of 1962.

Fearing a negative ruling on its opera

tions, the Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission (LFAC)
had attempted to validate its operations in 1966 by prohib
iting the payment of tuition grants to children attending a
private school that was primarily maintained by state grantin-aid payments.

In the spring of 1967, the state legisla

ture established a backup system of tuition grants in the
event that the courts invalidated the present program.

A

new scheme created the "Louisiana Education Commission for
Needy Children" which would administer a new system of
grants for the aid of "needy" children attending private,
non-sectarian schools.

To pass the scrutiny of the courts,

the amount of payments would be based on family income and
the number of dependents, with a maximum payment of $350 per
child per school year.

However, in August of 1967, a three-

judge federal court called the state tuition program a link
in a century-old chain of de jure segregation of the white
and black races.

The court felt that unless the tuition

grant system was eliminated, it would destroy the public
school system.

The LFAC had made the state "a party to

32

United States v. Plaquemines Parish School Board, 12
RRLR 220, 1299-00 (1967).
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organized private discrimination," and its grants had dam
aged blacks by draining students, teachers and funds from
the desegregated public system.

The court also cited evi

dence of tuition grant schools having substandard facili
ties and inferior educational programs.

The 1967 tuition

program was declared a sham by the federal courts and voided
in March of 1968.33
When the new school year began in 1967, new HEW guide
lines took effect, allowing only those freedom of choice
plans to continue that were achieving meaningful desegrega
tion and were bringing an end to the dual education system.
Failing plans were to develop a more effective plan that
resulted in substantial faculty desegregation, at least 30
percent of schools desegregated by 1968, and complete deseg
regation by 1969.

M. Hayes Mizell, an advisor to the Office

of Education, summed up the effect of freedom of choice on
blacks in a public statement condemning this policy.

He

declared that freedom of choice for Southern blacks meant
"the freedom to risk social isolation and academic failure,
and the freedom to be denied equality of educational oppor
tunity."

It would not and could not attain the goal of a

unitary system because it was "dependent upon the courage,
inclination and determination of the Negro citizen to throw
off the psychological and social restraints placed upon him

33

Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance
Commission, 12 RRLR 1386-87 (1967), 296 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.
La. 1968); Acts of Louisiana, 1967, Regular Session, no. 99.
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by generations of slavery, legally enforced segregation and
prejudice."34
Freedom of choice placed the burden for ending the dual
education system on blacks, whose own schools had a stigma
of inferiority to white schools.

Therefore, few whites

would choose to attend them under a freedom of choice plan.
Black pride and heritage was dealt a serious blow by black
children opting to enroll in the "better" white schools,
where they were subjected to enormous social and emotional
pressures.35
In October of 1967, Washington Parish became the first
school district in Louisiana to have its freedom of choice
plan abolished and its schools ordered by federal courts to
operate on a unitary system of geographic attendance zones.
The courts declared that the justification for freedom of
choice as an interim plan was removed once all grades had
been desegregated.

The next step was the assignment of

students to the school nearest to their homes on a nonracial
basis by geographical zoning.

Complete desegregation was to

be extended to all school-related services, facilities,
activities and programs, transportation, and faculty and
administrative staffs.

In addition, the school system was

to equalize facilities, equipment and instruction; provide
O/
3 Southern Education Report 14, 19 (January/February
1968 ).
35Ibid., 21.
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remediation programs to overcome inadequacies brought about
by the effects of segregation; adopt measures to prevent
abuse and harassment of blacks by school employees; and plan
new schools without regard to the old dual system.36
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court ended any
faint hopes in Louisiana that freedom of choice could be
used indefinitely to delay the disestablishment of the dual
education system.

In Green v. County School Board of New

Kent County, the high court adopted the view of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, declaring that freedom of choice
would only be acceptable if it was effective in promptly
bringing about unitary school systems.

School boards had

the obligation of devising a plan that "promises meaningul
and immediate progress" toward ending de jure segregation. 37
In August of 1968, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded nineteen Louisiana school cases for rehearings in
Adams v. Mathews.

Lower courts were ordered to conduct

hearings by November to determine whether present desegrega
tion plans in these cases "promise realistically to work
now."

It was presumed that a school district had failed the

test established by Green if it had predominantly black or
white schools with few members of the opposite race attend
ing them, or if it had no substantial integration of its

Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 276 F.Supp.
834 (E.D. La. 1968).
37

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
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faculties and school activities.

Such school districts were

to take "affirmative action" toward effective desegregation
before the beginning of the 1968-69 school year or shortly
thereafter, adopting new alternatives to freedom of choice.
Their options included consolidation of schools, pairing of
schools and implementation of majority-to-minority transfers
to bring about a truly unitary and nonracial school sys
tem. 3®

However, the federal courts realized the problems

inherent in disestablishing the dual system, and granted
school districts additional time to comply with Green and
Adams.

Unfortunately, many school districts used this

reprieve once again to hinder the desegregation process.
By 1968, only a very small percentage of the black
student population was enrolled in schools with whites,
while the overwhelming majority attended all-black schools.
Local school officials in Louisiana continued to cling
desperately to freedom of choice and refused to take any
forward steps that would appear to be cooperating too
closely with the federal courts, or that would bring about
an end to the dual system.
In some parishes, high schools kept social contact with
black students to a minimum by providing few opportunities
outside of class for racial mixing, such as cancelling
dances and other social activities.

Black students were

sometimes segregated within the school itself in classrooms,

^^Adams v. Mathews, 403 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968).
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dressing areas and lunchrooms, and were frequently ignored
in class by teachers who were unwilling to deal with them.
Many blacks found themselves inadequately prepared for the
transition to formerly all-white schools, often due to the
inequitable de jure system of segregation that had resulted
in the creation of inferior black schools.

Black students

were often taunted, teased, physically and mentally har
assed, and socially ostracized by whites.

Therefore, it

was not surprising that many blacks transferred back to
their former schools during the school year or did not
return in the fall.

In this respect, freedom of choice was

a monumental failure, since it did nothing to encourage
blacks to attend schools on a choice basis because "choice"
actually meant daily harassment and emotional and social
problems.
Freedom of choice was a success as a short-term deseg
regation plan, but a failure as a long-term one.

It had

been successful in that it was a beginning and had brought
less social and emotional upheaval than an immediate end to
the dual system by massive integration would have brought.
It was a compromise situation since it rested on the prin
ciple of gradualism, with few blacks willing to challenge
the all-white public school system.

Whites were willing to

accept a few black students in order to continue receiving
federal funds.

However, local school officials used freedom

of choice as yet another weapon in their arsenal to delay
action on desegregation.

Nowhere in the state did public
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officials agree to dismantle their dual systems immediately
and voluntarily.

Instead, they did only what they were

compelled to do and no more.
By the end of 1968, the federal courts and the Justice
Department realized that freedom of choice had failed as a
viable desegregation plan for bringing about a unitary sys
tem.

The final blow was delivered to the dual system by the

Supreme Court, which tardily arrived at a view similar to
that of the Fifth Circuit Court, declaring that freedom of
choice was not an end in itself but merely an interim plan
to be used to bring about the final goal of a totally uni
tary system where there would be no separate all-white or
all-black schools based on the past effects of de jure
discriminat ion.
End of the Dual Education System, 1969-1971
Federal pressure brought to bear on school boards to
adopt alternative desegregation plans to freedom of choice
resulted in the collapse of several dual school systems in
Louisiana in the fall of 1969> and of the remainder by the
end of the 1970-71 school year.

However, the emphasis was

on terminating the de jure system and its lingering effects
on public education, not on the de facto system that was the
product of legitimate neighborhood schools.

It was more

difficult for the Southern states to draw a distinction
between what had resulted from a de facto situation and what
had emerged as a result of decades of segregation by state
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and local decree.

The local school boards had the burden of

offering substantial proof that virtually one-race neighbor
hood schools were constitutional.

In the Northern and

Western parts of the nation, which had only traces of segre
gation by law in public education, it was more difficult to
levy charges of discrimination and easier to defend an
alleged practice of segregation.
In 1969, the Johnson Administration, which had exer
cised strict supervision over public school systems with a
history of racial discrimination, yielded to a less vigilant
Nixon Administration.

During the 1968 Presidential cam

paign, Richard Nixon had pledged to decelerate the desegre
gation process, though adopting a stand opposing the South's
de jure system.

Although the federal courts would have

benefited from the assistance of a strong ally in the White
House, the machinery was in place to bring about an end to
the all-black and virtually all-white schools of the South.
The federal courts were poised and prepared to deliver
last blows

the

to a system already on the verge of collapse.

It

was the ruling by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Alexander v. Holmes (1969) that strengthened the
resolve of the lower federal courts to bring a swift and
timely end to the dual system of education based on de jure
segregat ion.
On May 28, 1969, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a

lower court decision inHall v. St. Helena, which

had upheld

freedom of choice plans in eight parishes.
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Applying its ruling to thirty-eight school systems in
Louisiana, the appellate court instructed school boards that
they had an affirmative duty to abolish all vestiges of
state-imposed racial segregation in the public schools.

Any

system that had schools with no whites or with less than ten
percent of the total black student population was prima
facie evidence that its desegregation plan was not working,
and the board had an obligation to adopt a new plan.

Empha

sis was also placed on fully integrated faculties, staff,
facilities, transportation and school activities.39
Less than a month later, the federal district court for
the Western District in Louisiana implemented this decision
in thirty-four school districts under its jurisdiction.

All

boards were ordered to promptly submit their existing plans
for review by the Office of Education, and to submit a new
plan of operation to the court for the 1969-70 school year
within thirty days.

If any board failed to submit a plan,

one would be recommended by HEW.

Pursuant to additional

requirements by the appellate courts, all plans had to be
approved by the district court by July 25, 1969.^®

State

Superintendent William J. Dodd referred to the HEW desegre
gation plans as "crackpot social experiments" drawn up and
forced on the state by "a host of Northern bureaucratic

'IQ

Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 303 F.Supp.
1224 (E.D. La. 1969); 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969).
^Conley v. Lake Charles School Board, 303 F.Supp. 394
(W.D. La. 1969).
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carpetbaggers and local scalawags" intent upon allowing HEW
to seize control of the public schools.41
As the 1969-70 school year approached, the most serious
trouble occurred in the state since the New Orleans desegre
gation crisis of I960.

Since 1954, massive integration had

been merely conjecture, but now, talk and litigation were at
an end and the destruction of the dual system was at hand as
forty-four school systems were ordered to accomplish sub
stantial desegregation.

During the summer of 1969, branches

of the Citizen's Committees for Quality Education (CCQE)
sprang up around the state to unite whites in opposition to
court orders that would bring about massive integration.
Led by Dr. Donald Roberts, the CCQE sponsored a demon
stration of several thousand whites in a march to the State
Capitol Building in Baton Rouge on August 16, 1969.

There,

Roberts called for a special session of the legislature to
repeal the compulsory school attendance law, to grant public
aid for private education, to file a suit against HEW due to
its violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition of
the use of busing to overcome racial imbalances in the
schools, to establish ability grouping in the high schools,
and to utilize the National Teachers Examination to deter
mine competency of teachers in their subject areas and to
replace "substandard teachers."

The crowd booed the gover

nor's executive secretary when he tried to explain that

^

New Orleans Times Picayune, July 11, 1969.
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everything possible had already been done at the state level
to prevent massive integration, and that the governor was
working with others for a return to freedom of choice.42
About this time, a Gallup Poll was released revealing
that 44 percent

of Americans felt that desegregation was

proceeding "too

fast," 22 percent that it was "not fast

enough," and 25 percent that it was proceeding "about
right."

Most of those in the 44 percent category felt that

quickened desegregation would promote racial strife and that
a gradual approach was the best method by which to proceed.
Among Northern white parents polled, 54 percent were opposed
to sending their children to a school that was over half
black, while 64 percent of Southern white parents were
similarly opposed.

The poll revealed that nearly half of

Southern whites had finally accepted the principle of mas
sive school integration, and that
were opposed to

only 21 percent of them

sending their children to a school with even

a few black students.

Also, 47 percent of Southern whites

did not object to schools with half black enrollment.

By

contrast, a similar poll conducted in 1963 had shown that
61 percent of Southern whites were opposed to sending their
children to schools with any blacks, and 78 percent were
opposed to the idea of a school with half black enroll
ment .43

/2

Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Aug. 17, 1969.
^ Ibid. ; New York Times, Sept. 2, 1969.
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Scattered trouble arose across Louisiana as the new
school year approached.

The most serious problems occurred

in Iberia, Evangeline and St. Landry parishes in the south
western part of the state.

Violence at a high school and a

march by black students in New Iberia to protest the closure
of the black high school resulted in the closure of the
city's only high school and imposition of a strict curfew
for the following two nights.

Hostile crowds in Evangeline

and St. Landry Parishes forced school boards to close the
schools indefinitely, and suits were filed in state court to
force the boards to return to freedom of choice.

However,

on September 11, 1969, the federal courts ordered the two
parishes to reopen their schools.

When they reopened on the

following day, a white boycott left them virtually all
black. ^

Organizers in both parishes then set up private

schools as alternatives to integrated public schools.

By

the end of the year, approximately 1800 of the 2000 white
children in the Ville Platte area of Evangeline Parish were
attending private schools.

In November, about 4000 whites

attended a rally in Opelousas in St. Landry Parish, with
Governor McKeithen and several other state officials in
attendance.

The governor informed the crowd that if HEW

plans were ordered in all of the schools, that the legisla
ture would refuse to "vote a dime for public education," and

^ Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Aug. 28, Sept. 3, 5,
13, 1969.
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called upon the federal government to treat Louisiana like
the Northern states, where segregation existed legally.45
Scattered violence, boycotts and picketing

occurred at

several schools in parishes in the southeastern part of the
state.

Violence, street demonstrations and a few firebomb-

ings occurred in Gonzales and Plaquemine in the parishes of
Ascension and Iberville.

In these areas, as well as in the

parishes of St. John, St. James and West Baton Rouge, boy
cotts and picketing significantly reduced the number of
white students attending public schools.

Because of contin

ued violence, classes in Ascension and West Baton Rouge
Parishes were suspended briefly.46
In the Florida Parishes area, problems were encountered
mainly in Washington and Tangipahoa Parishes.

In Washington

Parish, federal marshals escorted black teachers and stu
dents to some schools because of the threat of violence, and
pickets and a small boycott plagued attendance at a few
schools.

In Tangipahoa Parish, boycotts and pickets were

conducted and one school burned, with a strong suspicion of
arson being the cause.47
Most areas in the central and northern part of the
state were quiet.

A rally in support of a boycott was

staged in Concordia Parish, followed by a modest boycott on

^Read, Let Them Be Judged, 508-09.
^Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Aug. 26, 29, 30, 31,
Sept. 3, 7, 10, 196$:
^ Ibid., Aug. 26, Sept. 7, 1969.
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the first day of school.

In Grant Parish, blacks boycotted

several schools because of the use of busing to achieve
integration there.

In North Louisiana, there was much talk

of boycotts, picketing and the creation of private acade
mies, but no serious incidents were reported.
Although several organized attempts were made by vari
ous groups, including local chapters of the CCQE, to prevent
the dissolution of the dual system, desegregation proceeded
with surprising success.

In most areas, members of the

community realized that the fight to retain segregated
schools was over and that widespread fears of racial vio
lence were unfounded.

Therefore, they decided to get on

with the business of educating their children.

Except for

an occasional racial incident at a secondary school, the
transition to a unitary system had been accomplished with a
minimum of violence.
Despite all of the talk about the creation of private
schools as alternatives for the desegregated public schools,
few were actually established.

In areas where parochial

schools existed, they were filled to capacity and inundated
with requests for new applications.

The greatest increase

in white private school enrollments came in the 1969-70 and
1970-71 school years, when an additional 15,158 and 11,716
students respectively entered nonpublic schools, while the
public schools lost nearly 25,000 (4.5 percent) of their

*8 Ibid., Sept. 8, 9, 1969.
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white students (table 12) during these two years.

Between

1969 and 1971, the largest number of new nonpublic schools
were opened in Caddo (fourteen) and Ouachita (ten)
Parishes.49

However, once the initial reaction to

desegregation had passed and economic pressures began to
outweigh unfounded fears, whites returned to the public
schools, resulting in the collapse of most of the hastily
formed private schools and returning the parochial schools
to their former enrollments.

Exceptions were in areas where

the only educational alternative was a predominantly black
school or in primarily Catholic parts of South Louisiana.
On October 29, 1969, the United States Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Alexander v. Holmes, in which it
declared that the standard of "all deliberate speed" set in
the second Brown decision in 1955, was "no longer constitu
tionally permissible."

School districts were ordered to

"terminate dual school systems at once and . . . operate now
and hereafter only unitary schools."

The major significance

of this decision was that it vindicated the actions of lower
federal courts exercising jurisdiction over Louisiana, and
extinguished the last hopes by intransigent school systems
that desegregation could be delayed long enough that the
federal government might abandon its determination to bring
about unitary school systems.

^Louisiana, State Department of Education.
School Directory Session 1970-71, 266.

Louisiana

■^Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 1218 (1969).
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Table 12
Louisiana School Enrollment, 1960-1976

Public
Year

Nonpublic

White

Black

White

Black

1960-61

429,078

279,899

113,541

24,828

1961-62

442,112

290,533

116,446

24,657

1962-63

460,589

301,433

118,466

24,689

1963-64

473,917

311,380

123,897

24,774

1964-65

487,039

318,966

125,428

24,420

1965-66

498,781

325,082

127,233

24,133

1966-67

510,965

331,040

131,162

23,188

1967-68

525,813

337,225

125,441

21,682

1968-69

545,829

344,482

118,276

20,266

1969-70

535,996

348,473

133,434

20,186

1970-71

521,146

349,470

145,150

20,528

1971-72

522,965

351,522

140,804

19,278

1972-73

—

—

—

—

1973-74

518,327

352,140

136,408

20,258

1974-75

513,717

348,961

134,807

20,886

1975-76

521,152

350,081

134,808

21,563

Source:

Louisiana, State Department of Education.

Louisiana School Directory, Sessions 1960-76.
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In November of 1969, the United States Supreme Court
rejected Louisiana's request that it be allowed to return to
freedom of choice, but took no action on a desegregation
timetable for thirty-eight school systems, which had until
the fall of 1970 to complete the transition to a unitary
school system.

As a result of this decision, seven members

of the state's Congressional delegation sponsored a House
bill to amend the 1964 Civil Rights Act to give parents
freedom to select which school their children would attend,
and to prohibit the withholding of federal assistance from a
public school because of the racial composition of its stu
dent

b

o

d

y

.

However, in December, the Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals adopted a strict view of the Alexander v. Holmes
decision and declared all dual systems void.
In the Singleton v. Jackson (Singleton III) case, the
Fifth Circuit Court struck down freedom of choice plans in
six states, including several within Louisiana.

Under the

decision, faculties and staff would be merged by February 1,
1970, and student bodies by the fall

s e m e s t e r .

52

Two weeks

later, though, the Supreme Court revised the Singleton III
decision in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board,
ordering three school boards to plan for desegregation of

*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 11, 25, 1969.
52

Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969).
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student bodies as veil as faculty and staff by February 1,
1970.53
The Carter decision brought massive Integration to Deep
South public schools and divided the courts on how to
enforce it.

Many judges became concerned about having to

disrupt the schools in the middle of a semester, because of
the damage it would inflict on black and white children
alike.

Reluctantly, the Fifth Circuit Court voided its

earlier decision delaying student integration and began
remanding active school cases to the district courts to
comply with the Carter decision and complete the transfor
mation to unitary systems by February 1, 1970.54
Fifteen school systems in Louisiana were given less
than two weeks to desegregate their student bodies, facul
ties and staffs.

Eight districts closed their schools for

several days in order to move equipment from one school to
another and to transfer students.

In a few others, the

change was made almost overnight and near chaos ruled as
some schools reopened with nearly half of their teachers and
students new.

Except for a few scattered boycotts and

heated discussions about creating private schools as
"alternatives to the federal schools," cooler heads pre
vailed and the unitary system was brought about with

Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 90
S.Ct. 611 (1969).

5/

J Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District, 425 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
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relatively few serious incidents.

55

However, a second wave

of student withdrawals now occurred as more parents began
sending their children to nonpublic schools in the 1970-71
school year.

Approximately 6700 students had transferred to

Catholic schools in the 1969-70 school year, with some evi
dence showing that segregation was part of the reason for
many of the transferals.

However, the Louisiana Catholic

Church officially discouraged such action and all parochial
schools were now desegregated.

The New Orleans Archdiocese

responded that it had lost 1600 students in the past year,
which offered some proof that there were no general trans
fers of public school students into the Catholic schools to
avoid integration.56
Between January and August of 1970, the federal courts
in Louisiana were primarily concerned with adjusting school
desegregation plans to bring about a truly unitary school
system as quickly as possible.

Any remaining school system

having a freedom of choice plan was ordered to adjust to
another desegregation plan in order to complete the dissolu
tion of its dual system.

Subterfuges conducted by various

school systems were quickly overruled.

Among these was the

transfer of all-black classes with their black teachers
intact to previously all-white schools and continuing to

55

New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 30, 1970; Jackson
Daily News, Feb. 4. 197b.
•^Chicago Tribune, Mar. 2, 1970.
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maintain a dual system within the schools themselves.

The

courts also exercised supervision over the integration of
transportation, extracurricular activities, facilities,
faculty and staff assignments, and majority-to-minority
student transfers within the unitary system.

School systems

were also ordered to recover school equipment and books
loaned to private schools, and to refrain from rendering any
further assistance to private schools in the future.

Mean

while, on July 10, 1970, the director of the Internal
Revenue Service announced the beginning of a crackdown on
private segregated schools in the

S o u t h .

57

In April of 1971, the United States Supreme Court
announced new guidelines for school desegregation in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.

The high

court re-emphasized that its objective was "to eliminate
from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segre
gation," and expressed its opposition

to "invidious racial

discrimination" in all aspects of the public schools.

The

court upheld the setting of racial quotas for both faculty
and student assignments when it was necessary, gerrymander
ing of geographic attendance zones, and busing when it fos
tered desegregation but did not harm children or the educa
tional process, but overruled the neighborhood school

57

Johnson v. Jackson Parish School Board, 423 F.2d 1055
(5th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Concordia Parish School Board, 3
Race Relations Law Survey (hereinafter cited as RRLS) 174
jwrur.—
-----------------—
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concept for student assignments if it failed to bring about
a unitary school system.58
The Swann case stirred up controversy almost immedi
ately.

Southern reaction was bitter because of the distinc

tion being made between formerly de jure segregation in the
South and present de facto segregation in other parts of the
country.

Lower federal courts viewed the decision with

frustration and confusion.

Instead of clarifying the situ

ation, Swann created more problems than it attempted to
resolve.

Its vagueness on several points resulted in a

split among the fifteen judges of the Fifth Circuit Court,
which continued to reverse lower court rulings primarily
because statistical evidence showed insufficient racial mix
ing.'

Swann was so perplexing that it became all things to

all parties and became universally misunderstood, resulting
in further litigation being filed in the overburdened fed
eral courts.

The Supreme Court was particularly remiss in

failing to provide guidelines specifically outlining the
limits of permissible busing, leaving the problem for the
lower courts to determine what the outer boundaries were.
As a result of its shortcomings, Swann turned many district
judges against the higher federal courts.59

58

Swann v. Chariotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
59

Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 551; Read, Let
Them Be Judge5~| 530-31.
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Desegregation of School Personnel
Among the chief victims of integration were black
teachers and principals.

In several cases, principals were

demoted, becoming assistants under less qualified white
principals, and were initially passed over for advancements
or relegated to minor positions within the central office.
Many black teachers were dismissed on various grounds, often
being told no reason other than that they had been displaced
because of desegregation.

Most of the demoted or dismissed

educators took no action against school boards because of
their reluctance to jeopardize their future employment pos
sibilities.

Only a few stalwart blacks challenged the

injustices rendered to them and brought suit against their
boards.
As early as 1966, the federal courts and HEW began to
consider faculty desegregation in earnest.

In that year,

the courts ruled that desegregation covered faculties and
staff as well as student bodies, and new HEW guidelines
included demands for at least token integration of faculties
as part of the requirements for compliance with the 1964
Civil Rights Act.

The first faculty integration began in

New Orleans in the fall of 1966, when two black teachers
were assigned to two predominantly white schools, and two
white teachers were assigned to a reverse situation.

New

teachers applying in Baton Rouge were informed that they
would be assigned to any position that might become
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available regardless of the racial composition of a
school.60
As schools underwent the transformation from dual to
unitary systems, federal courts became increasingly vigilant
about the treatment of black educators by their school
boards.

In various court cases, the judiciary established

new dictums for the adjustment to integrated faculties.

The

qualifications of all teachers in a school system had to be
taken into account and "objective standards" used to evalu
ate them.

Only the least qualified educators were to be

dismissed, and they were to be given the first opportunity
to be rehired when vacancies became available.6*
The Singleton decision of 1969 ordered several parishes
to merge their faculties and staff by February 1, 1970.
Thereafter, most school systems in Louisiana were either
already operating under a unitary system or about to, so the
courts increased their surveillance of the treatment of
black educators within the single school system.

Boards

were not allowed to reassign a staff member if he received
less pay, less responsibility or was required to exercise a
lesser degree of skill than under his previous assignment.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit Court ruled in 1970, that a
merit system could be used as a standard for employment,

^ Southern Education Reporting Service, "School
Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, Louisiana"
2 (August 1967).
^Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F.Supp. 578 (W.D. La.
1969).
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promotion and reduction of staff once a truly unitary system
had been created.

However, nondiscriminatory, objective and

reasonable criteria had to be utilized . ^
Most of the initial friction between black and white
teachers declined substantially after the first full year of
massive integration in a school district.

However, many

black educators continued to be subjected in the 1970's to
racial stress, charges of incompetence from white students
and parents, and unequal treatment by school board personnel
and colleagues.

Blacks were often bitter because of imper

tinent white students who ridiculed their ability to teach,
and resented snubs by white teachers in lunchrooms and
faculty lounges.

They also felt that they were being dis

criminated against for promotions in subtle but legal ways
as newer and tougher criteriawere developed to
blacks out of the upper ranks

keep most

of the central office staff.

In the absence of provable evidence of racial intent and due
to the high cost of interminable litigation against the
school board, most problems were
little feeling of vindication

settled out of court, with

byb l a c k s .

On the other hand, many of the white appointees to
predominantly black schools were young, inexperienced and
ill-prepared for teaching black students.

Having little

62

Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969); Carter v. West
Feliciana Parish School Board, 2 RRLS 173 (1970).
^Read, Let Them Be Judged, 513; confidential
communication.
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notion of black language, customs, deprivation and pride,
many white teachers quit out of frustration, burn-out or
racial animosity.

Many black educators still feel that

white teachers emerging from today's colleges are poorlyequipped to deal with ghetto-type situations in many innercity school systems, where they are usually initially
assigned.

Not until they have gained experience and tenure

are they transferred to "better" schools, which has resulted
in an extremely high turnover in teaching positions in
schools where a large black enrollment predominates due to
center city decay and white flight to the

s u b u r b s . ^

Public School Desegregation after 1971
By the end of 1971, a unitary student body and faculty
had been achieved in most of the state's sixty-six public
school districts (the separate Lake Charles district had
merged with the Calcasieu Parish school system). However,
the courts were still compelled to consider other public
school areas in order to remove the lingering effects of the
dual system provided under de jure segregation.

Among the

areas examined were the issues of testing, continued use of
racist symbols within desegregated schools, rules of disci
pline, busing, new school construction and abandonment,
private schools and reapportionment of school districts.
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Among the devices employed by several school systems
after the establishment of the unitary system was the admin
istration of various testing procedures to assess and place
students.

Admittedly, some systems legitimately desired to

place students in classes that would impart maximum benefits
and assistance in the transformation from all-black to
integrated schools.

For various reasons many black children

performed poorly on standardized tests and were academically
behind the average white student, resulting in their inordi
nate assignment to lower classes based on their achievement
scores.

The federal courts decided that this was another

stigma imposed on black children and ordered the discontinu
ation of all such testing and placement until the demonstra
tion of proof that the unitary system was being operated on
a nondiscriminatory basis.

Realizing the disparities

between white and black children, the court ordered the
implementation of remedial programs so that blacks could
receive guidance and the opportunity to advance to their
natural level of performance.

Otherwise, all students were

to be assigned to "heterogeneous, racially integrated
classes."^5
Another problem encountered by many black children was
the continued use of indicia of white supremacy and segre
gation at desegregated formerly all-white schools.

When a

65

Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 3 RRLS 92
(1971); Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 330 F.Supp.
1340 (E.D. La. 1971).
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St. Tammany Parish principal of an integrated high school
continued to display a Confederate battle flag beside
American and Louisiana flags, a federal district court in
1970 ordered that "all Confederate flags, banners, signs
expressing the board's or its employees' desire to maintain
segregated schools, and all other symbols or indicia of
racism shall be removed from the schools and shall not be
officially displayed at school functions of any kind."

In a

similar case decided in early 1971, a state district court
dismissed a suit to void the decision by the Orleans Parish
School Board to discontinue the use of the Confederate flag
as the school banner at a local integrated high school and
the term "Rebels" for its athletic teams.

The board had

taken such action at the request of the parish superinten
dent, who had been petitioned by black students to do so.
The state court found the board's procedure to be within its
powers.
With the establishment of unitary school systems, a
degree of trouble could be expected from both black and
white students, who were not yet acclimated to the new
situation.

When violence broke out at some of the high

schools in the early 1970's, the application of disciplinary
rules was called into question.

In a case brought by black

students challenging the constitutionality of Louisiana's

^Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 316 F.Supp.
1174 (E.D. La. 1970); Gaillot v. Orleans Parish School
Board, 3 RRLS 51 (1971).
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school district disciplinary statutes, rules and regula
tions, the federal courts strengthened the stand of the
schools on discipline in early 1973.

The courts held that

the disciplinary statutes were not so vague as to infringe
upon the First Amendment rights of students, despite the use
of such phrases as "willful disobedience," "intentional
disruption," "immoral or vicious practices" or "disturbs the
school."

The judiciary would not interfere with high school

regulations involving the dress code and would leave some
discretion to school authorities concerning school behavior.
Although a student did not surrender his rights upon enter
ing a school, neither was he allowed to openly disrupt the
educational process to express a grievance.^7
One of the most controversial desegregation issues to
strike the nation in the 1970's was the use of busing for
the purpose of equalizing racial numbers.

Several areas of

Louisiana came under court-ordered busing because of the
ineffectiveness of alternative desegregation plans to bring
about a valid unitary school system.

Among the first school

districts to be required to implement busing of students was
Jefferson Parish.

In the summer of 1971, the school board

was ordered to draw up a new desegregation plan in accor
dance with Swann, with the possible use of busing to enhance
greater integration of students.

Although the board

67

Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 472
F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973).
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submitted a plan, it did not recommend its adoption.

Its

scope entailed busing 3000 students (90 percent of whom were
black), who had previously walked to neighborhood schools,
to more distant schools with an average daily round trip of
seven miles.

Holding that some short-term disadvantages

would have to be endured in order to achieve the long-term
goal of a unitary system, the court ordered the plan imple
mented for the 1971-72 school year.®®
By 1972, the vast majority of people in the country
were opposed to court-ordered busing to desegregate the
public schools.

A Gallup Poll taken in 1972, showed that

two-thirds of those polled approved of integrated schools,
but that 69 percent were opposed to busing as a means for
achieving that goal.

Earlier in the year, President Richard

Nixon addressed Congress on his plan to curtail courtordered busing.

His proposals included placing an immediate

moratorium on busing pending a congressional investigation
to establish judicial guidelines, prohibiting busing below
the seventh grade, and allowing busing only if other reme
dies failed.

Although Congress did not adopt his recommen

dations, its 1972 Amendments to the Higher Education Act
included provisions which slowed the desegregation process
and limited the use of federal funds for busing students to
"overcome racial imbalance" or to "carry out a plan of

68

Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 3 RRLS
134 (1971).
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racial desegregation."

All further court-ordered busing

would be stayed until all current appeals were exhausted or
until January 1974, federal funds would be used to finance
busing only at the request of local school officials, and no
federal official could require or encourage using busing
unless "constitutionally required."69
Another area in which the federal courts took a harder
line was on school construction, abandonment, consolidation
and site selection.

The school board in Jefferson Davis

Parish closed two formerly all-black schools on the presump
tion that whites would refuse to attend them and to support
the school system.

The courts ruled that boards were justi

fied in closing old schools and constructing new ones in
order to eradicate state-imposed segregation, but not for
suspect reasons.

In another case, the Fifth Circuit Court

held that all future abandonment, consolidation, construc
tion and site selection for new school buildings had to "be
accomplished in a manner which will prevent re-establishment
of the dual school system."70
When the Lafayette Parish School Board proposed to
spend $5 million on improvements on schools, federal courts
overruled it in 1973» on the grounds that the school board

69

Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 512-14; New York
Times, Mar. lB"J 1972; 4 Race Relations Reporter 29-31
(Nashville; Race Relations Information Center, January
1973).
70

Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, 446
F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1971); Dunn v. Livingston Parish
School Board, 445 F. 2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
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had failed to establish "by preponderance of evidence" that
its actions would not result in the resegregation of the
school system.

Before the board could approve school con

struction proposals, it had to consider the extent to which
existing facilities could be utilized, the inequities in the
present plan of operation, the racial composition of the new
schools, and whether the growth of an area to be served by
new schools was the result of white flight from existing
schools.
White flight from the public schools was not as serious
of a problem as the courts had earlier feared that it might
be, except in areas where viable private alternatives
existed.

Between 1968 and 1971, major shifts occurred from

public to nonpublic schools in the parishes of Caddo,
Evangeline, Pointe Coupee, St. John and Tangipahoa (table
13).

Outside of these areas, there was no spontaneous and

sustained decline in public school enrollment across the
state as a reaction to massive integration (table 14).
Instead, there was more often a gradual decline of white
students in heavily black schools.

After desegregation,

many public schools experienced progressive losses of white
students, as their families moved out of black school dis
tricts and into predominantly white neighborhoods.

Systems

were then restructured so that schools with large black

71

Trahan v. Lafayette Parish School Board, 362 F.Supp.
503 (W.D. La. 1973).
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Table 13
Public and Private School Enrollment, 1968-1972

1969--70

1968--69
Parish

1970--71

Public Private Public Private Public Private

Caddo

62,613

4,012

61,217

5,675

57,401

8,406

Evangeline

9,088

699

6,309

3,198

6,508

2,620

Pointe Coupee

6,078

868

4,206

1,755

5,137

1,661

St. James

6,718

1,118

6,500

1,379

5,958

2,218

17,695

1,438

16,340

3,111

15,122

3,491

Tang ipahoa

Source:

Louisiana School Directory, Sessions 1969-71.

concentrations became even "blacker" with only a token num
ber of whites in their enrollment, while suburban schools
became essentially all-white.

In New Orleans, which already

had a we11-developed Roman Catholic parochial school system
by I960, the process resulted in de facto establishment of
several all-black, inner-city schools.

A similar situation

occurred in other cities which had sufficient private
schools to serve as alternatives to the public schools, so
that many central city schools were left virtually all-black
by the 1970's.72

^B o y d v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, 505 F.2d
632 (5th Cir. 1974); confidential communications.
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Table 14
Statewide School Enrollment, 1967-1976

Public

Year

State
Total

Total
Public

Nonpublic

Percent
of State
Total

Total
Percent
Non of State
public
Total

1967-68

1,010,161

863,038

85.4

147,123

14.6

1968-69

1,028,853

890,311

86.5

138,542

13.5

1969-70

1,038,093

884,473

85.2

153,620

14.8

1970-71

1,036,294

870,616

84.0

165,678

16.0

1971-72

1,034,570

874,488

84.5

160,082

15.5

—

—

—

—

1972-73

—

1973-74

1,026,726

870,468

84.8

156,258

15.2

1974-75

1,018,378

862,678

84.7

155,693

15.3

1975-76

1,027,604

871,233

84.8

156,371

15.2

Source;

Louisiana School Directory, Sessions 1967-76

To counter the effects of white flight, federal courts
ordered busing to equalize the black and white population
within several school districts.

Busing was implemented in

several school systems of the Western District of the fed
eral courts in Louisiana to arrive at an equitable racial
balance due to changing residential patterns as whites
migrated to the suburbs.
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Another problem that concerned the federal courts in
the early 1970's was the issue of reapportionment and redistricting of school board election districts.

The court's

primary concerns were that the ideal goal of "one man, one
vote" be attained and that all traces of de jure influence
be removed.

However, district courts tended to take local

conditions and geography into consideration before deciding
to approve or reject a redistricting plan.

In general, they

rejected any plan that deviated more than 2.5 percent from
the "one man, one vote" principle.

Although the courts pre

ferred single-member districts, they were not averse to
approving multi-member districts if they did not discrimi
nate against or significantly dilute the voting power of
minorities.73
Desegregation of Trade and Vocational Schools
Trade and vocational schools were brought under
desegregation orders prior to the integration of public
elementary and secondary schools.

As with the public

schools, the state legislature established a separate system
of white and black trade and vocational schools, then
attempted to prevent the collapse of the de jure system of
technical institutions.

However, they eventually came under

court orders to desegregate and complied reluctantly.

70

'^London v. East Feliciana Police Jury, 347 F.Supp. 132
(E.D. La. 1972); Panior v. Iberville Parish School Board,
359 F.Supp. 425 (M.D. La. 1973); Chargois v. Vermilion
Parish School Board, 348 F.Supp.498 (W.D. La. 1972).
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The first case to reach the courts concerning these
institutions was that of Angel v. Louisiana State Board of
Education.

In May of I960, the federal district court in

Baton Rouge enjoined the state from refusing to admit quali
fied black students solely because of their race and color
to trade schools in Crowley, Natchitoches, Greensburg, Lake
Charles and Opelousas.

A companion case, Allen v. State

Board of Education, was also settled at this time, enjoining
the state from refusing to admit black students to a trade
school in Shreveport.
During the I960 regular session of the state legisla
ture, a series of laws were enacted in an effort to prevent
the desegregation of the state's trade schools in the fall.
One act directed the governor to close any state trade or
special school "in case of disorder, riots, or violence," or
that "he deemed necessary to prevent" such turmoil.

Another

act provided for the classification of extant state trade
and special schools for the exclusive use by "non-negro and
negro students," granted the legislature exclusive power to
reclassify such schools, and placed them under the "exclu
sive control, management and administration" of the governor
if they came under a court order to segregate.

Two other

acts prohibited furnishing school supplies or funds or

^Angel v. State Board of Education, 5 RRLR 652-53
(I960); Allen v. State Board of Education, 287 F.2d 32 (5th
Cir., 1961); New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 30, May 26,
I960.
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recognition to desegregated state trade and special schools,
and empowered the governor to alienate their property to
private persons if they were closed. 75
Following the Angel and Allen decisions of I960, the
state appealed on the grounds that the State Board of
Education, which operated the trade schools named in the
suits, was an agency of the state and could not be sued
without the state's consent.

However, the Fifth Circuit

Court overruled this argument and ordered desegregation of
the vocational schools to proceed.

When the Shreveport

facility had not desegregated by the summer of 1962, a fed
eral district court ordered the defendants to show cause why
they should not be held in civil and criminal contempt for
their refusal to obey the court's order.

In September, the

State Board of Education declared that it would admit all
students requesting admission to these schools "without
regard to race or color."

However, more than twenty public

trade and vocational schools not named in court suits still
remained segregated.7®
Not until the middle of the 1960's was de jure
operation of the state's trade and vocational schools
brought to an end. In October of 1964, the courts prohibited

75

Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 579,
no. 580, no. 581, no. 582.
^State Board of Education v. Allen, 287 F.2d 32 (5th
Cir. 1961); State Board of Education v. Angel, 287 F.2d 33
(5th Cir. 1961); 8 RRLR 1075 (1963).
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discrimination against blacks seeking admission to Delgado
Trades and Technical Institute in New Orleans.

Five more

facilities were ordered to desegregate in the following
February, and the remaining eighteen in May of 1965.

The

Louisiana State Board of Education admitted the allegations
and offered no defense.

Therefore, the court enjoined it

from refusing to accept applicants on the basis of race,
refusing to enroll blacks because of their race, denying
blacks the "full and equal use" of facilities, applying
different admission procedures to blacks than for whites,
and practicing racial discrimination in the operation of the
trade schools.

All of the state’s public trade and voca

tional training schools were now under desegregation
orders.
The school systems of Louisiana had come a long way
since 1963.

Nine years after Brown had ordered an end to de

jure segregation in the public schools, only one school
district in the state had undergone even limited desegrega
tion.

It took a combination of efforts by Congress, the

executive branch and the federal courts to end the dual
system of education.

The impetus for modified integration

of the state's public school systems was judicial action,
with the reward of continued and expanded federal funding.

^Williams v. Board of Managers of the Delgado Training
Institute, 9 RRLR 1783 (1964); United States v. State Board
of Education, 10 RRLR 1205 (1965); New Orleans Times
Picayune, Oct. 10“ T?64, Feb. 19, May 8, 1965.
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However, not until 1965 did a majority of school systems
submit to any form of desegregation.
Under the guise of freedom of choice, school systems
bridged the gap between compliance and noncompliance with
the guidelines of HEW and the dictates of the federal
courts.

Freedom of choice succeeded to the extent that it

brought about initial integration gradually and with a modi
cum of violence.

Most probably, if massive integration had

come about suddenly, it would have spurred violent opposi
tion that may have wrecked public education and taken a toll
in lives and property.

Nevertheless, freedom of choice

failed because it gave whites a respite in disestablishing
the dual education system, and placed the burden for inte
gration on the backs of black parents who were products of a
century of oppressive measures that stifled any intention to
cross the color line.

Since state and local officials would

do only what was required of them, only by the heavy hand of
the federal government could the segregated system be swept
away.
Mainly through the actions of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals and a tardy Supreme Court, the dual education
system was finally brought to an end in Louisiana.

After

every grade had been opened to integration and freedom of
choice plans had been fulfilled, federal courts began to
order school systems to adopt alternate plans which would
bring about a unitary system more quickly and effectively.
What had been considered impossible to do between 1954 and
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1969* was now accomplished from 1969 to 1971, as unitary
systems replaced dual systems.

Although there was serious

opposition in scattered parts of the state, fears of a
wholesale white retreat from the public schools and wide
spread violence did not materialize.

Most parents begrudg

ingly accepted a situation over which they had no control,
and allowed the education of their children to proceed.
With the attainment of unitary school systems by the
end of 1971, the courts turned to eradicating the remaining
traces of the de jure system of segregation.

To prevent

the resegregation of school systems, the judiciary became
vigilant over testing and placement procedures, transporta
tion and school assignments, faculty assignment and dis
placement, school construction and closings, and school dis
trict reapportionment.

Particularly troubling for the

courts in Louisiana, as elsewhere in the nation, were chang
ing residential patterns resulting from white migration to
the suburbs.

A de facto system of racial and economic

segregation was created as neighborhood schools in the inner
cities became virtually all-black and suburban schools
essentially all-white.

The most effective means for resolv

ing this problem was through busing.

However, there was a

noted lack of support among two-thirds of Americans or from
more conservative Presidential administrations, Congresses,
and Supreme Court Justices in the 1970's.

Although busing

was considered to be an impractical solution, no other plan
surfaced which had a more realistic chance for success.
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Chapter VII
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
Introduction
The foundations of racial segregation in governmentoperated,

maintained and leased public facilities derived

from de jure origins, and were,

therefore, easier to

eradicate than segregation in areas such as housing or
employment, which had primarily de facto origins.

Among the

facilities funded or maintained by the state, parishes or
municipalities were government buildings, medical facili
ties, correctional institutions, auditoriums and recrea
tional facilities.
Most
operation

of the steps taken to

erase segregation from the

of government-sponsored facilities were initiated

by the federal courts.

Since discrimination in public

facilities was often based on law, it was easier to prove
state discrimination and to void artifices employed to
continue the segregated system.

The Civil Rights Act of

1964 capped the activities of the federal courts and removed
any uncertainty about the intentions of the federal govern
ment toward de jure segregation in public facilities.
However, more intricate maneuvers continued to provide a
means for continuing covert separation of blacks and whites.
275
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Arbitrary discrimination in the use of public facili
ties by the State of Louisiana and its political subdivi
sions rested upon a network of laws dating to the first
quarter of the twentieth century, then bolstered by new
legislation enacted during the desperate days of massive
resistance in the mid-1950's.

By 1963, the entire system of

de jure segregation was tottering on the brink of collapse.
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
assault on segregated public facilities was complete, and
only a few isolated cases surfaced in the courts thereafter.
In most instances, the federal judiciary had established
precedents elsewhere within the nation, so that federal
district courts or the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had
simply to re-apply earlier desegregation decisions to cases
arising within Louisiana.
Federal Policy in Regard to Public Facilities
Prior to 1954, the United States Supreme Court heard
few cases dealing with public institutions other than public
schools.

The court appeared to be deliberately evading a

sensitive issue since it generally denied certiorari
(declined to hear a case on appeal),
appeals on a technicality.

reversed, or dismissed

The two Brown decisions of 1954

and 1955 displayed a precise and deliberate effort by the
high court to eliminate de jure segregation from
tax-supported public facilities.

Thereafter, it adopted the

view that segregation in the operation of public facilities
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by the government or any of its agencies was a violation of
the United States Constitution.
The two post-Brown decisions that established the
Supreme Court's subsequent stand on public facilities were
Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore and Holmes v. Atlanta, both
decided in 1955.

In Dawson, the court affirmed a federal

appeals court reversal that voided Baltimore's segregated
public beach and bathhouse policy, while Holmes extended the
Brown decision to Atlanta's municipal golf courses.1
Although both of these cases were based fundamentally on de
jure discrimination, later litigation involved more intri
cate devices adopted by Southern states and municipalities
to continue segregation in public facilities.

Subsequently,

the Supreme Court adopted a policy of restraint, opting to
either deny certiorari or affirm lower court decisions
without comment, rather than becoming embroiled in court
challenges arising over the desegregation of public facili
ties .
Following federal rejection of state and municipal
legislation mandating segregated public facilities, Southern
authorities resorted to leasing publicly-owned facilities to
private lessees, with the understanding that proprietors
would continue to operate them on a segregated basis or for
the exclusive use of whites only.

Theoretically, this

^Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 350 U.S. 877 (1955);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
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subterfuge would conceal the state from direct involvement
in maintaining segregation.

However, the federal courts

remained vigilant and declared this maneuver an unlawful
attempt to transform private lessees into state agents for
the purpose of sustaining a prohibited policy.
In 1956 and 1957, the Supreme Court affirmed judgments
in two cases involving government leasing of public facili
ties by taking no action on them.

Lower federal courts

extended the Supreme Court ban on racial discrimination by
the state to that of the lessee.

In one case, lower courts

had held that a private lessee of public property could not
discriminate on racial grounds.

The other case involved a

privately leased restaurant located in a Texas courthouse,
which linked publicly-owned facilities with the issue of
privately-operated public accommodations.

By refusing to

take action on either case, the Supreme Court succeeded in
securing its intentions without having to become involved.^
Alarmed that the federal courts were becoming increas
ingly aggressive in ordering the desegregation of public
facilities, the Louisiana State Legislature of 1956 adopted
a harsher stand on segregation by proposing a state consti
tutional amendment which was adopted by the voters in
November of that year.

Using the United States

2
Department of Conservation and Transportation v. Tate
231 F .2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), 352 U.S. 838 (1956);
Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), 353
U.S. 924 (1957).
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Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment guarantee of a state from
suit without its consent, the legislature interposed the
state's will and immunity by prohibiting suits against state
agencies that perpetuated racial discrimination.

The state

amendment further required the recall of members of any
state agency that ordered the integration of any taxsupported facility, and removed integrated facilities from
operating as a function of government.3
In 1961, the Supreme Court broke its self-imposed
silence on the issue of leasing government property that was
being used to perpetuate racial segregation.

It declared in

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority that leasing
government-owned facilities to private individuals who
operated it on a segregated basis, constituted state
involvement.

The court took its final stand on the issue- of

segregated public faciliites in Hamilton v. Alabama in 1963,
when it declared that this subject was no longer open to
debate in federal courts.^

Although the fight continued in

the lower federal courts, the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 put a Congressional blessing on the actions of
the federal courts and enabled the Justice Department to
adopt a more active role in dismantling de facto segregation
in both privately and publicly operated facilities.

Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 613.
^Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961); Hamilton v. Alabama (1963).
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Government Buildings
Considering the nature of this type of discrimination,
it was extremely difficult for a state government agency to
practice overt segregation within its own buildings after
1955.

When such practices fell quickly after being chal

lenged in federal court, means were found to subvert federal
demands, primarily by resorting to the private lease system.
Since most of the landmark federal cases arose outside of
Louisiana, federal district and appeals courts simply
applied these decisions to test cases in the state when they
arose.

By and large, when the test cases failed, government

agencies dismantled all visible indications of de jure
segregation and, at least on the surface, appeared to be in
compliance with federal dictates.
After voiding state laws that established segregation
in government facilities, the federal courts concentrated
their efforts on private leasing in the early 1960's.

A

federal district court cited the Burton case of 1961 in
requiring restaurant, bar and lounge facilities in the New
Orleans airport to desegregate in 1962, even though they
were leased by the city to a private corporation.

The

courts also ordered the desegregation of privately leased
cafeterias that were located in the New Orleans and Baton
Rouge City Hall buildings in 1964. ^

^Adams v. City of New Orleans, 208 F.Supp. 427 (E.D.
La. 1962); Castle v. Davis, 9 RRLR 884 (1964); New Orleans
Times Picayune, Feb. 14, 1964.
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Another type of segregation existed within the halls of
justice themselves.

One of the time-honored Southern tradi

tions was to segregate seating within the state's courtrooms
and to provide separate restrooms, water fountains and
lunchroom facilities within the building.

During the public

defamation trial of 6. Elton Cox in 1962, several seats
designated for the use of whites in an East Baton Rouge
Parish courtroom were vacant while numerous blacks stood
outside because their section was filled.

Three blacks who

sat in the white section were arrested when they refused to
leave the area.

The judge responded that the separate

seating policy was a custom intended "to keep order," and
that he had already ordered half of the seats in the white
section to be used by blacks during the trial.

He subse

quently denied a motion by Cox's attorney that the segre
gated policy in seating and facilities be overturned.®

A

year later, though, the Supreme Court ruled that courtrooms
were public facilities and overturned segregated seating in
Virginia state courtrooms.7

Less than a month later, using

this decision, the high court voided the convictions of the
Q
three blacks who had refused to move during the Cox trial.
6

New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 3 0 ,
State Times, Nov 171 2 6 , 2 7 , 1 9 6 2 , May 8,
1-----

1 9 6 2 ;

Baton Rouge

1 9 6 3 .

Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
8
George v. Clemmons, 83 S.Ct. 1296 (1963); Baton Rouge
State Times, May 14, 1963.
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It was not until 1976, that the State of Louisiana went
on record to protect public access to public meetings held
in public buildings.

Defining a public meeting as "a meet

ing which is advertised as being open to the public," the
state legislature enacted a law prohibiting the denial of
any person access to any public meeting in any public build
ing used or owned by the state or one of its political sub
divisions on the grounds of race, color or c r e e d . 9
Auditoriums
Where public auditoriums were maintained, the rule of
"separate but equal" was often applied to prevent the pos
sibility of federal desegregation orders on the grounds of
denial of access by blacks to public facilities that were
accorded to whites.

However, where only one auditorium

existed, blacks were either denied use or compelled to
submit to prior approval by arbitrary white authorities
before access would be granted to them.
It was almost inevitable that a test case would arise
in New Orleans, with its large and active black population,
over the use of white-designated public auditoriums by
blacks for black causes.

In 1961, the black Longshoreman's

Better Conditions Club contracted with the city to use its
municipal auditorium.

When city officials learned of the

nature of the meeting and its list of speakers, which
Q
Acts of Louisiana, 1976, Regular Session, no. 700.
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included Martin Luther King, the contract was cancelled.
The black group won a temporary restraining order from a
local district court, prevailing over the city fathers for
less than three hours before the city won an appeal.
Two years later, a similar situation arose in New
Orleans when the NAACP sought an injunction requiring city
officials to grant black citizens equal access to the audi
torium.

The federal district court noted that the city had

permitted the notoriously racist White Citizens' Council to
use the facility, but had denied a similar request by the
NAACP.

The court, therefore, enjoined city officials from

discriminatory allocation of the auditorium, and prohibited
segregation and denial of its use to groups that advocated
desegregation.^
In many smaller municipalities, such as Houma, located
in the southeastern part of Louisiana, separate facilities
had been provided for the use of whites and blacks in an
attempt to avoid federal charges of racial discrimination.
The Houma Municipal Auditorium was used by whites, while the
Dumas Auditorium was constructed for the use of blacks.
Only with the passage of the public accommodations section
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did this situation come to an
end, and Houma, along with other municipalities in the

^Longshoreman’s Better Conditions Club v. New Orleans,
7 RRLR 194 (1961).
^Bynum v. Schiro, 218 F.Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963),
375 U.S. 395 (1964).
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state, dropped segregated requirements and reluctantly
adopted a policy of free access to public facilities on a
nondiscriminatory basis.

By that time, most municipalities

in Louisiana had come to realize that resistance to feder
ally ordered desegregation was futile, and nearly all of
them decided to comply voluntarily.
Medical Facilities
Segregation in medical facilities was almost equally
based on de jure and de facto origins.

Blacks who chose to

enter the medical field were likely to experience discrimi
nation in education and training programs, employment, and
medical and professional staff appointments.

Individual

blacks who sought medical attention were most likely to
encounter such practices as being housed in the older por
tions of hospitals where they often received treatment with
antiquated equipment and condescension from the all-white
staff, in contrast to whites who occupied the more modern
areas and had access to state-of-the-art facilities.

Blacks

were also subjected to segregation in wards, private and
semi-private rooms, use of lavatories, eating facilities,
entranceways, emergency rooms, maternity wards and nurser
ies, and ambulance services.

It was common for blacks to

encounter poor service, requests for more financial proof
than from whites for admission, and outright discourtesy
from hospital personnel.

To make matters worse, much of the
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bias applied to blacks until 1964 could be justified by fed
eral regulations governing hospitals.*2
The Hill-Burton Act of 1946, which governed public
hospitals under the jurisdiction of the Public Health
Service, included a nondiscrimination clause which provided
that state hospital construction plans "shall provide for
adequate hospital facilities for the people residing in a
state without discrimination on account of race, creed or
color."

However, the Surgeon General of the United States

was authorized to establish regulations whereby the antidiscrimination clause could be bypassed by the establishment
of "separate hospital facilities" for "separate population
groups" as long as "equitable provision" was made for each
group.

Under this rationale, hospitals in the Southern

states were provided with the means for continuing de jure
and de facto segregation of medical patients.*3
In the early 1960's, segregation in public and private
medical facilities in Louisiana was the norm.

As early as

1902, the state legislature had decreed that blacks and
whites would attend separate mental hospitals, although no
such public facility for blacks was in existence at that
time.1^

12

Two years later, the legislature provided for the

Bell,
confidential
13
Bell,
Act of 1946,

Race, Racism and American Law, 253;
communications.
Race, Racism and American Law, 255; Hill-Burton
TCHT'"'!:.'75=725, 60 5tat. 1040.

^Acts of Louisiana, 1902, Regular Session, no. 92.
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establishment of a separate "colored asylum," later named
the Central Louisiana State Hospital and located in Rapides
Parish.*5

Primarily because of their poor economic status,

blacks tended to frequent state charitable clinics and hos
pitals or went without medical care, while private hospitals
and clinics were primarily attended by whites.
In the racist atmosphere that prevailed during the New
Orleans school crisis of I960, the state legislature enacted
two laws that were targeted at the use of state medical
facilities by blacks.

One act provided penalties for fraud

and misrepresentation by persons applying for or assisting
others in applying for admission to state hospitals, while
the other law denied the use of charity hospitals to unwed
mothers.^
Shortly thereafter, three major breakthroughs were made
in the effort to destroy resistance to desegregation of
medical facilities.

They included the settlement of the

Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Hospital case, the amending of the
Hill-Burton Act and the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
The Simkins case involved a segregated Greensboro,
North Carolina, hospital which used Hill-Burton federal
funds.

15

A lower federal court ruled in 1962 that the

Acts of Louisiana, 1904, Regular Session, no. 143.

^ Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 136,
no. 251, no. 306.
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practice of racial discrimination in government owned,
operated or subsidized hospitals violated due process and
equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The hospital was ordered to open its facilities to black
doctors, dentists and patients.

In early 1964, the United

States Supreme Court upheld this decision.*7

About this

same time, the Surgeon General decided to amend the HillBurton Act.

Under new regulations, all medical facilities

receiving Hill-Burton funds were required to admit and treat
black patients and professionals in a nondiscriminatory
manner.

Race, creed, color or national origin could not be

considered in the admission of patients, in patient access
to all hospital facilities and services, or in the employ
ment of doctors, nurses, interns and medical technicians.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 capped the efforts by
Congress to eliminate discrimination from the nation's
medical facilities.

Various sections of the act not only

prohibited racial segregation but provided incentives to
desegregate voluntarily.

Title III empowered the United

States Attorney General to bring suit to enjoin discrimi
nation at public facilities owned and operated by state
governments;

Title VI required medical facilities to make

1 7

Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Hospital, 211 F.Supp. 628
(N.D.N.C. 1962), 376 U.S. 938 (1964); New Orleans Times
Picayune, Mar. 3, 1964.
18

Hospitals and Medical Facilities Amendments Act of
1964, Pub. L. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447; Baton Rouse State Times,
June 25, 1965.
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agreements with the federal government, pledging to operate
without discrimination as a requirement for receiving addi
tional federal funds; and Title IX permitted the Attorney
General to intervene in suits by persons seeking relief from
being denied equal treatment.*9

With coordinated action

taken by all three branches of the federal government,
racially segregated medical facilities soon vanished.
Most of the hospitals in Louisiana used federal funds
for construction and indigent care, yet practiced racial
segregation until the mid-1960's.

In the New Orleans area,

Charity Hospital received $1,243,824 for indigent care in
1962-63, Touro Infirmary received over $1,820,000 to help
construct a $5,000,000 addition, and DePaul Sanitarium also
received Hill-Burton funding.
One of the first civil rights cases'involving Louisiana
hospitals occurred in early 1963.

Black activist Arthur

Jelks asked the federal government to withhold $2,000,000 in
Hill-Burton matching federal funds from a planned charity
hospital in Baton Rouge until assurances were given that it
would be operated on a nonracial basis, including the right
of black physicians and nurses to be on staff at the pro
posed medical facility.21

Less than a year later, spokesmen

for Baton Rouge General and Our Lady of the Lake Hospitals

*^Civil Rights Act of 1964.

20
21

New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 3, 1964.
Baton Rouge State Times, Mar. 28, 1963.
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announced that two-thirds of the staffs of each facility had
voted to permit black physicians to practice at each hospi
tal.

However, Dr. C. Grenes Cole, the executive secretary

of the Louisiana State Medical Society promptly declared his
opposition to the desegregation of public and private hos
pital staffs.
In August of 1964, the first major suit in Louisiana
to desegregate a medical facility was filed by Callie
Castle, an elderly black woman, to integrate facilities at
Charity Hospital in New Orleans.

She contended that the

hospital was being run in violation of the Fifth and
Thirteenth Amendments, and Title III of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.

Following the filing of her suit, hospital

administrators desegregated treatment in the emergency room
and removed all "white" and "colored" signs.

In January of

1965, a hospital spokesman announced that a new system would
begin to operate for handling persons applying for treatment
and admission, without regard to race.^3
In February of 1965, state welfare officials declared
that nursing homes receiving federal funds under the KerrMills Medical Vendor Program must be willing to accept
blacks or lose federal funding.

Under the provisions of the

1964 Civil Rights Act, the State Department of Welfare,

22

Ibid., Feb. 25, 1964; New Orleans Times Picayune,
Mar. 4, 1964.
23

Pittsburgh Courier, Aug. 1, 1964; New Orleans Times
Picayune, Jan. 14, i£65.
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which received and supervised the distribution of federal
funds for old age assistance, was required to receive assur
ances from nursing homes that they were in compliance with
federal guidelines.

During the past year, the state agency

had disbursed $6,000,000, and in January of 1965, had
already paid out $577,675 to licensed nursing homes for the
care of over four thousand elderly welfare

pa t i e n t s . ^ 4

Citing discriminatory practices, the NAACP filed suit
against several hospitals in the state in April of 1965,
asking that public funds be cut off until they complied with
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The facilities that

were charged included Our Lady of the Lake (Baton Rouge) for
segregating wards and providing inferior facilities for
blacks, Sara Mayo (New Orleans) for maintaining segregated
facilities and refusing to allow black physicians to prac
tice in the hospital, Touro Infirmary (New Orleans) for
maintaining separate facilities for blacks and whites and
refusing staff membership to blacks, and St. Patrick's (Lake
Charles) for segregating patients and keeping separate
towels and linens for black and white patients.^5
In the summer of 1965, H. Hunter Huckaby, president of
the Louisiana Hospitals Association, announced that hospi
tals in the state would have to desegregate if they wished
to continue receiving federal funding, and that complete

2^Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 17, 1965.
25Ibid., Apr. 15, 1965.
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desegregation was only a matter of time, regardless of
whether a medical facility received federal allotments.
Approximately 72 percent of the money appropriated by the
state to hospitals came from the federal government.

In

order for the state to continue to receive funding, it had
to show that the money was distributed to institutions that
were in compliance with the Civil Rights Act, Hill-Burton
Act and other federal guidelines which prohibited racial
discrimination in patient care and employment of medical
personnel.

In addition, any hospital with one hundred or

more employees had to comply with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, which became effective on July 2, 1965.
This law prohibited the hiring or firing of employees on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex.26
The final blow was struck against segregated medical *
facilities in Louisiana with the issuance of an injunction
against the State Department of Hospitals and various hos
pital officials in December of 1965, for failure to comply
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Defendants were enjoined

by federal courts from continuing to maintain segregation in
wards, clinics, diagnostic or treatment areas, or in any
other hospital facilities.^7

Faced with a determined

federal government, most of the medical institutions in the

26Ibid., June 25, 1965.
27

(1965).

Rax v. State Department of Hospitals, 11 RRLR 394
----
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state began at least partial compliance with federal guide
lines, if for no better reason than to continue receiving
lucrative federal funding and in order to participate in
the new Medicare program.
Correctional Facilities
The state's segregated prison system was a more
difficult problem to solve than other segregated public
facilities.

With the end of the convict-lease system in

1901, the state purchased the Angola plantation property and
established a state penal farm near the Mississippi River in
West Feliciana Parish.

In 1900, the state legislature

enacted laws requiring segregation in the state peniten
tiary, and required segregated facilities and accommodations
in parish jails and prisons in 1918.28

The de jure system

was extended to black male juveniles in 1926 and 1928, with
the creation of a separate prison farm for black juveniles
(the State Industrial School for Colored Youths).29

jn

1938, the state legislature authorized the establishment in
each parish of industrial schools for black males under
eighteen years of age who were convicted for juvenile
offenses.

In addition, the legislature authorized judges in

districts without separate prison farm facilities for blacks

28

Acts of Louisiana, 1900, Regular Session, no. 70,
1918, Regular Session, no. 251.
29

Acts of Louisiana, 1926, Regular Session, no. 203,
1928, Regular Session, no. 150.
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to sentence black juveniles to any prison district in the
state where such facilities were available.30

However,

while special correctional facilities were established for
female white juveniles, none were ever created for female
black juveniles.
It was not until 1968 that the United States Supreme
Court ruled in Lee v. Washington that the operation of a
racially segregated prison system in Alabama violated equal
protection.31

in mid-1968, a federal judge in Louisiana

commenced the cumbersome task of desegregating the state's
correctional facilities.

Citing Lee v. Washington, the

court ordered state officials to begin working out an
orderly desegregation plan for the state's jails, prisons
and juvenile reformatories.32

About a month later, Orleans

Parish prison officials began assigning inmates solely on
the basis of their sex and status (women would be separated
from men and first offenders would be separated from hard
ened criminals).33
In 1969, major breakthroughs were made in the deseg
regation of correctional facilities within Louisiana.

Three

black inmates of Orleans Parish Prison filed a federal suit

30

Acts of Louisiana, 1938, Regular Session, no. 226,
no. 127.
31Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
OO

New Orleans Times Picayune, June 22, 1968.
33Ibid., Aug. 2, 1968.
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against the prison's warden because of his failure to
include them in a work program that would lead to their
early release.

White inmates were offered the opportunity

to participate in a work program which offered "double good
time," in which they could earn two days of sentence for
each day working in the special program.

The warden

responded that he had already begun to desegregate the
dining hall and recreation yard, but the federal court did
not feel that this was sufficient.

Therefore, it ordered

the warden to provide work for all suitable persons regard
less of race, and ordered the desegregation of all floors,
cell blocks, cells and work details.34
In the spring of 1969, a federal district judge
abolished segregation in Louisiana's juvenile correctional
facilities, after declaring that black reformatories were
far inferior to those provided for whites.

However, the

court realized the problems inherent in integrating a
juvenile correctional institution and did not order its
immediate desegregation. 35

jn September, the court became

dissatisfied with the procrastination of the state director
of correctional facilities in presenting an adequate deseg
regation plan, and ordered the desegregation of Louisiana
Training Institute in Monroe, the State Industrial School

^Pounds v. Theard, 230 So.2d 861 (1970); New Orleans
Times Picayune, Apr. 16, 1969.
^Major v. Sowers, 297 F.Supp. 664, 298 F.Supp. 1039
(E.D. La. 1969).
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for Girls in Pineville and the State Industrial School for
Colored Youth in Scotlandville.

In the future, juveniles

would be assigned to a facility on a geographic basis, while
current inmates would be reassigned later on the same basis.
All juvenile offenders in North Louisiana would be assigned
to the Monroe and Pineville facilities by sex, while all
offenders of both sexes in South Louisiana would be assigned
to the Scotlandville reformatory.

In addition, the court

ordered the desegregation of faculties and staff at all
facilities.36
Not until the early 1970's were laws concerning segre
gated juvenile and adult penal facilities corrected by the
state legislature.

In 1972, the legislature repealed laws

requiring separate detention facilities for black and white
juveniles, and changed the name of the formerly all-black
juvenile reformatory to the "Parish Industrial School for
Youths."

Three years later, the legislature deleted the

portion of the laws which permitted judges to sentence black
juveniles to any prison district that maintained a special
section for black juveniles, and deleted all provisions of
the laws requiring racial segregation in prisons.37

og
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 4, 1969.

q7

Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 372,
1975, Regular Session, no. 419, noT 4£6.
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Recreational Facilities
New Orleans and Baton Rouge were the major battlefields
in the fight to desegregate recreational facilities in
Louisiana.

During the 1950's and early 1960's, both cities

operated public parks, playgrounds, pools, community cen
ters, amusement parks, tennis courts and golf courses on a
segregated basis.

In order to forestall the federal courts

from voiding segregation of its recreational facilities,
many Louisiana parishes and municipalities embarked on a
building program in the 1950's to make separate and "equal"
facilities available to blacks, or leased public recrea
tional facilities to private individuals in order to cir
cumvent federal court orders to desegregate.

However, liti

gation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought about an end
to de jure segregation in recreational facilities across the
state.
The first case challenging the segregated operation of
recreational facilities in Louisiana was an NAACP suit in
1949 to desegregate the City Park golf course and Audubon
Park, both in New Orleans, on the grounds that there were no
comparable facilities available for blacks.

Mayor DeLesseps

S. Morrison realized the city's error in failing to provide
these facilities, and the threat it posed to the "white
only" recreation system in light of recent court decisions
on higher education declaring against unequal educational
opportunities for blacks.

Therefore, the mayor appealed to
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segregation logic and persuaded the residents of Gentilly, a
suburb of New Orleans, to agree to the location of a black
park in their area.

He emphasized strongly that their

refusal would endanger the entire system of segregated
recreational facilities, and would heighten chances for
court-ordered desegregation.

In 1956, Pontchartrain Park

and Golf Course opened for the use of blacks, with picnic
grounds, tennis courts and a baseball field.38

During the

interim before this park opened, an agreement was reached
between city officials and black community leaders in 1952
at the request of United States District Court Judge J.
Skelly Wright.

Blacks would be permitted to use one golf

course and three tennis courts on Tuesdays and Fridays, and
they were allowed to frequent the zoo portion of Audubon
Park but none of the park's other facilities.39
Although New Orleans had been willing to temporarily
appease black aspirations, many other municipalities in the
South were not so willing to accommodate them, resulting in
a flurry of federal desegregation orders. In 1951, federal
courts voided Houston's policy of denying blacks the use of
golf courses located within white city parks.

The Supreme

Court voided the policy of Louisville, Kentucky, which
provided separate facilities for whites and blacks and
excluded blacks from using an amphitheater located in a

^ H a a s , Delesseps S. Morrison, 75-76.
*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 8, 1955.
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white city park in 1954.

Atlanta was ordered to desegregate

its municipal golf courses and Baltimore its public beaches
and bathhouses in 1955.

At this time, New Orleans was in

the process of building Pontchartrain Park and Baton Rouge
had just completed construction of a separate golf course
for its black residents.

In the following year, the Supreme

Court affirmed a lower court decision that voided a Virginia
state park lease and extended the high court's ban on dis
crimination in leasing public property to include a ban on
discrimination in selling public property, if negotiations
included an attempt to continue segregation by the sale or
lease of such property.^®
In 1956, state and local officials were alarmed at the
Supteme Court's actions in banning segregation in public
parks, playgrounds and golf courses outside of Louisiana.
In April, park and recreation officials from New Orleans,
Monroe, Zachary, Thibodaux, Baton Rouge, Arabi, Lake
Charles, Lafayette and Shreveport met in Baton Rouge and
adopted three resolutions designed to maintain segregated
park facilities.

Their proposals revolved around the issue

of interposition, requesting the state legislature to enact

^Holcombe v. Beal (1951); Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Association, 347 U.S. 951 (1954); Holmes v.
Atlanta (1955); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore (1955);
Department of Conservation and Development v. Tate (1956);
New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 9, 1955.
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a constitutional amendment withdrawing the state's consent
to suit over parks and recreation.
When the legislature met in the spring of 1956, it
proceeded to enact four laws to interpose state authority
behind the separation of the races in all parishes and
municipalities.

Thus far, the only state segregation law

dealing with public accommodations was a 1914 act that
required separate entrances and ticket offices for blacks
and whites at circuses.^2

Segregation in recreational

facilities rested largely on custom and on parish or city
ordinances.

Now, the state legislature became determined to

place its weight behind this form of segregation as part of
its program of massive resistance to keep the federal courts
at bay.

The state's police powers, as interpreted by state

authorities under the powers reserved to the states in the
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, were
invoked to justify state segregation laws.

A state mandate

was established for the segregated operation of all "public
parks, recreation centers, play grounds, community centers
and other facilities at which swimming, dancing, golfing,
skating or other recreational activities are conducted."
Although mixed audiences were permitted at such facilities,
separate seating and sanitary facilities had to be provided.
With an eye to possible federal intervention in segregated

^*New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 5, 1956.
/9
Acts of Louisiana, 1914, Regular Session, no. 235.
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public facilities, the legislature invoked the Eleventh
Amendment to the Federal Constitution by proposing a state
constitutional amendment withdrawing the consent of the
state to suits against state agencies with recreational and
educational activities.

Included within its scope were the

State Parks Commission, Recreational and Park Commission for
East Baton Rouge Parish, and all recreational districts of
the state.

Essentially, the state legislature had attempted

to interpose itself between the federal courts and parish
and municipal authorities to continue the practice of dis
criminatory use of public recreational facilities.43
An additional law enacted by the 1956 state legislature
prohibited interracial participation in "dancing, social
functions, entertainments, athletic training, games, sports
or contests and other such activities involving personal and
social contacts."

Sponsors of such programs were required

to provide separate seating, sanitary, drinking water and
other facilities, and "to mark such separate accommodation
and facilities with signs printed in bold letters."

Neither

race was permitted to use the facilities and seating of .
another r a c e .
The segregated system of parks and recreation of New
Orleans came under attack once again in 1957» when a federal

L%

Acts of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 14, no.
613; 1 RRLR 73T-32'(1956).
44lbid., no. 579.
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district court voided the state law and city ordinance that
required the segregated operation of City Park.

However,

city officials declared that they would not stop enforcing
segregation ordinances until all appeals were exhausted.
In the following year, the Supreme Court upheld the lower
court's desegregation order.45

However, public parks,

playgrounds, community centers, amusement parks, swimming
pools and other public facilities remained segregated for
several more years.
Beginning in late 1962, a new drive began to desegre
gate public facilities.

In December, one hundred sixteen

black children and their parents in New Orleans challenged
the state law which required separate public parks and
recreational facilities, and asked the federal courts to
desegregate all of the city's public parks, playgrounds and
community centers.

At the time, the New Orleans Recreation

Department (NORD) operated one hundred six playgrounds and
centers (eighty-eight for whites and eighteen for blacks).46
During 1963, the tempo of protest and litigation to
desegregate public recreational facilities accelerated.

In

June, NORD facilities and a New Orleans amusement park

came

under attack.

Faced with possible desegregation of its

pools because of a pending NAACP suit, NORD announced that

/c

Detiege v. New Orleans City Park Improvement
Association, 252 F.2d 122 (1958); New Orleans Times
Picayune, Oct. 21, 1958.
^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 21, 1962.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

302
it would not open its seventeen swimming pools (eleven for
whites and six for blacks) because of budget problems.
However, its budget was actually $6000 higher than in the
previous year.

When blacks attempted to integrate the all-

white Pontchartrain Beach midway and beach two weeks later,
they were denied access on the grounds that the property had
been leased by the city to a private lessee earlier in the
day.

At the end of July, the federal courts declared that

New Orleans facilities were segregated by state statute as
well as by custom, and that facilities provided for black
residents were far inferior to those for whites.

Therefore,

a preliminary injunction was granted and New Orleans offi
cials were required to desegregate all public recreational
and cultural facilities and activities, including all one
hundred six parks, recreation centers and playgrounds
administered by NORD.

The city ordinance and state "Anti-

Mixing Statute," upon which the segregation was based, were
declared void.

However, private groups could continue to

use publicly-owned and operated facilities on a segregated
basis if the use did not involve city or state action in
continuing segregation.

NORD officials declared that the

court decision changed nothing, since 99 percent of its
programs were operated by private groups anyway.^7

^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, June 11, Aug. 2, 1963;
Baton Rouge State Times, June 24, July 15, Aug. 2, 1963;
Barthe v. City of New Orleans, 219 F.Supp. 788 (1963), 376
U.S. 189 (1964).
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Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish recreational
facilities became the targets of charges of racial discrim
ination as early as 1953.

At that time, officials admitted

that they were operating a segregated system, but that the
separate facilities provided for blacks were equal to those
provided for whites.

The court denied the motion in 1954,

and no action was taken until plaintiffs requested a judg
ment on their pleadings in December of 1962.

City and

parish officials sought the right to maintain the dual
system of recreational facilities on the grounds of possible
loss of revenue, violence and the likelihood of closures of
facilities in the event of forced integration.

However, in

1964, the court overruled their actions and ordered the
parish to immediately desegregate all of its public facil
ities,

In May of 1964, facilities at Baton Rouge public

•

golf courses and tennis courts were desegregated with few
incidents.^
With the advent of the public accommodations section of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the question of de jure
segregation and discrimination in the operation of taxsupported facilities was definitively settled.

Neither the

courts, Congress nor the executive branch would tolerate
further delays in desegregating recreational facilities.
Therefore, most cities of the South quietly removed all
/Q
New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec.21, 1962; Baton Rouge
State Times, Dec.11, 1963, May 2b, 1964; Lagarde v.
Recreation and Park Commission, 229 F.Supp. 379 (1964).
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segregation signs and grudgingly admitted all races on a
nondiscriminatory basis to all such institutions.

A new

issue that arose at this time was the legality of closing
public facilities in order to prevent having to desegregate
them, particularly in the case of swimming pools.

Many

areas in the South opted to close public pools rather than
allow such a "horror" as an integrated swimming facility to
offend the minds of whites.

New Orleans had closed its

pools in 1963, while Baton Rouge closed its nine pools a
year later on the grounds of increased operating costs.

The

Recreation and Parks Commission then announced that it would
look into the feasibility of leasing the pools to private
operators as the City of Houma had done.

When challenged in

federal court, the commission was informed that a city and
parish were not required to provide recreational facilities.
However, if they were provided, they could not be operated
on a segregated basis.^9
A suit was brought against Jackson, Mississippi, which
had also closed its swimming pools, and this case reached
the Supreme Court in 1971.

Perhaps reflecting its more

conservative composition, the high court upheld the right of
people, for any reason, to choose to operate or to close a
public pool, as long as no one group was granted benefits
while others were denied them.

Since all pools in Jackson

had been closed, all groups were denied the use of public

^ Ba t o n Rouge State Times, May 7, 9, 20, 26, 28, 1964.
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facilities, so the actions of Jackson officials were consti
t u t i o n a l . ^

Therefore, similar action taken in Louisiana

was also legal.
In 1972, the State of Louisiana finally put to rest the
issue of segregation of all recreational facilities.

By act

of the state legislature, all provisions relating to sepa
rate seating and sanitary facilities, and prohibitions of
interracial personal and social contacts between blacks and
whites at social functions, games, dancing and entertainment
were deleted from the statute books.51

Although personal

acts of discrimination still continued, all remaining de
jure segregation had been outlawed finally by state action.
From the end of Reconstruction until 1956, the State of
Louisiana had very limited involvement in de jure segrega
tion of public facilities, with most of the regulations
being enacted and enforced by local government bodies or
custom.

When it appeared that the federal courts would void

municipal and parish segregation ordinances, the state leg
islature of 1956 decided to become actively involved in the
struggle to retain segregated facilities that were stateowned, operated and maintained through interposition of the
legislature between the federal courts and local government
agencies.

When this maneuver failed, municipal and parish

officials resorted to leasing public facilities to private

“^Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
51

Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session ,no. 254.
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lessees.

The courts voided this contrivance and demon

strated their determination in the early 1960's to insure
that equal protection of the law was practiced and, along
with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, public
officials in Louisiana were left with only three options.
They could defy the courts and continue to provide segre
gated public facilities, close all or part of the facili
ties, or desegregate.

Except in the case of swimming pools,

defiance and closure were ruled out.

Instead, municipal,

parish and state officials decided to continue full opera
tion of public facilities on a desegregated basis, since it
was no longer possible to practice segregation by law.
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Chapter VIII
DESEGREGATION OF TRANSIT AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Introduction
The federal government was the primary agent in the
desegregation of transit as well as in the area of public
accommodations.

The federal courts initiated the first

attacks on segregated railway, streetcar, bus and airline
facilities, and were gradually followed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and Justice Department in the 1950's.
However, not until the early 1960's were major strides
accomplished, following a determined and coordinated federal
drive to eliminate all remaining vestiges of de jure
segregation in Southern transit.

By 1965, all official

municipal, parish and state policies requiring separation of
the races in transportation were either abandoned or
overturned by federal action, although the more difficult
problem of de facto segregation remained to be resolved.
Unlike most areas that were desegregated, the source
for desegregating privately-owned public accommodations in
Louisiana was not the federal judiciary but Congressional
legislation.

Unquestionably, the courts played a key role

in bringing down segregation, but, it was the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, supported by the federal courts and the Justice
307
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Department that ended discrimination in hotels, recreational
facilities, restaurants and theaters.

Until 1964, most

public accommodations in the Southern states were still
operated in a racially discriminatory manner, sanctioned by
local custom and quasi-legal maneuvering.

White

Louisianians continued to practice private acts of segrega
tion and denial in the use of facilities until ordered by
the courts in the mid-1960's to cease such unlawful prac
tices.
Segregated Transit Prior to 1940
Segregated transit began during the 1820's in
Louisiana on New Orleans streetcars as a result of company
policy rather than by ordinance or statute, and lasted until
the advent of military Reconstruction in 1867.

As early as

1833, "star cars" were designated for black passengers by
placing a black star on special cars that were to be used by
blacks.

During the federal occupation of New Orleans

(1862-65), their use was banned briefly on two separate
occasions, but "star cars" remained in use on a continuous
basis until 1867.

Federal authorities halted the segregated

policy on streetcars after blacks attacked white-only cars
in the spring of 1867.

This situation was not characteris

tic of Louisiana cities during Reconstruction, since most of
them had no mass transit system similar to that of New
Orleans, and no other city in the state contained a potent
federal force to command obedience to an unpopular decree.
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White New Orleanians appeared to have accepted streetcar
desegregation fairly well, at least outwardly, because they
were powerless to prevent it.*
During Radical Reconstruction, the new Constitution of
1868 guaranteed blacks "equal rights and privileges upon any
conveyance of a public character", while the state legisla
ture enacted a civil rights law prohibiting racial discrim
ination on common carriers of passengers for hire in 1869.2
When political Reconstruction of Louisiana ended in 1877
with the ousting of Radical Republicans from control of the
government, no immediate change in the operation of public
transit was in evidence.
The first sign of impending trouble for black civil
rights came with the case of Hall v. DeCuir in 1878.

The

United States Supreme

Court struck down Louisiana's civi-l

rights act of 1869 as

an unconstitutional burden on inter

state c o m m e r c e . 3

Then, in the Civil Rights Cases (1883),

the high court overturned the part of the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1875 which had provided federal guarantees for
black equality in public transit.

The court determined that

the Constitution prohibited the states from discrimination,
but not private individuals.^

This ruling opened the door

^Fischer, The Segregation Struggle, 30-32, 38-39.
^Constitution of

1868, Article 13.

3Hall v. DeCuir,

95 U.S. 485 (1878).

*Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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wider to segregation, a fact which Louisiana legislators
recognized and exploited to prevent any further intermingl
ing of the races in social situations.

Their solution to

the race problem became the doctrine of "separate but
equal," beginning with railroads in 1890, waiting rooms in
1894, streetcars in 1902, and buses and taxicabs in 1928.
The first Louisiana statute providing for segregated
transit was enacted in 1890.

The law provided for separate

but equal accommodations for white and black railroad pas
sengers either by providing two or more coaches for each
racial group or by dividing individual passenger coaches
with a partition.

Passengers were prohibited from occupying

seats of members of the opposite race.

Railroad employees

wete required to assign passengers on the basis of race and
were authorized to deny service to anyone who refused to
abide by this l a w . 5

The act became the focus of the

challenge to the new Southern principle of "separate but
equal" in the Plessy v. Ferguson case in 1896.

The United

States Supreme Court found nothing unconstitutional in the
Louisiana act requiring separate but equal railroad facili
ties for whites and blacks.

If "separate" facilities were

"equal," then the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws" would not be violated.

Then, the

court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment only promised
blacks political equality, not social equality.

However,

5
Acts of Louisiana, 1890, Regular Session, no. 111.
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the federal justices assumed erroneously that a state would
accept the dictum that a segregation law would have to
assure blacks of truly equal facilities in order to be
valid.

One justice correctly observed that "separate but

equal" was a "thin disguise" for discrimination.®
Two other transit laws were enacted by the Louisiana
State Legislature in 1894.

One act ordered all railroad

companies to post the segregation or "Jim Crow" railroad act
of 1890 in a conspicuous place in each passenger coach and
ticket office.

In addition, it exempted from the transit

laws black nurses attending to white children, and black
prisoners in the care of white law enforcement authorities.
Another act required all railway companies to segregate
their waiting rooms by January 1, 1896.

From that date, no

person would be permitted to sit or remain in a waiting room
other than the one assigned to members of his race.?
In 1902, the state legislature extended the policy of
segregation to streetcars.

Streetcar companies were ordered

to provide two or more cars for blacks or to divide indi
vidual cars by wooden or wire screen partitions.

As with

railroads, penalties were outlined for noncompliance by
passengers, employees and companies.®

^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7
Acts of Louisiana, 1894, Regular Session, no. 177,
no. 98.
Q

Acts of Louisiana, 1902, Regular Session, no. 64.
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The legislature required buses and taxicabs to segre
gate in 1928.

Bus companies were to designate separate

seats or compartments for whites and blacks, and no one
would be permitted to occupy seats or compartments of per
sons of another race.9

By now, all mass transportation

facilities in the state had been brought under segregation
guidelines by state statute or by local ordinances.
Nationwide, blacks saw little hope in halting, much
less reversing, the trend toward segregation in transit
prior to 1940.

Between 1890 and 1910, they saw the futility

of trying to stem the rising tide in the South toward iso
lation of blacks in society.

In 1919, the NAACP failed to

persuade Congress to outlaw discrimination on interstate
railroads, and all of its attempts to halt the spread of
segregation failed.

Therefore, the equalization of accom

modations became the major focus of black organizations
since segregation could not be overturned at that time.
Federal Transit Policy, 1940-1955
In the 1940's, the federal government took pivotal
steps toward the eradication of segregation from interstate
transit.

The first major breakthrough in railroad desegre

gation occurred in the case of Mitchell v. United States in

g

Acts of Louisiana, 1928, Regular Session, no. 209.

^Catherine A. Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow: The
Desegregation of Southern Transit (Mew York: Columbia
University Press, 1983) 16-17.
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1941.

The Supreme Court ordered public carriers to assure

that accommodations provided for all passengers were
"substantially equal," resulting in the integration of
dining and pullman cars on interstate lines.

However, it

did not address facilities on intrastate railways.^
Another breakthrough was made in bus desegregation in the
case of Morgan v. Virginia in 1946, when the high court
declared Virginia's bus segregation law to be an unconsti
tutional burden on interstate commerce, as well as an imped
iment to free interstate travel.

However, state officials

in several Southern states, including those in Louisiana,
declared that the ruling did not apply to intrastate bus
laws.

To appease Southern officials, bus companies adopted

their own segregation regulations to replace the voided
state statutes.

Therefore, nothing really changed in the

Deep South following the Morgan decision.*2
The Truman Administration inaugurated a brief campaign
in the late 1940's to expand civil rights.

Among the

President's proposals to Congress was a request for a law
prohibiting discrimination in interstate transportation.
However, because the timing was too early for such legisla
tive action, the President was unsuccessful.

The federal

government did triumph, though, in its challenge of the
Southern Railroad's table-allotment policy on dining cars.

^Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
12Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
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In Henderson v. United States (1950), the Supreme Court
affirmed the government's assertion that the company had
breached rules established by the Interstate Commerce Act.
Although Plessy was not overturned, the court undermined de
facto segregation in dining cars as well as in other forms
of segregated transit.*3
Railroad companies across the country immediately began
complying with the Henderson case, except in the Deep South,
where segregation on buses and railroads remained the norm
for another decade.

However, many public carriers began

halting or modifying their segregation laws.

In 1951,

Greyhound Bus Company instructed its drivers to continue
observing segregation, but not to employ force against or
seek the arrest of any passenger who refused to take a seat
in the segregated section of a bus.

By the end of 1953,

only the Deep South states continued to rigorously enforce
and maintain transit segregation laws.*^
On November 7, 1955, a new force was unleashed in the
desegregation battle when the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) issued new regulations regarding railroads, buses and
waiting rooms.

The ICC overruled the practice of assigning

separate accommodations by race in railway coaches, buses
and waiting rooms "insofar as they pertain to interstate
travel," because it subjected black passengers to undue and

^Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
^Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 80-84.
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unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of the
Interstate Commerce Act.

Section 3 (1) of the act made it

unlawful for a rail carrier "to subject any particular
persons . . .

to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or

disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."

In addition, the

ICC held that travelers were "entitled to be free of annoy
ances . . . which inevitably accompany segregation," regard
less of the intentions of carriers to provide truly separate
but equal facilities for blacks and whites.

Transit compa

nies were ordered to discontinue segregation of interstate
passengers on trains and in station waiting rooms, and on
buses and in bus terminals by January 10, 1956.15
Desegregation of Bus and Rail Facilities in Louisiana
During the 1950's, Louisiana officials adopted a policy
of massive resistance toward any efforts by the federal
government to dismantle the de jure system of segregation in
transportation facilities in the state.
1960's ,

In the early

the federal government (with its vast resources)

launched a vigorous, coordinated and sustained assault on
all forms of segregation in transit and brought it to its
inevitable conclusion.
The ICC ruling of 1955, which established January 9,
1956, as the deadline for the removal of segregation signs

15

United States.
Interstate Commerce Commission.
Interstate Commerce Commission Reports 249 (Washington:
Government Printing Office) 335, 347-48.
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at railway and bus stations and at airports, injected the
race issue into the Louisiana gubernatorial election of
1955-56, prompting each candidate to avow his unwavering
support for segregation.

One candidate, James McLemore,

requested that Governor Robert Kennon call a special session
of the state legislature to nullify the ICC regulation.
Instead, the governor defied the ruling, ordering all state,
parish and municipal authorities to continue rigid enforce
ment of segregated transportation facilities. ^
When the state legislature of 1956 met, it enacted a
statute requiring the continuation of segregation in trans
portation terminals.

Transit companies were instructed to

provide separate waiting room and other facilities (drinking
fountains and restrooms) for white intrastate travelers and
another waiting room "for all other passengers."

Accommo

dations were to be equal for all passengers, and new signs
were to be posted declaring:

"Waiting, Interstate

Passengers and Colored Intrastate Passengers," and "White
Waiting, Intrastate Passengers.

In order to meet the new

ICC regulations, the state had simply changed the name of
its segregated practices.
An historic moment occurred in November of 1956, when
the Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision in Gayle v.

*^New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 22, 1955; Little
Rock Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 11, 1956.
171 RRLR 741 (1956).
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Browder, which involved the on-going Montgomery bus boycott.
The high court affirmed the decision to void Alabama's
intrastate bus segregation laws, yet failed to mention the
Plessy case, which had originated over the issue of
segregated transit.1®

In her detailed study of the

desegregation of Southern transit, Catherine Barnes declares
that the Montgomery bus boycott and Browder decision
resulted in the gradual elimination of segregation on buses
in other Southern cities, brought Martin Luther King to
national prominence, demonstrated to blacks that nonviolent
resistance and economic power could be employed to negate
segregation, and became a shining example for other black
Southerners of what could be accomplished through concerted
effort.1^
In Louisiana, the general attitude was that the Browder
decision applied only to Montgomery.

White officials had no

intention of voluntarily altering the segregated transit
system unless ordered by the courts.

However, black leaders

in Baton Rouge and New Orleans were heartened by the deci
sion and decided to challenge state and local transit regu
lations.

In late December of 1956, Reverend T. L. Jemison

headed a black group in forming the Baton Rouge Christian
Movement, whose aim was to desegregate the city bus system.

*®Gayle v. Browder, 142 F.Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956),
352 U.S. 903 (1956).
19

Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 121-22.
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Jemison contended that the state was in violation of a
Supreme Court mandate in Browder to end segregation in
intrastate transit, and that a Baton Rouge city ordinance
requiring segregated loading and seating on buses was also
unlawful.

A brief boycott of city buses by blacks in 1953

had brought slight improvement, but leaders now demanded an
end to all segregation in transit, threatening litigation if
necessary.

Officials of the Baton Rouge Bus Company

responded that they were caught between the Supreme Court
decision on one hand and state and local regulations on the
other.20
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (N0PS1), which oper
ated the city's bus services, responded that Browder only
affected Montgomery, not other city bus systems.

In January

of 1957, eight black ministers who claimed to represent two
hundred fifty churches and nearly two hundred thousand
blacks in the New Orleans area, petitioned NOPSI to deseg
regate the city's buses and streetcars.

They asserted that

the Browder decision applied to Louisiana transit and that
blacks were tired of riding behind screens and being treated
like second-class citizens.

Two black organizations, the

New Orleans Inter-Denominational Ministerial Alliance and
the New Orleans Improvement League, led by Reverend A. L.
Davis and Dr. William R. Adams respectively, worked in

20

New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 29, 1956.
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harmony to end segregated transit in New Orleans through
litigation.21
In the face of mounting litigation by black groups,
federal courts, the ICC and the Justice Department, inter
state bus lines began to abandon segregation as a policy
between 1957 and I960.

Continental Trailways abandoned

segregation of local passengers entirely during this period,
while Greyhound waited until 1961.

Most of the segregation

in Southern transit in the late 1950's occurred in terminals
rather than on transit

i t s e l f .

22

The first suit to end segregation in transit was filed
in federal court in New Orleans in February of 1957.

The

suit contended that segregated transit in New Orleans caused
blacks "great injury, inconvenience and humiliation" and
denied their constitutional rights.

In May, United States

District Judge J. Skelly Wright declared void all state laws
requiring racial segregation on buses, streetcars, street
railways and trolley buses operating within New Orleans on
the grounds that the laws denied blacks equal protection of
the laws and due process of law as guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment.23
New Orleans officials did not end segregation on city
transit immediately, but decided to await appeals.

Judge

21Ibid., Jan. 10, 1957.
22
Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 129-31.
2^Davis v. Morrison, 2 RRLR 996-97 (1957).
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Wright delayed further action until the exhaustion of state
and city appeals of his decision.

Within a year, the Fifth

Circuit Court affirmed the decision and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.

Four days after the Supreme Court

action, Judge Wright rejected a request by NOPS1 to delay
desegregation pending further federal appeals, and ordered
the end of segregation on New Orleans transit, beginning
after midnight on May 31, 1958.

Early that morning, an

eight-foot cross was burned on the judge's

l a w n .

24

By most accounts, the first day of integrated transit
in New Orleans was "uneventful."

Most black passengers, not

wanting trouble, continued to sit in the back and whites in
the front of buses and streetcars.

On some buses, whites

doubled up in seats so that blacks could not sit next to
them, and shifted seats when whites exited.

In most cases,

passengers minded their own business and went about their
own affairs.

Thus, for the first time in the twentieth

century, black New Orleanians were free to sit wherever they
chose on city transit.25
Because of the voiding of the state segregated transit
law, the Shreveport City Council unanimously approved an
ordinance that authorized an operator of a vehicle for hire

^Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958); 3
RRLR 424 (1958); New Orleans Times Picayune, May 31, 1958;
Atlanta Journal, June 1, 1958.
OC

Atlanta Journal, June 1, 1958; Little Rock Arkansas
Gazette,
June 1, 1958.
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to place passengers wherever he desired "to insure proper
weight distribution."

Earlier in 1957* five black ministers

rode in the white section on a city bus and read their
Bibles.

Knowing of their intentions in advance, the chief

of police made no arrests but later commented that anyone
following their example would be arrested.
During the late 1950's, the federal government did not
move vigorously enough to take advantage of propitious
opportunities to deliver a knock-out blow to the entire
system of segregated transit.

The ICC adopted a narrow

scope of its jurisdiction in intrastate commerce, while the
Justice Department and its Civil Rights Division were too
cautious to advance very far.

The Eisenhower Administration

lacked the verve for an all-out attack on segregated tran
sit, and Congress relied on the other branches of the
federal government to take action.

Therefore, the entire

intrastate transit issue was delayed until the new, vigorous
Kennedy Administration was inaugurated.
Following Boynton v. Virginia (I960), which declared
that segregation of interstate passengers in dining facil
ities in rail and bus terminals violated the Motor Carrier
Act, Greyhound announced in 1961 that it would remove all
segregation signs from its company terminals and restau
rants, and would abandon segregated seating on its buses.

^Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, Aug. 27, 1958; New
Orleans Times Picayune, June 16, 1957.
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However, the ruling did not apply to privately owned facil
ities used by the bus company.^7
During the late spring and summer of 1961, "Freedom
Rides" swept over the South.

When local law enforcement

officers failed to protect Freedom Riders from hostile and
violent treatment, Attorney General Robert Kennedy decided
to intervene in Southern transit.

Utilizing the resources

of the Justice Department in conjunction with the ICC, he
enforced desegregation on interstate, buses through pressure
and threats of litigation.

Four blacks who attempted a

Freedom Ride from Shreveport to Jackson, Mississippi, were
arrested in a white waiting room of the Continental
Trailways terminal in Shreveport.

In July, five other

blacks, using interstate bus tickets, rode from Shreveport
to New Orleans, stopping briefly in Alexandria and Baton
Rouge.

In Baton Rouge, two women in the group were refused

service in the Continental Trailways restaurant, and were
also asked to leave the white waiting area.

However, in New

Orleans, all five Freedom Riders were served at the bus
depot lunch counter without incident.^8
In September of 1961, the ICC unanimously adopted new
desegregation rules for interstate bus carriers that were to

^Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (I960).
28
Baton Rouge State Times, Aug. 4, 1961; New Orleans
Times Picayune, Aug” 7T, 19bl.
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take effect on November 1, 1961.

Under the new guidelines,

all segregation was banned on buses and in stations used by
interstate passengers.

Bus companies were directed to post

signs on buses declaring that seating was without regard to
race, color or national origin, and were prohibited from
supplying or using stations that were racially segregated.
The mere presence of a segregation sign was considered
impermissible segregation, so only stations displaying the
new ICC rules could be used by bus companies.^9

in order to

comply with these regulations, bus companies cancelled or
failed to renew agreements with establishments whose owners
refused to abide by ICC rules.
Reaction to the new ICC regulations was swift in North
Louisiana, where state action prevented their enforcement in
early November of 1961.

Police arrested the manager of the

Continental Trailways terminal in Shreveport when he removed
segregation signs on November 1.

Then, local district

attorneys in Monroe, Ruston and Alexandria obtained state
court orders forbidding integration of bus and rail depots.
The Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company took down the seg
regation signs in its depots on November 6, then replaced
them five days later because of the state restraining order.
The state also obtained a temporary restraining order

29

Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 176-77.
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prohibiting Greyhound and Continental bus companies from
desegregating terminal waiting rooms and facilities in Baton
Rouge.30
The Justice Department did not waiver from its stead
fast course of action, though.

It promptly announced in

mid-November of 1961 that the Justice Department would
handle any interference by Southern authorities with ICC
rules, while the ICC would handle noncompliance by bus
companies.

Suits were immediately filed against Monroe,

Alexandria and Ruston to prevent state courts from enforcing
segregation in bus and train terminals.

In the following

January, a three-judge federal panel (in United States v.
Lassiter) voided Louisiana statutes requiring segregation
of bus and train terminals because they imposed an undue
burden on interstate commerce and denied equal protection.
In addition, Louisiana officials, Continental Southern
Lines, and Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company were pro
hibited from requiring segregation in transit in the three
cities.31
The Justice Department also sought an enjoinment of the
state restraining order which prevented Greyhound and

^Washington Post, June 1, 1962; Baton Rouge State
Times, Nov. 11, 1961; State v. Greyhound Corp., State v.
Continental Southern Lines, Inc., 7 RRLR 233 (1961).
31

Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 179; Baton Rouge State
Times, Nov. 23, 1961; United States v. Lassiter, 203 F .Supp.
20 (W.D. La. 1962); New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 26,
1962 .
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Continental bus companies from desegregating waiting rooms
and facilities in Baton Rouge.

In March of 1962, a three-

judge federal court for Louisiana's eastern district voided
state statutes requiring segregated transit facilities and
dissolved the state court restraining

o r d e r .

32

Despite the voiding of the state's segregated terminal
laws in the Lassiter case, Shreveport police continued to
enforce segregation in terminal facilities and to arrest
blacks who attempted to cross the color line.

Therefore, in

November of 1962, federal courts enjoined the city and cer
tain of its officials from enforcing segregation in transit
because it imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce
and violated the Motor Vehicle

A c t .

33

With this case, the

last major stronghold of segregation in Louisiana bus ter
minal facilities succumbed.
Desegregation of Airport Terminals
Perhaps because so few blacks and whites used commer
cial airlines in Louisiana in the 1940's and 1950's,
Southern states did not adopt as stringent segregation laws
for airport terminals as they did in bus and rail transit.
The most commonly practiced form of racial discrimination
was not on board aircraft, but in terminal dining

32United States v. Pitcher, 7 RRLR 223-24 (1962).
33United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F.Supp. 708
(W.D. La. 1962).
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facilities, restrooms and waiting areas.

Since most air

ports were owned by governmental bodies, they were subject
to the ban by the United States Constitution on racial
discrimination, and it was more difficult for states and
cities to circumvent federal regulations.
The first significant federal case dealing with segre
gation in an airport terminal was Nash v. Air Terminal
Services (1949), which involved segregated dining facilities
in a dining and coffee shop in Washington National Airport.
Federal courts declared that a privately owned cafe located
in a federally owned airport was a public facility within
the meaning of the Constitution, and that Air Terminal
Services was presently operating dining facilities "in the
place and stead of the Federal government."34
In 1956, the Civil Aeronautics Administration banned
the use of federal funds for the construction of segregated
facilities in air terminals.

However, the new rules were

limited to segregated facilities within airports and to
future construction using federal appropriations.

It was

possible, though, for a city to circumvent federal regula
tions by building segregated facilities with its own funds,
thus remaining eligible for federal grants for other
construction at the

a i r p o r t .

35

^ N a s h v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F.Supp. 545 (E.D.
Va. 1949).
35

Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow, 140.
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In 1962, federal courts voided segregated practices at
airport terminals in New Orleans and Shreveport.

Moisant

International Airport in New Orleans became a target of the
Justice Department in June of 1961, because of segregated
practices in its terminal.

A suit was filed to bar the city

and a private concession operator from refusing to serve
blacks in the airport restaurant and coffee shop.

Previ

ously, airport officials had accepted $1,125,000 for con
struction of the terminal, agreeing in the funding applica
tion to "operate the airport for the use and benefit of the
public, on fair and reasonable terms, and without unjust
discrimination."

However, blacks were required to obtain

food at a small snack bar without seating facilities in the
terminal.

The Justice Department cited instances of dis

crimination being practiced against members of the armed
forces and diplomatic representatives of other nations, and
food vouchers issued by airlines to black interstate and
foreign passengers whose flights were delayed, were not
being honored at the airport.

In Adams v. New Orleans, the

federal courts banned the continued operation of segregated
facilities within the airport terminal in August of 1962.36
The Justice Department filed a suit against the Greater
Shreveport Municipal Airport in July of 1962 for practicing
segregation within its terminal.

In November, a federal

og

New Orleans Times Picayune, June 27, 1961; Adams v.
New Orleans, 208 F .Supp. 427 (E.D. La. 1962).
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judge ordered the removal of segregation signs from the
airport terminal and prohibited segregated practices in
terminal facilities and eating establishments.37
Transit and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought Congressional
sanction to a fait accompli by the federal executive and
judicial departments in the desegregation of transit.

Under

its various provisions, de jure segregation in public
facilities was prohibited (Title II), the Justice Department
was permitted to initiate litigation against local and state
government bodies which owned or operated segregated public
facilities (Title III), discrimination was prohibited in
programs or activities receiving federal funds (Title VI),
and the Justice Department was permitted to initate or join
cases against segregated city carriers (Title IX).

The

threat of possible litigation or loss of needed federal
funding was usually enough to force remaining transit com
panies and government agencies to desegregate.

However, it

was still possible to circumvent federal law by de facto
means, such as by establishing virtually all-black or
all-white bus routes which were enhanced by residential
segregation.

^United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F.Supp. 36
(W.D. La. 1962); Shreveport Journal, July 27, Nov. 3, 1962.
^®Civil Rights Act of 1964; Barnes, Journey from Jim
Crow, 192.
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The last major Louisiana case involving segregated
transit was settled in 1965.

The suit involved a New

Orleans ordinance that provided for segregation in the use
of taxicabs.

A federal court invalidated the discriminatory

provisions of the ordinance, but allowed city officials time
to bring about non-discriminatory compliance by city taxi
cabs, since New Orleans officials had not insisted on strict
adherence to or enforcement of the ordinance in recent
years.

Within fifteen days of the court ruling, the

Department of Public Utilities and the Taxicab Bureau were
to notify holders of city taxicab permits that they would no
longer be permitted to discriminate in the operation of
their vehicles.39
After 1965, all legal barriers to full and equal use of
transit facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis in the State
of Louisiana had fallen.

De jure segregation was ended on

all public and private transportation conveyances as well as
in related facilities such as depot and terminal waiting
rooms, dining areas, restrooms and ticket counters.

Unfor

tunately, de facto segregation still remained in employment
and in the use of transit, and numerous incidents of dis
crimination toward blacks using transportation facilities in
the state could still be found for the next decade.
Because of allegations of continued racial discrimina
tion being practiced in New Orleans in 1969, Mayor-elect

^Bergeron v. City of New Orleans, 11 RRLR 945 (1965).
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Maurice Landrieu introduced a public accommodations ordi
nance in the City Council at the request of the New Orleans
Human Relations Committee.

Under the proposed ordinance,

city bars and taxicab companies were prohibited from prac
ticing discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or
national origin beginning January 1, 1970.

Following its

adoption on December 23, a state district court issued an
order restraining its enforcement after a suit by bar
owners.

However, on January 15, 1970, a federal judge

voided the state court order and upheld the public accommo
dations ordinance.40*
Segregated Public Accommodations in Louisiana
Segregation in public accommodations in Louisiana had
its origins in the antebellum period.

According to

Louisiana historian Roger Fischer, the presence of large
numbers of free blacks in New Orleans before the Civil War
caused a collapse of racial discipline typical in rural
areas of the state.

Blacks residing in New Orleans enjoyed

the use of segregated facilities to a degree unknown in
other parts of the South.

As early as 1816, theaters and

public exhibitions were officially segregated by city ordi
nance, but blacks were denied access to white restaurants,

^He a t h v. Schiro, Heath v. City of New Orleans, 2 RRLS
35; New Orleans Times Picayune, Dec. 17, 30, 31, 1969,
Jan. 16, 1970.
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hotels, private white schools and "respectable

s a l o o n s .

"^1

However, it must be noted that New Orleans was only one part
of Louisiana, and that these conditions were not the norm in
smaller towns and remote areas of the state.
On first appearance, Louisiana seemed to have had one
of the most radical of Reconstruction governments among the
ex-Confederate States.

Its Constitution of 1868 included a

provision which prohibited "distinction or discrimination on
account of race or color" in all "places of public business,
or of public resort" that were licensed by a state, parish
or municipal authority.

An 1869 public accommodations law

was enacted which prohibited discrimination by race or color
in admission to or entertainment at any public inn, hotel or
place of public

resort in the state.

The act wasembodied

in operating licenses, which subjected an

operator to for

feiture of the license, closure of the business and liabil
ity for civil damages for violations.^2

However, the

attitudes of pre-Civil War whites remained, and areas that
were beyond the reach of federal troops adamantly opposed
all social aspirations of blacks.
Joe Gray Taylor, historian of the Reconstruction period
in Louisiana, holds that there was no radical change in
daily relations

^Fischer,

between whites and blacks during

The Segregation Struggle,9-11.

^ Constitution of 1868, Article 13; Pauli Murray (ed.),
States' Laws on Race and Color (1950), 172.
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Reconstruction, irregardless of statutes on the law books.
Physical segregation that occurred during slavery days
continued afterward, and no serious thought was ever given
to allowing blacks the use of public accommodations on a
basis equal to that of whites.

Taylor maintains that

segregation was not required by law, but "was enforced by
custom and public opinion just as effectively as by law. "43.
After 1877, Louisiana officials gradually legislated
segregation and denial in the use of public accommodations,
with their actions increasingly upheld by the federal
courts.

The Constitution of 1879 omitted all references to

segregation but deleted all sections relating to social
equality.

State leaders were still uncertain about how far

the federal government would go toward enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1875.

After 1879, these two federal documents were the only

legal impediments to overt segregation in Louisiana.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 made it unlawful to deny
anyone "full and equal enjoyment of any of the accommoda
tions, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land and water, theaters and other places of
public amusement" on the basis of race and color.

In the

Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the United States Supreme Court
held that racial discrimination was not a form of involun
tary servitude prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment,

/O

Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 434-35.
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and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress
to prohibit private acts of racial discrimination.

A decade

later, the high court crystallized its efforts to prevent
the federal government from safeguarding the rights of
blacks from state infringement in the Plessy decision of
1896.

Racial discrimination by private action was now pro

tected under the guise of "separate but equal" accommoda
tions, and the door was opened wider to further acts of
racial discrimination in Louisiana.44
During the first six decades of the twentieth century,
blacks were prohibited by law and custom from using most
public facilities in Louisiana.

In 1908, blacks and whites

were prohibited from drinking in the same saloons, and in
1914, segregation was extended to circuses, shows and tent
exhibitions.45

By 1956, most of the segregation practiced

across the state was due to custom, local ordinances or
private regulations, rather than through state statute.

As

the national civil rights movement heated up during the
1940's and early 1950's, white leaders in Louisiana became
concerned about the future of segregation.

Therefore, in

1956, the state legislature enacted three new segregation

^Robert F. Cushman. Cases in Constitutional Law
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 19?5) 684; Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
45

Acts of Louisiana, 1908, Regular Session, no. 235,
1914, Regular Session, no. 235, 191b, Regular Session, no.

TW.

-------

------ -----------
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laws that dealt with public accommodations.

One law pro

vided for the separation of whites and blacks in all recrea
tional activities; another required employers to furnish
separate sanitary, eating and drinking facilities for white
and black employees; and a third law prohibited interracial
participation in athletic events and social functions.46
The first of these laws to confront federal litigation
was the

one which

prohibited interracial participation

between

white and

black athletes.

Prior to itspassage, the

Board of Supervisors at Louisiana State University (LSU)
voted not to ban interracial sporting events, despite pres
sure from the Baton Rouge City Council and several segrega
tionist

organizations. After the law went into effect on

October

15, 1956, eight schools cancelled games

planned with

LSU because of the presence of blacks on their teams.

A

black prizefighter challenged the state statute and a regu
lation of the Louisiana State Athletic Commission when he
was denied the right to fight because of his color.

In

1958, federal courts declared that such segregation could
not be justified under the state's police powers, so the
commission and the state were restrained from enforcing
their regulations because of their effect in violating equal
protection.47
^ A c t s of Louisiana, 1956, Regular Session, no. 14,
395, 57T.
^Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission, 168 F.Supp. 149
(1958), 359 U.S. 533 (1959).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

335
Sit-in Demonstrations in the Early 1960's
As I960 began, the civil rights movement took a sharp
turn from litigation to direct action in the form of sitins, most of which were targeted at lunch counters, restau
rants, libraries, theaters, hotels, parks and beaches.
However, they achieved only a modicum of success prior to
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
During the late summer and early fall of I960, New
Orleans was the scene of numerous sit-ins and picketing at
churches, lunch counters and stores that practiced segrega
tion.

In September, small groups of black and white stu

dents staged sit-ins at three white Protestant churches.

At

one of them, two blacks were denied entrance after being
informed that the church's board of deacons had a policy not
to admit blacks at that time.

During the previous week,

several stores in the city's downtown area were picketed and
black protestors arrested.

Mayor DeLesseps S. Morrison

informed the public that demonstrations hurt "the community
interest, the public safety and the economic welfare" of New
Orleans, and that he had instructed the police not to tol
erate any more sit-ins or pickets.

However, the pickets,

demonstrations and arrests continued into the next year.

In

January of 1962, the president of the Greater New Orleans
Chamber of Commerce visited Atlanta and Dallas to see how
they had handled desegregation.

Secret meetings were then

held in February between black leaders, merchants and civic
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leaders in New Orleans.

In September, by prearrangement,

fifteen major drug, department and variety stores desegre
gated their branches within the city as two hundred blacks
in small groups of three or four sat down and were served at
formerly white lunch counters without incident.
Another major victory was scored in Baton Rouge over
lunch counters in the following year.

The city was the

scene of demonstrations and sit-ins at several lunch coun
ters in the spring of I960, and of a major confrontation
between police and demonstrators in December of 1961, which
led to the Cox case and injunctions against further
demonstrations, picketing or sit-ins in the city during
1962.

When lunch counter sit-ins resumed in the spring of

1963, a coordinated effort was made between merchants and a
biracial committee to quietly desegregate lunch counters at
twelve major stores in August.49
Elsewhere in the state, there was intense opposition to
desegregation of any kind.

Not until the enactment of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 did most of the segregation bar
riers to equal treatment come down across the state.
Desegregation of Hotels and Motels
The struggle to desegregate hotels and motels did not
create much controversy.

New Orleans was the central focus

^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, Sept. 13, 18, 19,
Oct. 6, I960; New York Times, Sept. 13, 1962.
^Baton Rouge State Times, May 30, Aug. 7, 1963.
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of early efforts to desegregate lodgings in the state prior
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Since it was difficult to

disguise a hotel or motel in order to escape coverage under
this act, most Louisiana lodging proprietors quietly deseg
regated without much contention.
Economic pressure and civic pride played major roles in
the desegregation of New Orleans hotels in the early I960's.
In May of 1963, a three-judge federal panel voided the state
law that sanctioned segregated hotels.

However, the court

declared that the state could not compel a proprietor to
segregate or integrate his establishment.

Only the owner

could decide that question for himself.50
Because New Orleans was one of the few Southern cities
that still practiced segregated lodging, it was avoided as a
convention site by many integrated organizations.

In 1963,

the American Legion convention, which was expected to bring
fifty thousand persons and $7,000,000 to New Orleans, can
celled its plans to meet in the city because Louisiana
Legionnaires could not guarantee unsegregated facilities for
all delegates.

It was estimated that approximately 80 per

cent of large national conventions had black members and
that all would be integrated within a few years.

Therefore,

in September, four of the most prominent hotels in the city
(Sheraton-Charles, Jung, Royal Orleans and New Orleans

SO

McCain v. Davis, Bates v. Sheraton Corporation of
America, 217 F.Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1963); New Orleans Times
Picayune, May 19, 1963.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

338
Airport Hilton Inn) decided to admit some blacks rather than
risk losing big conventions.

However, the Roosevelt and

Monteleone remained segregated for another year.

Despite

the absence of blacks in its delegations, a trade conference
relocated its convention from the segregated Roosevelt Hotel
to the integrated Jung in May of 1964, in order to avoid
losing its key speakers, who opposed segregation.

The owner

of the Roosevelt responded that he would not integrate until
required to do so under the civil rights bill pending before
Congress.51
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 inflicted a mortal blow on
segregated public accommodations in Louisiana, by imparting
to the federal executive and judicial branches the authority
necessary to crush all remaining vestiges of de jure segre
gation, and placing an enormous burden of proof for de facto
segregation on proprietors who engaged in private acts of
discrimination.
201 and 202,

Title II of the act, particularly Sections

became the main instrument used by the federal

courts in Louisiana to eradicate segregation and discrimina
tion in public accommodations.

Section 201 prohibited

discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color,
religion or national origin in the denial of anyone "to the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of

“^ New Orleans Times Picayune, May 21, 1963; Baton Rouge
State Times, Sept. 10, 19b3, May 13, 1964.
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accommodation."

It also established a definition of what

constituted a "place of accommodation" that "serves the
public."

Section 202 prohibited the use of any statute,

ordinance or regulation by a government body in requiring a
proprietor to operate a business on a racially discrimina
tory basis.52
The first major challenge to Title II of the Civil
Rights Act occurred before the end of 1964 in the case of
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.

The Supreme Court

not only held that Congress was within its powers to enact
this legislation, but expanded its interpretation of the
interstate commerce power of Congress to include the regula
tion of local activities that might have a substantial and
harmful effect on commerce.

Section 201 (c) of Title II

specifically targeted "any inn, hotel, motel, or other
establishment which provided lodging to transient guests" as
affecting commerce.53
In most cases, lodging proprietors in Louisiana quietly
desegregated their establishments after 1964, with one noted
exception:

the United States brought action against the

operator of two motels in the state because of their refusal
to admit, accommodate or provide services or privileges to
blacks on racial grounds.

In 1966, they were restrained by

52Civil Rights Act of 1964.
■^Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964).
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federal courts from such discriminatory practices in the
future.54

With this test case, it was thereafter

unnecessary to resort to litigation in order to gain com
pliance with the Civil Rights Act in Louisiana in regard to
hotel and motel lodgings.
Desegregation of Restaurants
Restaurants presented a form of close social mixing
that alarmed many whites because of its implications for the
future of segregated public accommodations and struck at the
heart of the doctrines of white supremacy.

It was the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 that brought about the actual desegrega
tion of most dining establishments in Louisiana.

Except for

the earlier desegregation of lunchrooms in transit terminals
or lunch counters in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Louisiana
restaurants had remained almost untouched by integration
prior to 1964.

However, the provisions of Title II of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 made de jure and de facto
segregation in the operation of privately-owned dining
establishments in the state untenable, despite attempts at
various ruses to forestall compliance with the law.
Sections 201 and 202 of the Civil Rights Act covered
restaurants and cafeterias and became the subject of a chal
lenge in Katzenbach v. McClung.

The Supreme Court quickly

■^United States v. Happy Hosts, Inc., 11 RRLR 1503

(1 9 66 ).

---
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declared that Title II covered any eating establishment
which "principally engaged in selling food for consumption
on the premises . . .

if . . .

it serves or offers to serve

interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food
which it serves . . . has moved in commerce."55
In July of 1964* there was no immediate influx of
blacks into formerly all-white restaurants.

Within two

weeks of the passage of the Civil Rights Act, several major
Shreveport businesses with branches outside the state deseg
regated their lunch counters, but most of the restaurants
and clubs in and around the city removed their "white only"
signs and went "private", in an attempt to bypass the
requirements of the federal act.

Other restaurants in

northern and western Louisiana took similar action.

In the

Baton Rouge area, a few major restaurants immediately admit
ted blacks, while others continued to deny their patronage
or went private.

In New Orleans, blacks were told by their

leaders to use accommodations when they wanted to, not just
as test cases.

While the mayor warned outsiders not to come

to New Orleans to test the accommodations law, blacks were
reportedly served at various cafeterias in the city, and
major restaurants were taking reservations by blacks.

Out

side the city, in Jefferson Parish, blacks were refused
service at several drive-in and indoor restaurants.

In

Plaquemines Parish, segregation leader Leander Perez, Sr.

55Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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called on all Southerners to refuse to heed the Civil Rights
Act and to snarl the federal courts with litigation.56
The most noted attempt to circumvent the Civil Rights
Act was to transform a restaurant into a "private club" that
was not open to the public, in order to meet an exemption
provided for in Section 201 (e) of the act.

The largest

such attempt was the formation of the Northwest Louisiana
Restaurant Club of Shreveport and Bossier City, which was
joined by nearly one hundred restaurants in the state.

The

organization had a ninety-nine year charter which provided
that non-voting membership cards would be distributed to
"acceptable" customers and patrons.

It issued 160,000

membership cards and had plans to issue another 100,000.
However, the United States brought suit alleging that club
members were practicing racially discriminatory acts in
violation of Title II.

Federal courts determined that all

of the restaurants belonging to the club had practiced
racial segregation prior to the passage of the Civil Rights
Act, and that the club existed for the sole purpose of
avoiding compliance with federal law.

While professing to

be a private club, ample evidence was presented that member
ship cards were issued to any white customer but denied to
all blacks.

Declaring the club to be a sham, the courts

permanently enjoined club members from denying blacks equal

^Burton, On the Black Side, 108; Baton Rouge State
Times, July 10, 23, 1964; New Orleans Times Picayune,
July 7, 1964.
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access to and use of their restaurants and other facilities
on racial grounds.57
Desegregation of Bars, Theaters and Recreation Facilities
The desegregation of bars and lounges was brought about
gradually under various provisions of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act, as federal courts expanded its meaning to cover
any discrimination sanctioned by law, government or law
enforcement officials.

Under the original construction of

the act, bars were only included for coverage if they were
located within a covered establishment that was under the
jurisdiction of Title II.

Otherwise, private drinking

establishments were free to determine their clientele,
within reason.

However, the burden of proof was on the

proprietor to manifest that the discrimination being prac
ticed was not illegal.
Because of hazy provisions of Title II in regard to
bars, several suits were filed in federal courts in the
latter half of the 1960's alleging racial discrimination.
The courts held in 1965, that Section 202 applied only if
discrimination by an establishment was required by law,
rather than because of the private preferences of propri
etors who practiced discrimination on their own initiative.
In a 1967 case, the federal courts voided a New Orleans city

■^Baton Rouge State Times, July 3, 1964; United
States v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F.Supp.
151 (W.D. La. 1966).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

344
ordinance that required racial segregation in establishments
selling drinks for consumption on the premises.

The court

held that this measure was in violation of Section 202
because it was an attempt by a governmental agency to compel
segregation in the operation of a business.58
When the New Orleans City Council enacted a public
accommodations ordinance regarding bars and taxicabs in
1969• eighty bar owners immediately brought suit on the
grounds that they would suffer a substantial loss of white
customers if their establishments were integrated.

The

council had passed the ordinance following the negative
image portrayed during the summer and fall of 1969. when
black delegates of conventions in New Orleans were denied
service in several local bars.

In November, delegates to

the Head Start and Child Development Conference meeting in
New Orleans adopted several resolutions charging the city
with racial discrimination and urging a convention boycott
of the city and relocation of the 1970 Super Bowl (expected
to gross $4,250,000 for New Orleans) to another city unless
conditions improved for blacks.

Therefore, civic and busi

ness leaders of the city pressed for reform, resulting in
the enactment of a new public accommodations ordinance.

“^Tyson v. Cazes, 238 F.Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1965);
Pania v. City of New Orleans, 262 F.Supp. 651 (E.D. La.
1967).
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After federal courts negated a state court restraining
order, the ordinance took effect in January of 1970.59
By 1972, the reasoning of the federal district courts
had broadened to include almost anything bordering on racial
discrimination in bars and lounges.

In that year, the

courts held that a bar that provided a juke box and pool
table for the entertainment of its patrons came under
Section 201 of Title II as a "place of amusement."

The

court sensed that the Civil Rights Act should be afforded a
liberal construction to eliminate the inconvenience, unfair
ness and humiliation of racial discrimination.^
As with other forms of segregation, private acts of
discrimination in the operation of movie theaters in
Louisiana were voided by the Civil Rights Act under Section
201 (b) of Title II, which specifically covered "any motion
picture house."

Following the enactment of the law, most

theaters in the state decided to comply voluntarily.

How

ever, a suit ensued when the owner of a theater in Mamou,
Louisiana, continued to restrict blacks to balcony seating
and whites to the lower section of his movie house.

The

courts held that films customarily shown in the theater
moved in interstate commerce, making the establishment a
"place of public accommodations" as defined in Title II.

CO

New Orleans Times Picayune, Aug. 14, Sept. 24,
Nov 21, Dec. 31, 19F?” Jan. I S "1970.
^United States v. Vizena, 342 F.Supp. 553 (W.D. La.
1972).
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Therefore, the proprietor's seating practices constituted
segregation and was prohibited by federal law.61Most of the public recreational facilities such as
parks, playgrounds, gyms, swimming pools and auditoriums in
Louisiana were state or locally owned and had already come
under federal regulations proscribing their segregation as
"state action."

After 1964, Title II was used to desegre

gate private recreational facilities that offered the sale
of food or entertainment to the general public and which
were practicing racial discrimination in violation of
federal law.
The major case dealing with segregated recreational
facilities was Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., which
involved a Baton Rouge amusement park that provided mechani
cal rides for the entertainment of children, and which
operated an ice skating rink during the winter.

In 1966,

the federal district court in Baton Rouge decided that the
park, dance studios and bowling alleys did not fall under
Title II because they did not offer exhibitions for the
entertainment of spectators.

However, on a rehearing in

1968 by the Fifth Circuit Court (which had affirmed in
1967), the appellate court decided that the amusement park
was covered by Title II as a "place of amusement."62

6lBryant
62
Miller
523 (E.D. La.
342 (5th Cir.

v. Guillory, 11 RRLR 426 (1965).
v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F.Supp.
1966), 391 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1967), 394 F.2d
1968).
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In 1967i the federal courts achieved the desegregation
of a bowling alley in the New Orleans suburb of Algiers in a
roundabout way.

Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did

not cover bowling alleys, the establishment contained a
lunch counter that served bowlers and spectators.

The

courts concluded that the refreshment counter came under
Section 201 of Title II, which encompassed a business that
was located on the premises of a covered establishment,
served interstate patrons and whose food moved in interstate
commerce.

In addition, the snack bar was an adjunct to the

bowling alley and thus, was not exempt from the act.®3
Title II was also used by the federal courts to prevent
subterfuges in the realm of sports facilities.

The United

States brought suit against the Slidell Youth Football
Association, which operated a youth football league and
owned a sports facility where league teams competed.

After

1964, the organization deleted "white only" from its bylaws
and added a restrictive membership clause, under which
applicants were required to obtain a two-thirds vote of
voting members of the association in order to participate in
its football program.

In 1974, a federal district court

held that its operations constituted a "pattern and prac
tice" of racial discrimination, its sports facility was a
"place of entertainment," its operations affected commerce,

^ Adams v. Fazzio Real Estate Co., Inc., 268 F.Supp.
630 (E.D. La. 1967).
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and that it was not a private club.

Therefore, the associ

ation was subject to provisions of the Civil Rights

A c t .

64

By 1974, there were few traces of overt discrimination
still being practiced in transit or public accommodations
across the state.

Prior to 1964, de jure segregation had

been voided by the federal courts, and various state ser
vices were ordered to desegregate and cease discriminatory
operation, particularly in the cities of New Orleans and
Baton Rouge.

After Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of

1964, privately-owned accommodations felt the brunt of fed
eral determination to end segregation.

Most of the proprie

tors of public accommodations submitted because of

mounting

lawsuits and after realizing that many of the fears expected
to accompany desegregation had not materialized.
During the late 1960's, Governor John J. McKeithen
adopted a neutral posture on desegregation outside of the
field of education.

The new administration under Edwin

Edwards enjoyed a large measure of black support and pro
ceeded to push for the repeal of segregationist laws in the
1972 state legislature.

Repealed were requirements for

segregated sports and social events, transit, sanitary
facilities, drinking fountains, and waiting rooms.65

in

1973, various civil rights measures to protect equal public

^United States v. Slidell Youth Football Association,
387 F.Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974).
ge
Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 254,
no. 262, no. 263, no. 26b.
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access to public accommodations were incorporated in the new
state constitution, which was approved on April 20, 1974,
and took effect that same year.

Under it, special provi

sions were included prohibiting the denial of equal protec
tion of the laws or passage of laws which discriminated
against anyone "because of race or religious ideas, beliefs,
. . . birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations."

In another provision,

everyone was granted "access to public areas, accommoda
tions, and facilities" free from discrimination based on
race, religion, national ancestry, age, sex or physical
condition . ^
Not only did the executive and legislative branches of
the state government undergo a change of attitude by 1974.
The state courts became vigilant and ready to forestall any
attempt to maintain discrimination in transit and public
accommodations.

Louisianians had come a long way since the

Brown decision of 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Although traces of discrimination continued to exist in
scattered areas of the state in the form of de facto
segregation, these attempts, like dinosaurs, were doomed to
extinction in light of the changes in both attitudes and law
within the state by 1974.

^®State of Louisiana, Constitution of 1974, Article I,
Sec. 3, Sec. 12.
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Chapter IX
DESEGREGATION IN FAMILY RELATIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING
Introduction
Among the most difficult areas to desegregate were
family relations, employment and housing.

All three were

rooted in both de jure and d£ facto segregation, and pro
vided the core for separate white and black societies.

The

weight of culture, heritage and personal preferences assured
that desegregation would be only limited successes in all
three areas.
De jure regulations had been provided in the area of
family relations since the end of Reconstruction to maintain
and to safeguard white heritage, both past and future, from
black intrusion.

In the name of white supremacy, laws were

adopted in Louisiana restricting blacks from claiming white
status on legal documents, or from cohabitating with whites.
In addition, blacks were later threatened with denial of
state benefits if they chose or encouraged others to defy
segregat ion.
Discrimination in employment in Louisiana was primarily
based on custom and tradition, having its origins in the
antebellum period.

Prior to 1964, strides were made mainly

by federal executive decree, which outlawed the application
350
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of racial discrimination in federally-funded construction
contracts.

However, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act

was most effective in eradicating de jure and overt prac
tices of discrimination, along with sympathetic federal
court action that established affirmative action programs to
overcome the influence of past practices of racial discrimi
nation.
As with employment, housing discrimination was particu
larly difficult to manage.

Both were rooted more in custom

than in law, making it difficult to distinguish where law
ended and custom began.

Although housing segregation origi

nated during Reconstruction, it was not until 1968 that
housing received the full attention of the federal govern
ment, when both Congress and the Supreme Court decided to
actively participate in the destruction of racial discrimi
nation in housing.

However, as with employment, much of the

discrimination was imbedded within the bedrock of society
and could not be uprooted by normal means of legislation,
prosecution or litigation.

In the final analysis, only time

could temper personal choices to discriminate in both
employment and housing.
Desegregation in Family Relations
Among the most serious threats to "racial purity,"
white supremacy and the entire segregated way of life in the
South was the issue of family relations.

Encompassing mar

riage and divorce laws, birth and death certificates, and
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laws dealing with children and inheritance, the area of fam
ily relations was steeped in de jure safeguards to prevent
any possibility of intrusion by blacks into a white world.
One of the primary fears of the Negrophobic South was
the "pollution" of the blood and heritage of the white race
by blacks through miscegenous relationships.

Although cul

ture could have accomplished the task fairly well, the
leaders of Louisiana felt that it was crucial to bestow the
sanction of law on these social taboos, resulting in the
enactment of a wide range of statutes before 1900 to outlaw
interracial sexual contacts in and out of marriage.
By I960, with the acceleraton of the national civil
rights movement outside of the state, many Louisianians
sought a way to prevent the collapse of segregation.

Legis

lators hardened the state's position on miscegenation as
well as on attempts to change the racial designation on
birth certificates to "white," and employed scare tactics by
serving notice on needy blacks that their identification
with the civil rights movement could jeopardize continued
use of free state institutions or participation in state
public assistance programs.

Not until the 1970's was an

atmosphere established that was conducive to equal access to
state benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis, or was it
possible to expunge discriminatory legislation regarding
marriage, vital records and children from state law.
The subject of marriage clearly came under state
action, since society felt the need to place restrictions
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on who could perform marriages and on who could marry.

In

addition to regulations on marital procedure, race was taken
into consideration for marriage in Louisiana prior to 1967.
Miscegenation, or intermarriage between people of different
races, was still prohibited in Louisiana and fifteen other
states when the United States Supreme Court voided them in
1967.
Miscegenation laws were plainly state action since they
prohibited interracial marriages and cohabitation, and
attached criminal penalties for violation.

This was a par

ticularly difficult subject to broach because of the appre
hension among whites of the "mongrelization" of the white
race and the propagation of half-breed outcasts who would be
unable to fit into either white or black societies.

While

racial mixing was one of the greatest fears of most white
Southerners, most black Southerners did not view miscegena
tion as a major concern.

Gunnar Myrdal observed in his

landmark study of black social and psychological conditions
that whites placed miscegenation at the top of their list of
priorities for maintaining segregation, while blacks saw it
with scant significance as a barrier to equal rights.*
However, blacks were opposed to miscegenation laws because
of their psychological impact in implying that they were not
fit to marry whites.

A Ford Foundation study conducted

^Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper,' 1944) 60-61.
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among several black families in Chicago in the early 1960's,
attested that there was very little proclivity within the
group studied to promote miscegenation.2
Prior to the Civil War, it was not uncommon for wealthy
white Louisiana men to take black mistresses, many of whom
were set up

in apartments in New Orleans.

At that time,

it

was relatively easy to keep blacks and whites separated
socially, so there were few fears that blacks would infil
trate white

society through blood lines.

However, white

imagination

and fears of domination by blacks

grew by leaps

and bounds with white perceptions and fantasies acquired
during Reconstruction.

All social contacts between the

races became circumspect, and blacks became socially ostra
cized, except on an employer-servant level.
During Reconstruction, conservative whites were unab.le
to enact or to enforce legislation restricting social con
tacts between the races.

In fact, the Radical legislature

was able to enact a law in 1870 legitimizing the natural
children of persons who had been prohibited from marrying
during slavery.3

Meanwhile, whites awaited the opportunity

to pass legislation that would prevent the occurrence of
their greatest fear— racial mixing of the white blood line.
Between 1894 and I960, the Louisiana legislature
enacted a series of laws to check sexual contact between

2
Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 267-68.
O

Acts of Louisiana, 1870, Regular Session, no. 68.
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whites and blacks.

In 1894, "miscegenation" was defined and

all marriages between whites and blacks were voided.

Then,

in 1900 and in 1902, mixed marriages of Loui*siana tritiz*** •
who had married outside of the state, then returned to
Louisiana to live as husband and wife, were nullified.

The

legislature addressed the subject of "concubinage" in 1908
and 1910, prohibiting such unions between whites and blacks,
and providing penalties for violations of the laws.

In 1920

and 1942, miscegenous marriages were prohibited again,
penalty of imprisonment with or without hard labor

and a

for up to

five years was provided for persons found guilty of engaging
in miscegenation.^
The state miscegenation laws came under attack in the
1950 !s, when a state district court voided the statutes.
However, the state supreme court overturned the decision in
1959, upholding the acts as a constitutional use of the
police powers to maintain "purity of race" and to prevent
the "propagation of half-breed children."5

Thus far, the

federal courts had avoided ruling on the issue of interra
cial marital relationships, but this situation was altered

^Ibid., 1894, Regular Session, no. 54, 1900, Regular
Session, no. 120, 1902, Regular Session, no. 9,
_ffggu~
lar 5e s'sion, no. 87, 19l0,"Regular SesTion, no. 206, 19^5,
Regular Session, no. 220, 1942, Regular Session, no. 43.
^State v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233 (1959); Robert J.
Sickels, Race, Marriage and the Law (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1972) 97-98.
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during the 1960's by the expansion of the civil rights move
ment along with more liberal attitudes among federal judges.
In 1963. the United States Supreme Court voided the
cohabitation law of Florida, but left its miscegenation law
intact.®

The high court did not invalidate a state misce

genation law until Loving v. Virginia in 1967.

It concluded

that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of a citi
zen to freely marry without restrictions "by invidious dis
crimination," and that "the freedom to marry, or not marry,
a person of another race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State."7
Louisiana did not immediately repeal its miscegenation
laws, but awaited a federal ruling.

As late as 1964, its

miscegenation laws were still being strictly enforced.

In

that year, a nineteen year old black man and a thirty-two
year old white woman were arrested in Baton Rouge on one
count of miscegenation.

During the same year, a national

controversy erupted when the acting warden of the state
prison at Angola, Louisiana, declared that black inmates
were not allowed to correspond with whites.

At issue was a

three-year correspondence between a black prisoner on death
row and a white woman in Sweden.

A state official later

explained that the real reason for denying the correspon
dence was because of state policy to allow only the

^McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
^Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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immediate family, prison officials, attorneys, ministers and
spouses to have access to prisoners.&
Two months after the

decision in Loving, the Supreme

Court decided the case of Zippert v. Sylvester.
and a black woman had filed suit asking

A white man

a federal court to

compel the clerk of court

of St. Landry Parish to issue a

marriage license to them.

Citing Loving, the court voided

the state's miscegenation law because it violated the
couple's rights to equal protection.

The local clerk of

court was then ordered to issue a marriage license, if the
couple was eligible to marry under other valid state quali
fications for marriage.

A license was granted and they were

married in Lafayette in August of 1967.^
Despite alterations in marriage laws throughout the
United States after 1967, changes in thinking did not pro
gress very far.

Two opinion polls taken in 1970 found that

56 percent of persons surveyed nationwide were opposed to
laws prohibiting marriages between whites and blacks, but
that 72 percent of whites were opposed to marriage between a
white close friend or relative and a black.
In 1972, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted sev
eral laws to repeal discriminatory marriage laws.

Among the

Q

Baton Rouge State Times, Dec. 9, 21, 1964.
^Zippert v. Sylvester, 12 RRLR 1445 (1967).
*^Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 284-85.
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statutes repealed were those prohibiting interracial mar
riages, making miscegenation a crime, and requiring a parish
clerk of clerk to list the race of litigants in the docket
ing of divorce proceedings.^
Another problem that concerned many Louisianians was
the designation of race on a birth certificate.

Racial

listing on a birth certificate was a determining factor in
deciding who a person could marry, where his children could
attend school and whether he could participate in various
state programs.

With the numerous concubinage situations

existing in Louisiana prior to the Civil War, the issue of
racial designation became a serious problem once miscegena
tion laws were enacted and whites became determined to
preserve purity of the white race from infiltration by
blacks.
In the absence of sufficient medical, scientific and
geneological data, it was difficult for the state to deter
mine blood lines except through birth certificates and court
testimony from reliable witnesses.

Unfortunately, many

poverty-stricken and isolated rural residents of the state
had few, if any, documented records of births.

Therefore,

it was necessary to obtain "delayed issuance" of birth
certificates in order to meet legal requirements for
entrance to schools, marriage, employment or the like.

To

**Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 256,
no. 397, no. 258.
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be accepted as a member of the white race meant greater
opportunity and the possibility of a better life for one's
children.

To be classified as black meant the denial of all

but menial economic opportunities, subjection to a rudimen
tary education, a stigmatized existence, and few opportuni
ties for improvement in the lives of succeeding generations.
Without a birth certificate, it often became necessary
to determine race on the basis of testimony from members of
the community or from living relatives or friends of the
petitioner seeking the issuance of a delayed birth certifi
cate.

The major problem encountered was the presentation of

sufficient proof to substantiate the claim that a person was
indeed white.

The decision about a person's racial classi

fication was often made arbitrarily by local or state
records officials, leaving the state courts as the only
recourse for persons who were dissatisfied with the official
verdict.

Then, it was the responsibility of the state

judiciary to weigh the evidence and determine whether the
petitioner was entitled to the coveted racial designation of
"white" and all of the privileges attendant upon it.
In 1910, the state courts defined "colored persons" as
"all persons with any appreciable mixture of negro blood,"
and placed the burden of proof on the person challenging
state r e c o r d s . O n c e a public document was issued, the

12

Lee v. New Orleans Great Northern Rail Co., La., 51
So. 182 (1910); State v. Treadway, La., 52 So. 500 (1910).
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petitioner assumed the responsibility of proving "beyond any
doubt at all" that a mistake in race had been made by the
recorder.

In a 1957 case, a woman brought suit after a New

Orleans official changed the racial designation on her
father's death certificate from "Negro" to "white" and then
back again after receiving additional evidence concerning
his race.

Because of the enormous burden of proof necessary

to change the racial listing, along with ambiguous judicial
and statutory definitions of race, both district and appel
late state courts upheld New Orleans records officials.*3
A similar case arose from a 1956 statute that prohib
ited interracial participation in sporting events.

In order

to be able to compete with white boxers, a black profes
sional boxer requested that New Orleans officials issue him
a delayed birth certificate listing his place of birth as,
"New Orleans" and his race as "white."

After succeeding in

district court, he lost in the court of appeals, which side
stepped the racial issue and voided the lower court decision
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not proved that he had
been born in New Orleans.

Thus he was not entitled to be

issued a delayed birth certificate.^
In order to prevent blacks from using loopholes in
state laws to desegregate white facilities, the state

13

State ex rel. Rodi v. City of New Orleans, La., 94
So.2d 108 (1957).
*^State ex rel. Dupas v. City of New Orleans, 3 RRLR
510 (1958).
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legislature in I960 tightened laws relating to legal docu
ments.

One statute denied the issuance of delayed birth

certificates unless the petitioner had a letter from the
State or New Orleans Bureau of Vital Statistics attesting
that no previous file existed for him.

Another law required

children applying for admission to a public or private
school for the first time to present an official copy of
their birth certificates to school authorities.

If race or

age were not listed, local school boards were empowered to
require additional proof of both factors.*5
During the 1960's, state courts continued to apply
strict interpretation procedures to persons seeking changes
on birth certificates.

In 1962, a state appellate court

ove.rturned a lower court ruling concerning a man who was
granted the right to have his race changed to "white,"
although he was one-sixteenth black.

The court of appeals

reversed because the evidence presented confirmed that the
defendant had a "traceable amount" of Negro blood, and that
he had failed to meet the burden of proof of showing "beyond
any doubt at all" that he was white, or tracing his geneal
ogy far enough to satisfy legal

r e q u i r e m e n t s . " ^

A s

late as

1967, state courts continued to require a petitioner to
establish "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the racial

15

Acts of Louisiana, I960, Regular Session, no. 410,
no. 541.
^^State ex rel. Cousin v. Louisiana State Board of
Health, La., 138 So.2d 829 (1962).
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designation on a birth certificate was incorrect.
of

If traces

Negroblood could be found, the appellate courts denied

requests for changes by petitioners.
The
of

state legislature did not define "traceable amount"

Negroblood until 1970.

Under the new statute, no one

with "one-thirty-second or less of Negro blood" could be
designated by any public official in Louisiana to be
"colored," "mulatto," "black," "negro," "griffe," "AfroAmerican," "quadroon," "mestizo," "colored person" or
"person of color."

In 1973, a state appellate court voided

the act because it was based on "wholly irrational and
scientifically insupportable foundations," and "was so vague
as to be incapable of meaningful application." However, the
state supreme court reversed this decision in 1974, uphold
ing the 1970 statute as neither vague nor
discriminatory."

"invidiously

Despite judicial support for it, the law

was later repealed.
Since 1974, state courts have altered their position
from requiring proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" to a lesser
standard of "preponderance of the evidence" in proceedings
regarding the alteration of vital records.

They presently

17

State ex rel. Encalde v. City of New Orleans, State
ex rel. Encalde v. Louisiana State Board of Health, La., 188
So.2d 88 (1967); State ex rel. Pritchard v. Louisiana State
Board of Health, La., 198 So.2d 490 (1967).
18
Acts of Louisiana, 1970, Regular Session, no. 46,
1983, Regular Session, no. 44l; State ex rel. Plaia v.
Louisiana State Board of Health, La. App., 275 So.2d 201
(1973), La., 296 So.2d 809 (1974).
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subscribe to the belief that "race designations are purely
social and cultural perceptions," and recognize the diffi
culty in applying a racial label.

In addition to birth

certificates, the courts have admitted into evidence other
factors such as physical appearance, self-perception, hered
ity, community recognition and cultural bias before making a
final determination on racial designation.19
The first mention of children in state legislation on a
racial basis in Louisiana occurred in 1870, when a law was
enacted legitimizing the natural children of persons who
were formerly prohibited from marrying during the antebellum
p e r i o d . 20

Thereafter, it was unnecessary to single out

children for discrimination, since segregation applied to
all residents of the state regardless of their age.
One of the ways in which the state legislature of I960
sought to discourage blacks from engaging in civil rights
activities was through threats aimed at their children, by
targeting illegitimate children and persons on public assis
tance programs.

One act made it a crime to give birth to

two or more illegitimate children and placed guilt on both
the mother and father.

Another act redefined "dependent

child" and set new guidelines for state assistance.

A home

situation in which parents or other relatives were living
together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage was

*^Doe v. State, La. App., 479 So.2d 369 (1985), La. 485
So.2d 60 (1986).
20

Acts of Louisiana, 1870, Regular Session, no. 68 .
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declared an unsuitable environment for a dependent child.
In addition, no state assistance would be granted to any
dependent child living with a mother who had given birth to
an illegitimate child after having received a welfare pay
ment.

As a follow-up, the legislature prohibited such a

child from receiving state financial assistance until proof
was presented that the mother had "ceased her illicit rela
tionship," and was maintaining a suitable home for the
child .21

Later, the state attorney general declared that

this act operated retroactively and applied to any mother
during the past who had given birth to an illegitimate child
after having received public assistance.22
The legality of the I960 child dependency and illegiti
macy laws was open to question.

They were intended more as

a threat to blacks than anything else, and remained on the
statute books until 1972.

At that time, the state legisla

ture prohibited the use of race, color, religion or national
origin to deny citizens the right to participate in or
receive benefits from any state-assisted program or
activity.2^
Two other areas of concern dealing with children and
race in Louisiana were adoptions and inheritances.

In 1948,

21

Ibid., I960, Regular Session, no. 75, no. 251,
no. 306 .
225 RRLR 906 (I960).
2*1

Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 540.
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the state legislature provided that a single person or any
married couple jointly could petition to adopt children "of
his or their race."

This law stood until voided by a fed

eral .district court in 1972, when a white couple petitioned
to adopt a black child.

The court recognized the difficul

ties inherent in an interracial adoption, and justified
taking race into consideration in the best interests of the
child.

Because the 1948 state law forbade all interracial

adoptions and did not serve a legitimate state aim, it
denied equal protection and was regarded as arbitrary and
"invidious discrimination."24

jn 1975, the legislature

deleted the provisions of the 1948 statute restricting adop
tions on racial grounds, and enabled natural fathers and
mothers to legitimate their natural children by simply
stating their intention to do so, and without regard to the
race of either parents or

c h i l d r e n .

^5

In 1966, a state district court handled the issue of
inheritance and race, when it disinherited the natural
brothers and sisters of the decedent because they were the
products of a miscegenous union.

The estate then passed to

the state in the absence of a legitimate h e i r . The Loving

Ibid., 1948, Regular Session, no. 228; Compos v.
McKeithen, 341 F.Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972).
25
Acts of Louisiana, 1975, Regular Session, no. 421,
no. 422.
26Hibbert v. Mudd, La., 187 So.2d 503 (1966).
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and Zippert cases of 1967 placed this decision in jeopardy
because of the distinction it made between races.

It is now

illegal in Louisiana to treat illegitimate children differ
ently from legitimate ones, much less to place discrimina
tory obstacles in the way of inheritances.
Employment
Prior to 1964, the executive branch of the federal
government was the principal source of opposition to racial
discrimination in employment.

Largely as a result of pres

idential executive orders, beginning with Franklin D.
Roosevelt, race differentials in federal government employ
ment began slowly to disappear after 1940.

During the late

1940's and early 1950's, President Harry Truman made several
additional efforts to end racial discrimination in federa.l
civilian employment and in the armed forces.

After a period

of relative stagnation during the Eisenhower years, efforts
to desegregate employment increased under the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations.

The forces of antidiscrimination

in employment triumphed with the enactment of Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which brought the federal courts
into active involvement in ending job discrimination in both
the public and private sectors.
Employment discrimination in Louisiana prior to 1964
was primarily de facto rather than de jure, based mainly on
custom and tradition.

Although no state law existed requir

ing a distinction in employment, discrimination clearly
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existed in practice.

After Title VII took effect, several

unions and companies operating in the state became test
cases in the federal courts to bring an end to invidious
means of racial discrimination in the work place.

By the

1970's, affirmative action programs had been established in
several companies in order to bring an end to the effects of
previous discriminatory policies.
Prior to the Civil War, most blacks were engaged in
agricultural pursuits, although a few served on plantations
as artisans.

The free black population in New Orleans was

employed principally in such non-agricultural vocations as
day laborers, small shopkeepers and tradesmen.

With the end

of slavery, black artisans outnumbered white artisans in the
South five-to-one.

However, changes in the employment sec

tor began almost immediately as new caste requirements
sanctioned a system in which jobs were separated into cer
tain ones for whites and others for

b l a c k s .

^7

A study conducted on the employment situation of blacks
in Baton Rouge between 1870 and 1880 uncovered a situation
that was probably typical among blacks across the state
during and shortly following Reconstruction.

With the end

of slavery, black employment did not undergo radical
changes, but continued to be based primarily on menial
positions.

However, by 1880, a noticeable decline had

occurred in the number of blacks in trades such as masonry,

27C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Rress, 1951) 3b0 .
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blacksmithing and carpentry.

Counterbalancing this trend

was a sharp increase in the number of blacks serving as
cooks, servants, and day and farm laborers.

Most blacks

were unable to move into better jobs because of their lack
of capital, opportunity, training and education.

As in most

areas of the state at this time, Conservative Democrats in
Baton Rouge used economic pressure to control black votes,
so that "Democratic" blacks were hired first by Conservative
planters and businessmen .^8
In 1889, a racist solution to the problem of black
employment was offered in the guise of the "Shreveport
Plan," sponsored by the Daily Caucasian, the most racist
newspaper in Louisiana.

The plan suggested that blacks be

treated essentially as sub-humans.

Perhaps, this attitude

reflected the mood of the average white Louisianian who
feared economic competition with the free black laborer.
Blacks were not to be employed in "easy" jobs such as cooks,
waiters or porters, but were to be given "the hardest and
most degrading tasks" for earning a living.^9

However,

after 1890, "Negro-job" industries in the South expanded to
include work in sawmills, coal mines and railroad construc
tion and maintenance.

In the meantime, whites forced blacks

28

Terry L. Seip, "Municipal Politics and the Negro:
Baton Rouge, 1865-1880," Readings in Louisiana Politics,
261-62 .
29

Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 190-91.
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out of better paying and more attractive occupations, and
farther down the job ladder. 30
After 1910, blacks were excluded from all "white work."
They were not allowed to work in the manufacturing of tex
tiles and furniture; electricity, oil and gas, paper and
pulp, and chemicals; and urban service occupations— buses,
streetcars, telephone and telegraph, trade, banking, insur
ance and brokerage.

Blacks were still able to work in agri

culture, tobacco and fertilizer industries and as longshore
men.

While the number of whites employed in agriculture

decreased, blacks working in non-agricultural pursuits
declined from 26.7 percent in 1910 to 21.1 percent in 1930.
To compound problems for blacks in employment, labor unions
limited the number of blacks who could enter the building
trades or work for railroads, and secured the passage of
laws that all but eliminated the possibility of blacks
becoming plumbers and steamfitters.

However, blacks could

belong to separate unions for bricklayers, plasterers and
longshoremen.31
Most of the limited progress made by blacks between

1940 and 1964 in reversing discrimination in employment
occurred outside of the South and resulted from efforts by
the executive branch.

Congress did not begin to exert

^Woodward, Origins of the New South, 360.
George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South,
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1967) 155-64.
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itself in this field until 1964, and only then did the
federal courts begin to seriously challenge de facto racial
discrimination in employment throughout the nation.

Of all

types of racial prejudice met by blacks, employment and
housing were probably the most widespread in all areas of
the country.

Laws and court rulings on employment were not

designed exclusively with the South in mind, as in the
fields of education, elections, transportation and public
accommodations.

National prejudice in employment was more

difficult to eliminate since it was not based on law but on
custom and usage, and because it was exceedingly difficult
to persuade white employers, employees and unions to cease
arbitrary treatment of minorities.
During the 1940's, the Roosevelt Administration took
the first steps in modifying the employment situation for
blacks through executive orders.

Beginning in 1940, dis

crimination was ended in the Federal Civil Service by law.
In 1941, the President required the holders of defense
contracts to refrain from discrimination on the grounds of
race, creed, color or national origin.

Another executive

order granted broad contract powers to the War and Navy
Departments and to the Maritime Commission, with a stipula
tion that contracts include a nondiscrimination clause.
Then, in 1943, President Roosevelt required the addition of
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an antidiscrimination clause to all government contracts,
not only those for

d e f e n s e .

32

The Truman Administration continued the efforts of its
predecessor, but its major victory was the order to desegre
gate the military in 1948.

By May of 1950, the navy and air

force were almost entirely integrated, while the army began
desegregating in the summer of 1950 as the Korean Conflict
began.

To minimize domestic racial incidents, desegregation

was initially extended to occupation and garrison troops
overseas.

Lastly, it was extended to military posts within

the United States, including the South, and into civilian
employment within the armed

f o r c e s .

33

It was during this time that the New Orleans police
force became integrated.

No blacks had been employed as

police officers since 1915.

In 1949, black applicant

Carlton H. Pecot brought suit in state district court when
he was denied employment after receiving one of the highest
scores on the police civil service examination.

The court

directed the mayor and the superintendent of police to show
cause why Pecot should not be employed.

After meeting with

his advisors, the mayor decided in June of 1949 to begin
hiring blacks on the police force.

When Pecot and another

<12

Ramspect Act of 1940; Executive Order Nos. 8802,
9001, 9346.
^Executive Order Nos. 9664, 10210, 10308, 9981;
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York:
Oxford University Press, i974) 136-37•
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black officer were hired in 1950, it became the intention of
the mayor to limit their use as police officers by posting
them to black neighborhoods, as undercover police and in
juvenile cases.34

Despite this limited use of black

officers, their hiring was a promising start in eradicating
employment discrimination throughout the state as a whole.
Advances in employment protection for minorities during
the 1950's languished nationally under the Eisenhower
Administration.

However, the federal contract and employ

ment policies of Roosevelt and Truman were continued.

Dur

ing this time, the first Louisiana case involving employment
discrimination arose in the federal courts, which approved a
consent decree for Celotex Corporation in Marrero, a suburb
of New Orleans.

Under the decree, all parties agreed to

eliminate racial discrimination in the use of seniority
lists and for jobs that became available.

In addition, the

courts authorized the continuation of the present employment
system within the company as long as current employees held
the same

j o b s .

35

Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a vigor
ous program to attack discrimination in employment was con
ducted.

Shortly after taking office, John F. Kennedy issued

an executive order creating the President's Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity, which had the authority to

Haas, Delesseps S. Morrison, 77-78.
^Butler v. Celotex Corporation, 3 RRLR 508 (1958).
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impose sanctions for violations of nondiscrimination clauses
in federal government procurement contracts.

In addition,

government contractors were required to take affirmative
action in order to insure that job applicants and current
employees were treated without regard to race, creed, color
or national origin.

In mid-1963, President Kennedy amended

his 1961 order to require the inclusion of nondiscrimination
clauses in all federally assisted construction contracts.36
In early 1961, the Civil Rights Commission requested
state agencies and businessses in Louisiana to complete
questionnaires concerning their pattern of black employment.
Most of the forms were submitted to the state attorney gen
eral for a legal opinion or discarded by those receiving
them.-

J. D. Deblieux, Chairman of the Louisiana Advisory

Committee to the Civil Rights Committee, declared that a
five-year study of civil service employees revealed that
about 20 percent of the total were blacks, who were employed
in state institutions in professional, educational and
technical jobs.

It was also pointed out that Louisiana had

been the first Southern State in 1950 to equalize black and
white teacher pay, basing it on comparable education and
experience.
Service,

During the same year, New Orleans Public

Inc. acceded to threats of a black boycott of buses

Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 803; Executive
Order Nos. 10925» llll4.
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and streetcars, and agreed to hire qualified blacks when
additional transit operators were needed.37
A Public Affairs Research Council study was announced
at the end of 1961, indicating that working age blacks were
migrating out of Louisiana in large numbers because of a
lack of equitable employment opportunities with whites.

The

non-white population of the state had declined from 50 per
cent in 1900 to 32 percent in 1960.38
In early 1963, state officials were required to respond
to charges of discrimination in the hiring of civil service
workers in agencies receiving federal assistance.

This

followed the issuance of revised HEW guidelines prohibiting
discrimination in the "recruitment, examination, appoint
ment, training, promotion, retention or any other personnel
action, because of political or religious opinions or affil
iations or because of race, national origin or other non
merit factors."

State agencies that came under the new HEW

regulations included welfare, highways, education, employ
ment security, hospitals, public works, colleges and univer
sities, civil defense, adjutant general’s office and depart
ment of health.

In March, W. W. McDougall, state civil

service director, reported that Louisiana was meeting HEW
standards for nondiscrimination in employment and had banned
discrimination based on "non-merit factors."

However, four

07

New Orleans Times Picayune, Mar. 22, Aug. 11, 1961.

38Ibid., Dec. 19, 1961.
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months later, the Labor Department reported that blacks were
not receiving equal employment opportunities at the Michoud
39
Saturn rocket plant outside of New Orleans.
At an open meeting of the Louisiana State Advisory
Committee in July of 1963, charges were leveled of wide
spread racial discrimination in employment opportunities and
in technical training in New Orleans.

The committee was

informed that both New Orleans and Louisiana economies were
suffering because many blacks who were unable to find suit
able employment equal to their training were leaving the
state to use their talents elsewhere.

While the population

of New Orleans in I960 was 37.8 percent non-white, the labor
force was only 28.8 percent black.

Of non-white males,

about 13 percent had white collar and technical jobs while
63 percent had unskilled positions.

By comparison, 48 per

cent of whites had white collar and 39 percent had unskilled
jobs.

Speakers before the civil rights committee cited Bell

Telephone and Telegraph, NOPSI and the Orleans Parish School
Board as the areas of major concern in New Orleans.

Blacks

were only able to secure employment parking cars, caddying
on golf courses, working on soft drink trucks or in other
low-paying menial labor.

Because of a lack of training,

blacks were also unable to secure skilled employment in the
space industry or at Kaiser Aluminum, both of which claimed

^Baton Rouge State Times, Feb. 21, Mar. 23, 1963; New
Orleans Times Picayune, July 29, 1963.
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to be equal opportunity employers.

In New Orleans, blacks

were allowed to attend only one overcrowded trade school
that offered only six courses.

On racial grounds, they were

barred from attending Delgado, which offered thirty-five
different training courses.
the failure of

Compounding

black problems was

the governor to implement the Federal

Manpower Resources Training Act, which provided federal aid
in technical training on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Louisiana was the only state that did not take advantage of
this program by 1963.^®
Following
taken on their

a threat of racial strife if no actionwas
demands, black leaders of New Orleans

announced in August of 1963 that an agreement had been
reached with city officials to hire blacks as sanitation
workers and firemen.

In addition, city leaders agreed to

work with the New Orleans Civil Service Commission to assure
that blacks would be hired on the basis of their qualifica
tions.

A month later, the city hired ten blacks as garbage

collectors and confirmed that blacks were being hired under
civil service as firemen.41
During the first half of 1964, a few government con
tract industries attempted to hire blacks, but were unable
to find many who were qualified for available technical
positions.

The Michoud rocket plant hired three blacks as

^ N e w Orleans Times Picayune, July 10, 1963.

41Ibid., Aug. 13, Sept. 10, 1963.
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clerks and one as a documentation specialist, but could not
find other qualified blacks for technical openings.

Among

its 9200 employees, Chrysler Corporation and Boeing Company
employed 434 blacks.

However, only forty of them were in

scientific, technical or engineering jobs, while the rest
were in unskilled or clerical jobs.

The primary reason for

the lack of black applicants was the failure of the educa
tional system to train them despite the willingness of some
businesses to hire

t h e m .

42

In Baton Rouge, the scene of several demonstrations in
the early 1960's because of racial discrimination in hiring
practices, a few stores began hiring blacks as clerks and in
other positions after meetings between local merchants and a
biracial committee.

By mid-1964, blacks already employed

who had undergone special training programs several months
earlier were being upgraded and

p r o m o t e d .

43

The enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 brought the legislative and judicial branches of the
federal government into active protection of the right of
employment without racial discrimination.

Along with the

weight of an energetic administration, an assault by the
combined forces of the federal government on employment
discrimination severely weakened the opposition and

^ New York Times, Apr. 26, 1963.
^ B a t o n Rouge State Times, June 30, 1964.
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established the foundations for equitable employment oppor
tunities for minorities.
Title VII, officially entitled the Equal Opportunity
Employment Act, took effect on July 2, 1965.

Employers,

employment agencies and labor organizations were prohibited
from discriminating in employment or training programs on
the grounds of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.

The heart of the act was the creation of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with the power to
receive individual complaints of discrimination from private
employers, to investigate and file complaints of discrimina
tion on behalf of individuals, and to serve as a concilia
tive body to obtain voluntary compliance with Title VII
guidelines prior to litigation in federal courts. ^
Because the EEOC lacked any mandatory enforcement
power, Title VII was amended in 1972.

The commission

received enforcement powers; was empowered to file suits
after the failure of its efforts at conciliation; and had
its provisions extended to educational institutions, govern
ment agencies, and employers and unions with fifteen or more
employees or members as of March 24, 1973.^5
There was no immediate rush by federal courts or by
individuals in Louisiana to expunge racial prejudice from
the job market in 1964.

Several companies and unions within

^Civil Rights Act of 1964.
45

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
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the state became test cases and were brought under federal
scrutiny for programs that reflected past policies of
employment discrimination.

When it appeared that lengthy

and costly federal intervention and litigation were the
alternatives, most employers terminated overt prejudice in
hiring, promotions, payment and layoffs.
An early promise of improvement in employment practices
in the state occurred when the New Orleans City Council
adopted an ordinance terminating discriminatory employment
practices in 1966.

Because of continued pressure from black

organizations, the city officially declared that all agen
cies, boards and departments of the city would fairly con
sider all qualified applicants for employment regardless of
race, religion or nationality.^
Beginning in 1967, federal courts began implementing
affirmative action plans in areas where past discrimination
had produced a lingering effect on employment.

The question

of inverse discrimination quickly arose to challenge affir
mative action programs, while the courts became preoccupied
with company and union policies that had detrimental effects
on victims of past discrimination in employment.
The first major employment case decided in federal
courts in Louisiana after Title VII took effect, was a suit
against Local 53, International Association of Heat and
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers.

After the failure of

469 RRLR 1578 (1966).
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the EEOC to conciliate, two suits were filed in federal
court accusing the local of refusing to consider blacks for
union membership or to refer blacks for employment.

Combin

ing the two cases in 1967, the court ordered the union to
accept the four black plaintiffs for membership and to elim
inate three discriminatory prerequisites for union member
ship:

kinship to a current member, sponsorship and approval

of a member by a majority of the union, and work experience
prior to the date of the court injunct ion.47
In 1968, Congress and the Supreme Court strengthened
federal efforts to assure equal employment with the enact
ment of Title 1 of a new Civil Rights Act, and in the case
of Jones v. Mayer.

Title I prohibited anyone from injuring,

intimidating or interfering on the grounds of race, color,
religion or national origin with the right of a person seek
ing or holding employment in either private or public sec
tors. 4®

Although the Jones decision dealt primarily with

housing discrimination, the Supreme Court indicated that the
right to contract for employment was protected by 42 U.S.C.,
Section 1981, which subjected violators to the same laws and
penalties as persons who practiced housing discrimination.
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared
that Section 1981 created a "cause of action" for racially

^Vogler v. McCarty, United States v. Local 53,
International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and
Asbestos Workers, 12 RRLR 2062 (1967).
4818 USCA Sec. 245, Civil Rights Act of 1968.
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discriminatory acts by private employers, and proposed that
federal district courts encourage the use of EEOC concilia
tion pending action under Section 1981.^9
Beginning in 1968, litigation in federal courts on
employment suits increased dramatically.

Crown-Zellerbach

in Bogalusa was in the forefront of civil actions for past
and present policies of discrimination by the company and
its unions, and became a test case for the judiciary.
than likely, the company's problems

More

convinced other busi-

»

nesses operating in Louisiana to comply with federal employ
ment laws or face similar litigation.
Crown-Zellerbach, as well as many other companies in
Louisiana, had existing promotion and layoff policies based
on the time served in a particular job or department rather
than in the company as a whole.

The Bogalusa plant had two

separate lines of progression for whites and blacks prior to
1965.

White lines were for more desirable and higher paying

jobs, while black lines were for "left-over," menial and
poorly paying positions.

In 1965, Crown-Zellerbach elimi

nated the black progression list and placed blacks who had
worked at the mill prior to 1965 at the bottom of the white
progression list, along with new employees.

When EEOC

efforts to conciliate failed, the Justice Department brought

^Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 754; Jones v.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 4^9 (1968); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine
Contracting Company, 437 F.2d 1011 (5th. Cir. 1971).
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suit against the company and Local 189» United Papermakers
and Paperworkers.

In 1968, federal courts enjoined the

defendants from discriminating against blacks; required them
to abolish any seniority system that discriminated against
blacks hired before 1966 in promotions, demotions, or selec
tions for training; and ordered them to replace the "job
seniority" system with a "mill seniority" system.

The "job

seniority" system subjected blacks to past discrimination
because the existing seniority, transfer and promotion
policies were rooted in a system that had denied blacks
access to lucrative and prestigious positions formerly
reserved for whites.

The courts held that Crown-Zellerbach

and its white union had violated Title VII by insisting on
policies that had the effect of "carrying forward exclusion
of a racially-determined class."50
Several weeks later, another suit was settled against
Crown-Zellerbach.

Federal courts ordered the company to

abandon its practice of awarding promotions on the basis of
job seniority because it perpetuated the effects of past
discrimination.

Furthermore, the court ordered that black

union members be admitted to the white local and that the
separate black local be dissolved,51

“^United States v. Local 189. United Papermakers and
Paperworkers, and Crown-Zellerbach Corporation, 1 RRLS 38,
219 (1968, 1969).
SI
Hicks v. Crown-Zellerbach Company, 310 F.Supp. 536
(1970).
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In 1970, Crown-Zellerbach's testing procedures for
employment, promotions and transfer became the target of
another employment discrimination suit.

Federal courts

determined that the test results led to a large number of
job openings for whites but excluded nearly all blacks, and
that the tests were not related to the lower and middle
level jobs for which they were being used.

The courts over

ruled the use of the tests, the continued existence of dual
lines of progression, and requirements that blacks take a
pay reduction in order to enter formerly white lines of pro
gression.

To overcome the effects of past discrimination

practices, the court ordered the establishment of an affir
mative action plan in which blacks would be offered vacan
cies in formerly white-only jobs on a seniority basis and in
preference to other employees.52

in the following year, the

Supreme Court upheld the section of Title VII that overruled
discriminatory testing for employment purposes, because
Congress had decided that tests "must measure the person for
the job, not the person in the abstract."53
Following the affirmative action decree, white workers
appealed the decision on the grounds that the federal dis
trict court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Title VII to
provide a remedy that would prevent discrimination in

F2

Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 319 F.Supp.
314 (E.D. La. 1970), 321 F.Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971).
“^Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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employment.

However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed the lower court’s actions in altering the rights of
white employees in order to most effectively protect and
redress the rights of black employees who had been victims
of past discrimination.54
Other suits followed in the early 1970's to bring
employers in Louisiana into compliance with federal laws
barring racial discrimination in employment.

However, by

1972, there was a noticeable change in the efforts of the
executive and judicial branches to vigorously prosecute
discrimination cases.

Beginning in 1972, the Justice

Department and the federal courts adopted a more conserva
tive approach toward discrimination suits.

By then, most of

the overt means of racial prejudice had been eliminated
through court action, threat of litigation or voluntary com
pliance with federal law.

Because the type of bias that

still existed in the business community was more difficult
to prove, the burden of proof shifted to the government and
its agencies, placing them under closer scrutiny by the
courts and narrowing the scope of Title VII and the EEOC.
By 1974, it appeared that the federal courts in
Louisiana had completely reversed direction.

In 1972, the

federal district court in New Orleans declared that the
maintenance of separate local unions for white and black

•^Vogler v. McCarty, United States v. Local 53, 3 RRLS
189 (1971).
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employees violated Title VII, but that the EEOC lacked the
power of

a d j u d i c a t i o n .

55

Then, federal courts held that a

litigant could only file a suit under Title VII if he was a
victim of unfair practices or discrimination based on
r a c e . 5 5

i n

a case against New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,

the courts held that the power of the EEOC to investigate
evidence involving an alleged charge of discrimination did
not give it the right to search through an employer's
records on a "fishing expedition" in hopes of discovering
violations of the law.

The charge of employment discrimin

ation did not require detailed evidence of discriminatory
behavior, but had to be based on facts.

The EEOC lacked

power to allow it to explore "potential" discrimination
regardless of its connection with the original

c h a r g e s .

57

Although racial discrimination remained a major problem
in employment in Louisiana in the 1970's, the federal courts
had brought about an end to overt acts of prejudice.

With

orders to unions to abolish separate black unions and to
admit blacks into formerly white-only unions, some progress
was made.

The courts also ordered the abolition of any

employment program sanctioned by unions or by businesses
that projected past policies of discrimination into present

55
Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Association, 341
F.Supp. (E.D. La. 1972).
"^Marshall v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union 60,
343 F.Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972).
*57
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown, 369
F.Supp. 702 (E.D. La. 1974).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

386

or future employment.

In addition, federal courts and the

Justice Department kept vigilance over company and union
regulations for possible bias, and over such procedures as
employee testing, hiring practices and layoff policies.

As

an inducement to gain voluntary compliance, the courts
expressed their willingness to grant back pay and attorney's
fees to successful litigants, and to order affirmative
action plans when they were necessary to rectify past prac
tices of discrimination.
Housing
Residential segregation was not a phenomenon peculiar
to the South, but was a national problem of major concern
throughout America.

Prior to 1900, it was primarily a de

facto situation without the sanction of law.

Thereafter,

housing patterns were codified in the South, as well as in
other parts of the nation.

The difficulty in dismantling

this type of segregation lay in the fact that culture and
economics were primary factors that dictated where individ
uals resided.
Prior to I960, the federal courts were largely inactive
in housing unless evidence of state action existed to sanc
tion, enforce or encourage racial discrimination.

With the

enactment of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, housing became one of the few
areas where Congress took an active stand against private
discrimination in advance of judicial and executive action.
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Federal courts followed the legislative lead with a deter
mined stand against private discrimination in housing in
Jones v. Mayer in 1968.

Thereafter, the entire national

housing industry came under tighter scrutiny by the federal
courts and the Justice Department for indications of private
acts of racial discrimination.
In the area of housing discrimination, Louisiana gener
ally followed the lead of other states and of the federal
government.

Economics and personal preferences played pri

mary roles in segregated residential patterns in the state.
Overt de jure segregation was not as influential in the
development of segregated residential areas as custom or de
facto patterns.

Nearly every Louisiana municipality had its

enclaves of black residents in little more than overcrowded
shantytowns, surrounded by a less dense pattern of white
dwellings.

After 1970, residential patterns in Louisiana

changed very little.

Although there were no legal con

straints on residential location, the continued presence of
economic facts of life and personal preference dictated an
individual's choice of area for settlement.

By 1974, few

blacks lived outside of nearly all-black concentrations,
while white flight decimated central parts of cities,
leaving them to poorer elements of society.

Meanwhile,

whites followed the national trend and resettled in the
"lily-white" suburbs.
Before the Civil War, whites and blacks lived in close
proximity to one another primarily because of the nature of
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slavery.

New Orleans, with its large free black population,

had black and white residences within close range throughout
the city.

Even there, though, a de facto pattern of

residential segregation existed through economic, cultural
and personal preference.

After the Civil War, blacks

streamed into the cities, primarily as a symbolic act of
rejection of plantation life and what it represented for
them.
A study that was conducted on Baton Rouge using the
censuses of 1870 and 1880, suggests that residential segre
gation developed during the 1870's.

Physical contact

between whites and blacks in the town decreased as the num
ber of black domestic servants living in white households
declined sharply.

At the same time, predominantly white and

black residential concentrations were developing.

However,

de facto segregation in housing did not become a statewide
phenomenon until much later.58
As early as 1866, the federal government recognized the
importance of freedom of residence.

Part of the Civil

Rights Act of that year granted all citizens the right to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real prop
erty, and to have full and equal benefits of all of the laws
for the security of persons and property as enjoyed by
whites.

These housing provisions were codified later as

■^Seip, "Municipal Politics," 263-64.
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42 U.S.C., Sections 1981 and 1982 and are still in opera
tion. 59
Unfortunately, the initial enthusiasm and determina
tion of Congress to protect the rights of the freedmen did
not endure, and the federal courts failed to share the same
convictions about safeguarding the personal rights of
blacks.

The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 undid much of the

civil rights legislation of Congress during Reconstruction,
and it was not long before this case was being used to jus
tify discriminatory devices such as residential zoning
ordinances to keep the races apart.

When federal courts

invalidated this artifice in 1917, buyers and sellers across
America resorted to the use of "racially restrictive housing
covenants," which prohibited selling or leasing of property
to blacks or "Mongolians" in perpetuity, and insured the
continuation of all-white neighborhoods.

In 1926, the

Supreme Court unanimously upheld restrictive covenants,
declaring that the Fifth Amendment placed limitations only
on the government, not on the action of individuals."^0
Prior to 1930, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted
a series of laws to restrict housing and enforce segregation
in order to codify a de facto situation.

In 1912, the

legislature gave municipalities the power to deny building
permits to anyone seeking to build a home in an area

59Civil Rights Act of 1866; 42 USCA, Sec. 1981, 1982.
^Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323.
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principally inhabited by members of a different race.

This

law was strengthened by a new statute in 1921 that provided
penalties for housing blacks and whites in the same dwell
ing, except for black employees such as maids.

The act

prohibited any person or corporation from renting any part
of an apartment house or tenement house already inhabited by
persons of one race to those of another.

In 1924, the leg

islature reserved to the state the power it had entrusted to
municipalities in its 1912 act, and defined a black or white
"community" as an area in which all residences for three
hundred feet on either side of the property in question
belonged to either blacks or whites.

Of course, whites in

the state found additional ways, legal or otherwise, to keep
blacks out of their neighborhoods.
During the late 1940's, a few glimmers of change began
to appear in the nation's housing practices.

The Federal

Housing Administration (FHA) responded to pressure from the
NAACP by eliminating a recommendation from its manual for
the use of restrictive covenants.

Then, President Harry

Truman's Committee on Civil Rights recommended that states
outlaw restrictive covenants, that Congress outlaw them in
the District of Columbia, and that the federal courts refuse
to enforce them.

However, it was still too early for most

of the committee's recommendations to receive serious

^*Acts of Louisiana, 1912, Regular Session, no. 117,
1921, Extraordinary Session, no. 106, 1924, Regular Session,

no.' us.

—

------

------ ----------
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consideration.

As late as 1948, the Supreme Court ruled

that federal lav did not preclude "private restrictive
agreements so long as the purposes of those agreements are
achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to the
terms."

Once again, the court had indirectly upheld the

validity of restrictive covenants by deciding that govern
ment sanction was illegal, but that private acts of dis
crimination were not.®2
In 1947, Mayor DeLesseps S. Morrison began a New
Orleans program that included slum clearance and construc
tion of public housing for blacks.

His biographer, Edvard

F. Haas, reports that he made limited progress because of
the tremendous increase in demand for new dwellings, and
because of fierce opposition by the building industry and
white property owners who abhorred the idea of locating
black housing projects near them.

These problems seriously

undermined the progress of the mayor, who was a political
realist and who strictly operated the city's housing pro
grams on a segregated basis.
During the 1950's, housing was relegated to a minor
position as the nation became preoccupied with de jure
segregation in education, voting and transportation.

Only

the federal courts took any action in 1953, extending the
ban on judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants to

62

Wasby, Desegregation from Brown, 37.
6?
Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison, 68-72.
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suits for damages against a co-covenantor who broke such an
a g r e e m e n t .

^4

In the meantime, minorities were excluded or

confined by overt discriminatory housing practices, by the
lack of sufficient housing, and through laws and government
policies that allowed local governments to exercise arbi
trary control over public housing within their jurisdiction,
often in a racially discriminatory manner.
During the mid-1950's, a $15,000,000 subdivision was
built around Pontchartrain Park in the Gentilly section of
New Orleans.

A thousand homes were constructed and sold for

$9800 to $25,000 each to minorities in the middle and higher
income brackets, the first homes being ready in 1955.

In

the same year, Bunche Village opened as a 7000 unit lowincome housing project near New
The

1 9 6 0 ' s

O r l e a n s .

^5

produced a breakthrough in the termination

of segregated housing through overt private actions.

A

combined assault by Congress with the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968, along with the Supreme Court decision in
Jones v. Mayer in 1968, cracked the foundations of private
discrimination in housing.

The legal effort to obtain

equality for minorities during the 1960's was directed
toward the goals of protection against discrimination,

^Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
ge
New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 23, 1954, Apr. 4,
June 27, 1955.
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creation of additional low-income housing and placement of
public housing outside of minority and poverty centers.
In 1962, the Kennedy Administration began a shift in
the course of executive policy on federal housing by mandat
ing equal opportunity and prohibiting discrimination in
federally-financed housing.

However, because it exempted

housing financed by FHA or VA loans prior to 1962 and hous
ing financed through private banks or savings and loan
associations, only about 18 percent of new construction was
affected.^®
At this time, the Housing Authority of New Orleans
(HANO) operated thirteen white and black projects in the
city on a segregated basis, providing housing for 10,275
low-income families (15,604 adults and 27,696 children).
HANO operated under congressional act, state law and city
ordinances.

Although receiving federal subsidies, actual

operation of the projects was left up to HANO, which was
subject to local authorities.

In 1961, HANO received rent

revenues of $3,890,615 from all thirteen projects and fed
eral subsidies of $2,700,000.
$62.75 per month.

Rent varied from $16.75 to

Occupants had to keep apartments clean,

be law-abiding and get along well with their neighbors.
The main objective of HANO under Public Housing Authority
guidelines was "to provide decent, safe and sanitary

^Executive Order No. 11063.
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dwellings and to lessen public expense by lowering the
incidence of crime and disease attributed to slums.
Lake Charles had the second largest number of low-rent
public housing units in the state.

Begun in 1942, the

city's housing program now had over six hundred units, with
plans to build additional ones.
the projects was $32.00.

Average cost of housing in

However, organized opposition to

the building of new units came from realtors and home
builders who filed suits to halt expansion of the public
housing program.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first
major attempt by Congress in the twentieth century to pro
tect the right to nondiscriminatory housing.

It prohibited

discrimination in programs or activities receiving federal
financial assistance, and directed all federal departments
and agencies to use federal funds in a nondiscriminatory
way.

Any activity or program being conducted in violation

of federal law would have its funds

t e r m i n a t e d .

®9

As a direct result of Title VI, New Orleans and Baton
Rouge housing authorities decided in 1965 to operate all of
their housing units on a nondiscriminatory basis.

In March,

HANO announced that it had ended its segregated policy and
would admit all qualified applicants to any housing project

67

Baton Rouge State Times, Jan. 16, 1962.

68Ibid., Mar. 13, 1962.
69Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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regardless of race, creed or color.

At the time, nine

thousand blacks occupied nine housing projects and three
thousand whites occupied five all-white projects in New
Orleans.

In May, the East Baton Rouge Parish Public Housing

Authority agreed to operate its one hundred seventy existing
units and all future units on a nondiscriminatory basis in
order to clear the way to receive $2,800,000 in federal
funds for the construction of two hundred new units.

Of the

existing units, one hundred twenty were for blacks and
seventy were for whites.70
The Department of Housing and Urban Development, in
1967, required a balance of sites for public housing within
and outside of ghetto areas, and required federally-funded
housing authorities to assign tenants on a "first-come,
first-served" plan that would prevent racial segregation in
projects.71

In the next year, Congress enacted a new Civil

Rights Act that included a fair or open housing section, and
the Housing and Urban Development Act.
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was the
first federal legislation specifically targeted against
housing discrimination and expanded federal coverage of the
housing market from 18 percent in 1962 to 80 percent when

^®New Orleans Times Picayune, Apr. 2, 1965; Baton Rouge
State Times, May 14” June 4, 1965.
71
Fair Housing and Exclusionary Land Use (Washington:
Urban Land Institute, 1974) 8u
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the law became fully effective on January 1, 1970.

The law

prohibited discrimination by race, color, religion or
national origin in the sale, rental or advertisement of the
sale or rental of a dwelling; prohibited lending institu
tions from discriminating in loans; forbade "blockbusting;"
and prohibited discrimination by real estate brokers' organ
izations.

Exempted from coverage were single-family houses

sold or rented without the services of a real estate agent
and which did not use discriminatory advertising.

Title IX

of the 1968 act made it a criminal offense to threaten or to
use force to willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with
anyone who was complying with or exercising rights under
Title

V I I I . 72

The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 expanded
the supply of lower-income federal housing by providing for
two massive building programs:

one for rental housing and

one for opportunities for private homeownership.

Under the

act, Congress intended to establish twenty-six million hous
ing units over the next ten years, six million of which
would be designated for low-income

f a m i l i e s .

73

of course,

most cities in the nation would be eager to obtain lucrative
contracts to provide housing for the urban poor, and would
have to submit to new federal regulations to operate them on
a nondiscriminatory basis.

^Civil Rights Act of 1968.
Fair Housing, 9.
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The Supreme Court began to change its view of housing
discrimination in the private sector in 1967* when it
affirmed a California State Supreme Court decision that had
voided a constitutional amendment prohibiting the state from
interfering in the sale or rental of property in California.
The federal high court ruled that such an action violated
the Fourteenth Amendment by expressly authorizing and making
constitutional the right to discriminate on racial grounds,
and involving the state in a discriminatory action.
The Jones v. Mayer decision of 1968 provided the
capstone of efforts by the federal government to bring an
end to de jure and overt private acts of discrimination in
housing.

The Supreme Court voided government enforcement of

restrictive covenants that were the result of purely private
racial discrimination unsupported by legal action.

Private

owners as well as public officials were now prohibited from
discriminating in the buying and renting of both public and
private property because of race and color.75
In follow-up cases, the Supreme Court broadened the
Jones decision to allow recovery of damages in 1969.

Thus,

discrimination was not only illegal but could be fairly
costly to practice.

In addition, the Department of Housing

and Urban Development was required to consider the impact of
site selections for housing projects on racial integration.

ZfReitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Jones v. Mayer (1968).
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In 1971, federal courts held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause was violated when a

building permit

was denied by county officials for housing in which lowincome black families would live.

Then, in 1973, the

Supreme Court broadened the scope of Title VIII of the 1968
Civil Rights Act by declaring that its purpose was "to
replace the ghettos by truly integrated and balanced living
quarters."

Thus, the court came to view the role of the

federal government in guaranteeing equal housing to extend
beyond mere nondiscrimination to actual integration.
After 1968, despite the combined efforts of the three
branches of the federal government to equalize housing,
other barriers still existed to deny blacks access to hous
ing outside of ghetto areas.

Local government bodies often

enacted exclusive land use ordinances, established zones
which excluded multi-family housing, adopted lot size and
square footage regulations that excluded all but expensive
housing, denied building permits with excuses such as inade
quate water or sewer facilities, prohibited construction of
low-income housing without community voter approval, and

76Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969);
Shannon v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 305
F.Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969), 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970);
Crow v. Brown, 332 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), 457 F.2d 788
(5th Cir. 1972); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1973); Otero v. New York City Housing
Authority, 344 F.Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), 354 F.Supp. 941
(S.D. N.Y. 1973).
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selected sites and assigned tenants to projects in such a
way as to insure racial segregation. 77
In Louisiana, similar ploys were used to restrict the
location of public housing.

As in most parts of the nation,

de jure segregation in housing was a dead issue by 1968, and
de facto segregation had become a major problem.

Although

the state did not repeal its statute prohibiting renting an
apartment or room to blacks in buildings occupied by whites
until 1972, it was a moot question by

t h e n .

78

With the

exception of a few scattered cases heard in federal court,
housing in Louisiana proceeded much as it did elsewhere.

By

1968, the resistance of most Louisianians had been broken
irrevocably by other desegregation battles, chiefly by those
in education.

As was the norm, it was easier to move from

the central city to the "lily-white" suburbs as blacks grav
itated to the central city.

In the suburbs, most white

children were able to attend predominantly white neighbor
hood schools that were the product of cultural and economic
forces rather than by decree.

This type of segregation was

more difficult to handle and baffled the federal courts
after court-ordered busing had provoked a national outcry.
In the three areas of family relations, employment and
housing, both de jure and de facto segregation played a

^ Fair Housing, 10.
78
Acts of Louisiana, 1972, Regular Session, no. 255.
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significant role.

Culture, heritage and personal prefer

ences weighed heavily on all three, making desegregation
particularly limited.

It was relatively easy to void laws

that restricted equal protection and equal access of blacks,
but it was more difficult to legislate or pronounce upon
ingrained prejudices in the matter of marriage, adoption,
employment or housing patterns.

In these areas, the federal

government could only provide legal protection for blacks
who challenged the status quo, but could do little to
overcome cultural and economic obstacles met by non-whites
in seeking employment.

Even with affirmative action pro

grams in place, many blacks were unable to qualify for
higher paying jobs because of a lack of the skills and
training necessary for available jobs.
During the 1970's, blacks were often shut out of
virtually all-white neighborhoods because of economics and
encountered white flight to the suburbs when they moved into
better residential areas.

Once abandoned by whites, the

inner cities faced erosion of the tax base, removal of white
childen from city public schools, and a steady deterioration
of inner city neighborhoods.

Attempts to improve housing

for low-income groups were besieged by litigation, inflated
land prices, and interminable delays and excuses by local
officials.

Because of expediency, lower site costs and

personal preference among many blacks to live near urban
centers and other blacks, housing projects were often con
structed near heavily black concentrations.

Blacks who
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remained dependent on public housing saw little hope of
improving their condition, but those who were able to
receive training and education, were often able to improve
their economic situation and may eventually be able to
overcome present housing problems through private home
ownership in the future.
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Chapter X
SUMMARY
The State of Louisiana was vastly different in 1974
from what it had been in 1954.

In two decades, it had

progressed from a closed, white-dominated society to an
open, multi-racial society with legal safeguards in place to
assure equal protection and equal opportunity for all
regardless of race or color.

Although private acts of

discrimination continued, de jure or government-sanctioned
segregation had been removed from all areas of social
contact in the state.

However, the weightier problem of

custom, or de facto segregation, remained to be resolved.
In 1954, Louisiana had a stratified caste system with
blacks on the bottom.

Under the principle of "separate but

equal," black citizens were subjected to continued humilia
tion, ostracism and rejection in every instance where they
might come into social contact with the white majority.
Instead of abiding by the Plessy doctrine, white leaders
chose to exclude blacks from most of the privileges enjoyed
by white Louisianians.

As a result of meager state appro

priations, the few existing public facilities prior to 1930
were constructed only for whites, while blacks were gener
ally excluded from all services.

Later, when funds became

402
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available for the construction of separate facilities for
blacks, they were often inadequate.
Black Louisianians were unable to protest their illtreatment at the hands of state and local officials because
of their lack of political and economic power.

Following

the disfranchisement movement, few blacks were able to vote
after 1900.

Prior to 1950, the only way blacks could effec

tively protest their conditions and improve their lives was
to leave the state and to try their luck outside the South.
Many blacks who remained in Louisiana were oppressed and
broken in spirit, benignly submitting to their outcaste
status.

With few defenders within or outside of the South

before 1954, they had little hope for improving their lives
or those of their children.
In general, blacks were discriminated against in every
aspect of life before 1954.

They were unable to vote, serve

on juries, buy homes in decent neighborhoods, use publiclyowned facilities, or frequent hotels, restaurants and other
public accommodations.

Separate public parks, playgrounds,

swimming pools, elementary and secondary schools, colleges,
waiting areas and correctional institutions were often pro
vided by the 1950's in hopes of appeasing blacks so that
they would not seek to desegregate white facilities.

Blacks

were permitted the use of courtrooms and transit facilities
along with whites, but on a separate seating basis.
White leaders used the state's police powers to subdue
blacks and to instill a humble and demeaning attitude within
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them.

After decades of being denied the vote, few blacks

bothered attempting to register following the removal of
some franchise restrictions after 1930.

Consequently, few

were able to qualify for jury duty, which was drawn from the
list of registered voters.

Blacks were also subjugated

through economic means and by the inadequate educational
system provided for them.

While a network of colleges,

vocational and trade schools was provided for whites across
the state, blacks were forced to attend a few meagerly
funded, overcrowded and far-flung institutions, to leave the
state for training or to abandon hope for additional educa
tion and training.

Even if businesses in Louisiana wished

to hire blacks, few were able to qualify for available jobs
because of insufficient education and training.

Thus, only

menial and low-paying jobs were left for blacks to perform,
notwithstanding the refusal of many employers to hire them
even if they had training and education.

Therefore, eco

nomic circumstances required blacks to live in squalor in
shantytowns and ghettos or to seek public housing.
The Brown decision of 1954 had a profound impact upon
the system of segregation in Louisiana, although it took
more than a decade to break the color barrier.

The court

ruling galvanized white racists into action in the mid1950's because of the implications of this judgment for the
future of the closed, white society of the South.

A program

of massive resistance was adopted as the answer to federal
intrusion into Southern race relations.

By the late 1950's,
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the racists had mobilized, seized control of the consciences
and emotions of the white populace, and persuaded the state
legislature to erect a bulwark of segregation laws to
embroil the federal courts in litigation for decades.

The

state assumed the burden of protecting segregation by
enacting legislation to prevent cracks in the white line,
and by interposing the state's authority and immunity from
suits between the federal courts and state agencies.
During the late 1950's, the civil rights movement grew
slowly but progressively in Louisiana.

Beginning in New

Orleans and Baton Rouge, blacks organized under the urging
of the NAACP to redress past grievances.

By the end of the

decade, several former white colleges had been integrated,
the state had resorted to leasing its publicly-owned facili
ties, systematic exclusion of blacks from juries was cur
tailed and the state's segregated transit law was voided.
In early I960, the first nonviolent sit-ins began in
Baton Rouge and New Orleans under the auspices of CORE to
bring state and national attention to racial discrimination
being practiced by local businesses.

Although only a few

college students took part in them, hundreds of thousands of
black Louisianians watched silently but hopefully, too timid
to take action themselves because of cultural training and
possible economic consequences.

In the same year, the first

major confrontation occurred over desegregation with the
integration of New Orleans public schools.

From November

until February of 1961, national attention was focused on
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the state as white supremacists in the state legislature
endeavored to prevent the desegregation of any public school
system.

The state's leaders devoted themselves to every

conceivable effort to use legislation and litigation to
thwart the intentions of the federal.government but, in the
end, capitulated to federal court orders.
As 1964 approached, the civil rights movement accel
erated nationally.

Federal courts and the Justice

Department worked in concert to bring down segregation in
transit, public facilities, and colleges and universities
through threats of prosecution and litigation.

Congress

capped federal efforts with the enactment of the sweeping
Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Touching upon every aspect of de

jure segregation— voting rights, public accommodations,
public facilities, public education and employment— the law
provided a crushing blow to Southern whites that the current
desegregation effort could be weathered as it had during
Reconstruction.

However, federal forces, undaunted by

Southern opposition, forged ahead and swept away futile
opposition to constitutional requirements of equal protec
tion of the laws.
Between 1963 and 1965, all public colleges and univer
sities and vocational and technical schools in Louisiana
were desegregated, segregated practices in courtrooms were
ended, medical facilities began operation free of racial
discrimination, public accommodations were desegregated, and
most of the public school systems in the state underwent
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limited integration in the form of freedom of choice.

The

impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was phenomenal, par
ticularly Title VI, which prohibited the discriminatory use
of federal funds.

It was now virtually impossible to escape

the watchful eyes of federal courts and of the Departments
of Justice and HEW if racial discrimination was being prac
ticed in federally funded programs.

Following the enactment

of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks began to register
in record numbers and to resume their places within the
political process.
From 1965 to 1969, most of the remaining institutions
still under segregated operation were integrated.
desegregation battle occurred over public schools.

The major
Local

school boards were denied the authority to continue opera
tion under a dual system of white and black schools with
provisions for transfers under a freedom of choice basis.
Federal courts left no doubt of their determination to
establish unitary systems throughout Louisiana, voiding
freedom of choice in 1968 as a viable alternative.

Federal

efforts also began the desegregation of all correctional
facilities for adults and juveniles, prohibited racial
discrimination in the private housing industry, provided
safeguards for equal employment opportunities and voided
miscegenation statutes.
As the 1970's approached, a more conservative mood
swept over the nation.

The militant bent of the civil

rights movement and the court ordered busing issue helped to
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harden national public opinion, as federal courts entered a
new phase in the elimination of discrimination.

Focus was

shifted from de jure segregation in the South to de facto
discrimination that was widespread across America.

All

branches of the federal government adopted a slower approach
toward civil rights, alert to discriminatory laws but less
concerned with the effects of purely customary practices of
discrimination.
Within Louisiana, unitary public school systems were
instituted between 1969 and 1971 through federal court
orders.

Thereafter, desegregated school systems were

closely monitored to prevent resegregation and to eliminate
the effects of past racial segregation.

A more acute prob

lem existed in the state's system of higher education, where
a dual system continued to function.

Despite various

attempts by federal and state authorities, this enigma has
yet to be resolved.
Another problem encountered in Louisiana was white
flight from inner cities to the suburbs.

In the case of

large cities, this often meant taking up residence in
another parish and thus in a different school district.
Inner city schools became predominantly black, while schools
in outlying areas reflected the community's black-white
ratio and became virtually all-white.

Compounding the

problem was the tendency of white parents in New Orleans and
Baton Rouge to enroll their children in available private
and parochial schools that were primarily white also.
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Attendant upon these problems was continued discrimina
tion in employment and housing.

Admittedly, employment

conditions and opportunities for blacks improved remarkably
during the 1970's.

However, when many blacks were finally

able to acquire the education and training necessary for
more advanced and better paying positions, they often found
that the types of jobs for which they had prepared were
still being denied to them by covert racial prejudice or
were nonexistent in Louisiana.

Those who did succeed were

no longer content to remain confined to poor black neighbor
hoods and sought housing in lower middle class sections.
Unfortunately, they quickly discovered that racial discrim
ination was still rampant, and means were found to deny
their relocation despite federal protections.

However, with

the dismantling of the de jure system of segregation, the
passing of time and the weathering of de facto prejudices,
the promise for a brighter future was held out to the next
black generation, if not immediately for their parents.
With the return of blacks to the polls and to appoint
ive and elective public offices in the early 1970's, black
citizens were able to assume an active role in safeguarding
their rights in the future.

As black electoral strength in

cities increased in proportion to their numbers, blacks
acquired municipal offices and were sent to the state legis
lature, where they took steps to insure that segregation by
law would never again raise its head.

In 1971, Edwin

Edwards actively solicited and received a majority of black

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

410

votes for governor.

Taking office in March of 1972, his

administration supported the repeal of existing segregation
statutes, and succeeded in writing a new state constitution
in 1973 that was free of discrimination and included guar
antees of equality and equal protection for all citizens of
the state.
Although many problems remained to be resolved and old
prejudices still existed, the "second Reconstruction" became
a permanent feature in the State of Louisiana.

The fabric

of society had been altered to reflect the changes wrought
by the federal government, and a new attitude of tolerance,
harmony and cooperation took root.

A minority of white

racists was no longer able to overtly discriminate against
blacks by law, or to succeed in persuading state authorities
to support private or public acts of discrimination.

Old

cultural prejudices were at least tempered to the point of
allowing blacks the opportunity to participate actively in
state programs and activities on an equal basis with whites.
They were now free to vote, hold public office, send their
children to the closest available public schools, seek equal
opportunities in employment and housing, serve on juries,
and use public and private facilities and accommodations on
a nondiscriminatory basis.

De jure segregation was dead and

blacks had the means to assure that its demise was perma
nent.

With its end, there was hope that the thornier issue

of de facto segregation could be eradicated one day.
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